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The security risks of cloud computing and ambiguity of security mechanisms implemented on an on-
demand cloud service such as Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), continues to raise concerns by cloud 
consumers. These concerns continue to hinder the adoption of the potentials offered by provisioning 
of computer resources of this scale. It also indicates a lot needs to be done to improve security 
controls implemented on cloud computing services as a whole. 
There is the need to understand and evaluate security mechanisms and controls implemented to 
preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data stored, processed and accessed in the 
cloud. Also there is the need to ensure these mechanisms meet security standards and requirements 
to mitigate any security risks. Although most organisations and cloud service providers (CSPs) have 
various information security management systems they used to evaluate their computer security and 
CSPs try to obtain security certifications based on industry standards, cloud customers are however 
not sure of the security mechanisms implemented on cloud services and how these mechanism are 
integrated to provide adequate security for their data and applications developed and deployed in 
the cloud.  
This research study highlights the use of a systematic and comprehensive approach developed by 
the researcher to understand in detail, the security architecture of PaaS clouds. This approach 
presents the development of a security framework which is used as a tool in an attempt to identify 
and evaluate security mechanism implemented on each PaaS component. The primary findings and 
preliminary analysis of the evaluation enabled the researcher determine the security provisions, 
capabilities and limitations of security features implemented on this type of cloud delivery model. 
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Computer security is defined as the protection afforded to an automated information system in order 
to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of 
information system resources [3][4]. Ensuring these objectives are met requires putting in place a 
security mechanism to detect, prevent computer systems from security attacks, or ensure speedy 
recovery in the event of such attacks [3]. 
In traditional information systems, the responsibility of ensuring these objectives are met is managed 
by IT administrators, security experts and users to ensure adequate security mechanisms are 
implemented, configured and deployed. However, in cloud computing, computer security 
responsibilities has shifted towards cloud service providers (CSPs) who offer computer resources as 
a service on a pay as you go basis;  than cloud customers who subscribe to use the service. Therefore 
this leaves customers wondering what are the security mechanisms put in place by CSPs in cloud 
environments and how they can be certain their information resources will be secure if they choose 
to adopt cloud computing. 
The Information Security Media Group [5] in a cloud security survey stated that, “CSPs hold greater 
responsibility for ensuring security of cloud resources followed by the organisation or customer 
adopting the cloud service. These responsibilities they concluded, involve implementing adequate 
security controls such as data encryption techniques, stronger ID/ access management controls and 
auditing of cloud service provisioning; a joint responsibility that should be shared by both 
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stakeholders”. Every cloud service provider has provisioned various security measures depending on 
its cloud offering and architecture [6] and many security guidelines, standards and frameworks have 
been proposed by experts and  researchers in the field towards security management and evaluation 
in the cloud. However, there is no one size fit all framework or security mechanisms able to 
accommodate both the dynamic nature of cloud architectures and shared management 
responsibilities between cloud providers and customers. 
Cloud service providers offer three major service delivery models. Offered by top providers such as 
Salesforce, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems and IBM include Software-as-a-service 
(SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS). Other services such as 
Identity-as-a-Service (IDaaS) and Security-as-a-Service (SECaaS) are considered as additional service 
provisions that are embedded or integrated into the benefits of cloud computing adoption. The 
different models suggests different cloud architectures as well as different security implementations 
used to secure each model. Moreover, not all CSPs publicly share comprehensive information relating 
to their host platforms, security mechanisms to secure the hosts and host operating systems since 
hackers can exploit such information when trying to intrude into the cloud service [7].  However in 
recent years, there has been demand for transparency in the area of security implementations and 
provisions used to secure cloud computing resources and architectures. Security management 
standards such as the ITIL, CSA, NIST and ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002 to mention a few, set up by 
computer societies, are relevant as a set of best practices, guidelines and practices for managing 
security related to cloud computing technology. 
These industry security guidelines, frameworks and standards revolve only around IT governance and 
customer relation management (CRM) established between CSPs and customers which are agreed 
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and documented in service level agreements (SLAs). The SLAs depend on the services rendered and 
service cost. The industry standards do not specify the required security mechanisms that should be 
put in place on service delivery models in the cloud but rather offer recommendations based on 
industry best practices in maintaining information security.  Cloud customers are faced with the 
issues and challenges of selecting cloud services as well as evaluating security implementations on 
clouds based on their own security needs. Hence, there is the need  for an approach to how this can 
be achieved and  ensure security implementations and provisions are fit for purpose to meet not just 
industry guidelines; but customer security needs with respect to specific cloud models and their 
architecture. This will enable cloud customers, a clear understanding to demand adequate security 
as a service (SECaaS) which is offered through security provisions and features implemented in cloud 
models. It also will enable customers make the right choice of CSPs in relation to their security 
demands. 
Services offered by CSPs vary from application development, software to infrastructure through 
cloud models. The security management also varies depending on several factors such as the 
deployment model and service level agreements. This study focuses on PaaS cloud models, as 
existing industry frameworks are focused on cloud computing security in general. On the other hand, 
related studies in this area have focused their attention on comparing security provisions offered by 
CSPs in various PaaS cloud environments with no consideration for methods evaluating how these 
security provisions meet certain security requirements. Moreover, methods of capturing security 
requirements that are specific for cloud service deployment and delivery models  is considered very 




Evaluating security provisions and implementations in any cloud model requires an extensive security 
approach that ensures the identity and resources of entities and the cloud architecture are preserved. 
It also requires the security implementations used to preserve these resources are tested for possible 
vulnerabilities or threats; and meet security requirements and criteria established by the customer’s 
service level objectives. According to CSA [8], “The challenges with PaaS can be similar to SaaS, in 
addition to providing the necessary provisioning capabilities to the developers in the form of APIs. 
Currently, APIs that support identity provisioning on PaaS platforms are lacking”.  Authenticating users 
in PaaS cloud environments guarantees the authorised users’ credentials are valid. An appropriate 
mechanism need to be in place to ensure this is possible and protect users’ credentials from possible 
security attacks at all times and if users have multiple passwords on PaaS accounts, how can they 
keep track of them in a secured manner? 
Managing access control of authorised users by monitoring and auditing source codes used in 
developing web based applications in the cloud is essential in PaaS cloud security. Likewise, keeping 
track of authorised users from deliberately attacking the platform which supports multi-tenants from 
compromising other user’s data in the cloud needs to be prevented or detected.  
This research highlights the security risks of cloud computing and ambiguity of security mechanisms 
implemented on an on-demand cloud service like Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), as it  continues to 
raise concerns by cloud consumers in the adoption of the potentials offered by provisioning of 
computer resources of this scale. Examining on-demand Platform-as-a-Service public cloud 
environments, across various cloud service providers, this research thesis focuses on the security 
controls and mechanisms implemented on each of the PaaS cloud components. The research focuses 
on developing a security framework which consists of industry standard guidelines to evaluate the 
security offerings on PaaS clouds in an attempt to understand how its security controls and 
5 
 
implementations meet the needs of customers in providing confidentiality, integrity and availability 
in the development of web based applications hosted on the cloud. Hence providing an efficient 
security analysis of PaaS cloud models. 
 MOTIVATION 
There is a critical need to systematically and comprehensively evaluate the security mechanisms 
implemented to meet security requirements to ensure computer security is failsafe and provided on 
PaaS cloud environments. For each security requirement there should be an evaluation to determine 
if there is a security solution available in the cloud marketplace or if the requirement should be met 
by building the solution internally [9]. This will enable PaaS cloud customers to have a deeper 
understanding of the cloud architecture in order to demand better quality of service from CSPs in 
terms of security provisions. This need provides a source of motivation for this research by 
developing a framework that can be used to bridge the gap. The research focuses on developing a 
security framework which consists of industry standard requirements and a systematic approach to 
evaluate the security offerings on PaaS clouds.  The research also attempts to understand how these 
PaaS security controls and implementations meet the needs of consumers in providing adequate 
cloud security in the development of web based/ mobile applications deployed and hosted in the 
cloud.  
In alliance with key security considerations for cloud SLAs, as described by the Cloud Standard 
Customer Council [10] in providing an adaptive framework which can be used to conduct security 




 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
1.3.1   AIM 
The primary aim of this research study is to develop a security framework that can be used to assess 
security mechanisms implemented on PaaS cloud environments based on cloud customer security 
requirements. The developed framework when deployed assesses the compliance, capabilities and 
limitations of the security mechanism implemented on the PaaS cloud environment. The framework 
deployment attempts to test the effectiveness of the framework in capturing customer security 
requirements in the evaluation and assessment process. 
To fulfil these aims, the objectives of the research are as follows: 
1.3.2  OBJECTIVES 
Objective (a)  Critical evaluation of PaaS cloud architectures 
Platform-as-a-Service cloud delivery model presents a complex architecture which needs to be 
broken down and understood in order to evaluate security requirements that are expected to be met 
by security methods and controls. The goal of this objective is to critically evaluate various PaaS cloud 
architectures in an attempt to segregate the cloud architecture; understand how components within 
the cloud function, as well as security risks associated with the cloud components. The key objectives 
of conducting an architecture review are to evaluate an architecture's ability to deliver a system that 
fulfils the stakeholders' security requirements and to identify potential risks on each component of 




Objective (b)   Security requirements mapping and classification  
This objective focuses on the gathering of cloud customer’s security requirements with the use of 
industry security domains that govern operational security in cloud computing environments. The 
objective is to categorise customers’ security requirements into domains and classify their security 
demands based on factors and concepts that influence security requirements. 
Objective (c)   Security provision mapping and classification 
This objective requires the evaluation and analysis of security implementations on PaaS Clouds in 
order to determine the security provisions, capabilities and limitations offered by a CSP on a given 
PaaS cloud model.  The objective is focused on ensuring components within the PaaS are secured 
and what security mechanism offers the security defence.  
Objective (d)  Identify the framework components 
This objective describes the use of industry security practices and guideline as baselines for the 
framework development. It requires the use of security approaches and methodologies to forge the 
framework development process and categorisation of the framework components.  The 
components are then merged to create the framework. 
Objective (e)  Deploy developed framework 
This objective describes the deployment of the security framework to assess and evaluate security 
provisions and implementations in PaaS cloud models. Based of scenarios for gathering customer 
security requirements, the evaluation and assessment results will present findings focused at the 





 ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
The original contribution to knowledge are summarized and highlighted below: 
 A developed reference model that can be adopted to segregate PaaS cloud architectures into 
layers in an attempt to identify its components, how these components integrate to provide 
cloud services and security mechanisms implemented in the cloud. (Chapter 5). 
 A framework that is used for PaaS cloud security analysis and auditing (Chapter 5). 
 A method for gathering and classifying security requirements and provisions which is used 
to identify critical security areas of focus on PaaS cloud architectures (Chapter 6). 
 RESEARCH SCOPE 
The scope of this research is limited to Platform-as-a-Service Cloud environments. The developed 
framework however is considered suitable only for the evaluation and analysis of the PaaS cloud 
environment and the security controls implemented on the cloud service. The research scope is in 
line with the shared security and management responsibilities between Cloud Service Providers 
(CSPs) and their customers. 
Although the security of applications hosted on PaaS clouds are critical to the overall security of the 
system, software applications depend on the resources provided by the system and as such can take 
advantage of the security controls provided by the system to help provide a foundational level of 
protection for the hosted applications [4]. This research study is focused on ensuring cloud customer 
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security requirements are maintained by the environment surrounding application development and 
is not focused on developed application related security. 
 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This section provides a structure for how the thesis chapters will be organised and discuss in summary 
the contents of each chapter. 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research project overview. The chapter introduces security issues and 
concerns in the adoption of cloud computing and progresses to discuss the cloud computing security 
responsibilities shared between CSPs and customers. The scope of the research is highlighted and 
narrowed down to security issues, security controls and implementation in PaaS cloud environments 
due to the broad area of cloud computing and the need for further research to be considered in that 
direction. The aim and objectives of the research are discussed in detail in the chapter as well as the 
original contribution to knowledge and the research scope. 
Chapter 2. Background and Literature Review 
This chapter discusses in detail, cloud computing and its architecture. It discusses in detail, different 
service delivery and deployment models of cloud computing highlighting the benefits, security issues 
and challenges. 
In this chapter, a generic security model for cloud computing is discussed and described in detail, 
the role of IT governance and implementation of adequate security controls to meet security 
requirements in cloud computing. 
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Sections in the chapter are focused on related work on risks of cloud computing and the various 
industry standards and frameworks that provide guidelines to implementing information security 
management in the cloud. 
Chapter 3. Security in Platform-as-a-Service  
This chapter provides a detailed overview of Platform-as-a-Service Cloud. The chapter focuses on 
the security and management of this service delivery model as well as the security issues and 
challenges related to the cloud. Other sections in the chapter discusses PaaS cloud security domains, 
where reference can be made to categorise the security requirements specifications and security 
mechanism provisions offered in Platform-as-a-Service Clouds. 
Chapter 4. Research Approach and Methodology 
This chapter highlights the research strategy, approach and methodology for this research. The 
chapter discusses, the mixed methodology with relevant justification on how the methodology will 
enables resolving the gap analysis whilst achieving the aims and objectives of the research study. 
The chapter focuses on the use of evaluation, simulation and testing methods in the analysis of 
security mechanisms implemented on PaaS clouds. It also presents the secondary research methods 
used and importance to the research data gathering. 
Chapter 5. Framework Development 
This chapter discusses the development a security framework that can be used as a tool to identify, 
evaluate and analyse security mechanisms implemented on PaaS cloud environments. The 
framework comprises of industry standard guidelines and security parameters which serve as 
building blocks for developing the framework which is specific for the security evaluation of PaaS 
Clouds. Using a taxonomy as a criteria for security requirements, the framework presents a detailed 
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approach of evaluating how security provisions on the cloud architecture meet industry security 
requirements. The chapter also presents in detail, the segregation of cloud architectures into layers. 
This segregation highlights one of the original contributions to knowledge. 
 
Chapter 6. Identifying Critical Security Areas of Focus on PaaS Clouds 
This chapter is focused on one of the original contributions to knowledge in this study. It discusses 
in detail, the development of a security mapping matrix using quantitative data gathering techniques 
and security classification to identify critical areas of focus and security areas of interest within the 
PaaS cloud architecture. The chapter describes how the matrix can be put into use to generate 
substantial and significant data necessary to represent customer security requirements analysis and 
output. 
Chapter 7. Framework Deployment and Testing 
In this chapter, the developed framework and processes are put into use to evaluate PaaS cloud 
models in two separate scenarios. The initial phase of the evaluation involves the segregation of the 
PaaS cloud models into layers while the latter phase produces security evaluation and assessment of 
customer requirements and also security features and provisions offered within each security domain 
of the PaaS cloud models. The security assessment also explore vulnerabilities in the security 
implementations within the cloud architectures. 
Chapter 8. Analysis and Findings 
In this chapter, a detailed analysis of results from the evaluation and security assessment are analysed 
in detail in relation to the security vulnerabilities in the PaaS cloud models. A critical analysis of how 
the security implementations meet the customer requirements are also presented based on evidence 
established in the simulation, tests and observations. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses in summary the research study and work done to achieve the aims and 
objectives raised in the study. The chapter also discusses recommendations based on the analysis of 
our tests; how security on PaaS clouds can be improved to mitigate security risks. The chapter 





















 BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the evolution of cloud computing, and its adoption and challenges in recent 
years. It describes relevant studies in the area by providing a detailed discussion of the cloud 
architecture, benefits, challenges, risks and challenges of cloud service delivery and deployment 
models. Furthermore, the chapter discusses security governance in the cloud in an attempt to 
critically analyse industry standard guidelines and frameworks that influence security and 
management of cloud computing in recent years. Each section in this chapter is designed to discuss 
both in-depth background and critical analysis on cloud computing security and management. In 
section 2.2, description of the development of cloud computing and its concept are discussed in 
detail. Section 2.3 describes the cloud architecture and its service delivery and deployment models. 
Section 2.4 discusses security issues and challenges of cloud computing while section 2.5 is dedicated 
to the security standards and guidelines for security and management in information and IT systems. 
In section 2.6, a security model is presented which highlights the present state of generic security 
that governs security in cloud computing. The model shows a combination of security governance 
and the use of technical controls in providing a holistic security management system for cloud 
computing. Section 2.7 describes security and management responsibilities of various stakeholders 
in the management of different cloud computing service delivery models. A summary of the chapter 





 CLOUD COMPUTING OVERVIEW 
Although there is no universal definition for cloud computing, it can be described as the provision 
of computer services to multiple users within a virtual environment on a pay as you go basis. It refers 
to both the application delivered as services over the internet and the hardware and systems software 
in the datacentres that provides those services [13].Cloud computing allows consumers to access 
resources online through the Internet without worrying about the technical/physical management 
and maintenance issues of the original resources [14].Cloud computing is the result of many factors 
such as traditional computer technologies and communication technologies being provided as a 
service to customers within a virtual environment and customers only have to pay for the service 
they need. It developed from technology and business approaches that emerged over the years such 
as utility computing, grid computing, platform virtualisation, and service oriented architectures (SOA) 
including the Web 2.0 and distributed systems [15]. All these pre-existing technologies, contributed 
to the emergence of cloud computing. Hence, Cloud Computing is not a new technology but a new 
way of delivering computing services via the Internet using distributed systems over virtual 
architecture. 
The cloud itself typically includes large numbers of commodity-grade servers, harnessed to deliver 
highly scalable and reliable on-demand services [16]. Based on these services, a commonly agreed 
upon framework for describing cloud computing services goes by the acronym “SPI” [7]. This 
acronym stands for the three major services provided through the cloud: Software-as-a-Service 
(SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). These services are 
commonly described as a service delivery model and each service provided by a Cloud Service 
Provider (CSP), requires a different approach consisting of new advances in processors; virtualisation 
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technology, disk storage, internet connection and inexpensive servers have all combined to make 
the cloud a compelling solution [7]. Methods of deploying services in the cloud can either be private 
(hosted within an organisation), public (provided by the CSP and hosted on the internet) or hybrid 
which combines both private and public cloud architectures. These architectures are referred to as 
cloud deployment models which can be used to provide any of the service delivery models (SPI) 
depending on the customers’ needs. 
The compelling solution offered by cloud computing through virtualisation and delivery of computer 
services, highlights the benefits that can be obtained from its characteristics and also on demand 
self-service. These characteristics include the multi-tenancy; which enables sharing of cost and 
resources by several users’ possible, hence improving system utilisation and efficiency. The scalability 
and elasticity of cloud computing, enables users to increase and decrease their computing resources 
as needed as well as an on demand self- service attribute, which enables cloud users to obtain and 
provide additional cloud services themselves without employing the services of an IT administrator. 
Although cloud computing is still emerging, the SPI (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) models have been largely 
agreed as the major service delivery models of cloud computing. However cloud computing can offer 
more services where anything can be offered as a service (XaaS), from application services to security 
services. The SPI and the cloud deployment models both make up the architecture of cloud 
computing. 
In the next section, the architecture of cloud computing and also the benefits and challenges of cloud 
computing are evaluated and discussed. 
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 CLOUD ARCHITECTURE 
Cloud computing architecture is made up of both the SPI delivery models (see Figure 2.1) and the 
cloud deployment models. Access to services offered by providers in the cloud require a range of 
devices available in recent times resulting in greater use and growth of services within the cloud [7]. 
Users only require a terminal through a browser interface to access services in the cloud. Mobile 
devices such as smartphones and tablets connected to a broadband network such as WiFi or WiMAX 
or standalone PCs connected to a high-speed internet, are able to access cloud resources hosted on 
any of the cloud deployment models without having to install applications or store data on local 
machines. Clouds can store huge amount of data which are hosted in data centres and server farms 
at multiple locations in providing service delivery with different levels of virtualisation technologies. 
2.3.1   CLOUD SERVICE DELIVERY MODELS  
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS): This is the provision of software applications by the cloud service 
provider via the internet. This service delivery requires the ability of the client or consumer to be able 
to access applications hosted by the provider without installing it on a local machine (unlike the 
traditional software model) with the use of a web browser. This stateless application architecture is 
paid for by the client on a pay per use, monthly based subscription or in some cases free. The 
maintenance of the software is managed by the provider and support does not require a license with 





Benefits of SaaS 
SaaS model supports multi-tenancy which allows multiple users access to applications hosted on the 
CSP’s hardware unlike the traditional IT model where individual customers have to install the 
application on a local server and is isolated only to the customer. SaaS also benefits the CSP or 
software vendor by increasing its control over use of the software application by limiting 
unauthorised duplication and distribution of unlicensed copies allowing the vendor greater upgrade 
and patch management control [15]. The SaaS model requires a customer to lease an application or 
software when needed by simply logging in through the web browser without having to install it on 
the local machine at any time. The upgrading and management of the software is relegated to the 
vendor and not the customer.  
SaaS enables the efficient use of software licenses and reduces overhead of license management. 
Customers can employ a single license on multiple computers at different times instead of 
purchasing extra licenses for separate computers that may not be used and thus over-provisioning 
the license [7]. 
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS): In the PaaS delivery model, CSPs provide a platform where 
application and software developers can access an environment to develop computer applications. 
Vendors provide application toolkits also known as Software Development Kit (SDK) for developers 
similar to SaaS model but in this case, the service provided is specifically for developers to develop 
applications using the vendor’s platform to build higher level applications.  Developers are also able 
to deploy their applications to run in the cloud which can be accessed via a URL by the end users. 
Other services provided include database storage and management, programming language on-
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demand scalability and security services. Examples include Microsoft Azure, Google App Engine, and 
Force.com. 
Benefits of PaaS 
PaaS delivery model provides a lower cost entry for developers by supporting the whole software 
development cycle (SDLC) of the Web application, thereby eliminating the need for acquisition of 
hardware and software resources; hence developers can put their web applications and distribute 
them on the cloud [14], [15]. 
The PaaS service delivery model enables software developers to develop and deploy web 
applications at a low cost as applications required for development are hosted and provided by 
vendors. This encourages web based application development and reduces the complexity of 
installing and maintaining infrastructures and software used to develop web based applications. 
Another benefit of PaaS is that, application web based vendors can host their applications on a cloud 
platform to enable other developers have access to use these services as a platform on a cloud 
environment. Therefore enabling developers gain control of the application, whilst using the cloud 
platform to develop their applications. 
Unlike the traditional IT model which supports use by a single isolated user or group, PaaS support 
multi tenancy which enables multiple users (developers) access to the cloud platform environment. 




Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS): This cloud service delivery model describes a service where 
vendors or CSPs virtually provide the infrastructure to run the entire clients infrastructure. Services 
such as storage on servers, disks space, backups, security on servers are virtually handled by the 
vendors and all that is needed is the client to log into the cloud through a web browser and have 
access to these computer resources infrastructures on a pay as you go. Clients only have to pay for 
the amount of space they need and need to worry about constant backups or threats that could 
affect a data centre on site or the cost of maintaining multiple servers. Examples include Amazon 
EC2, Sun’s Cloud services and Google Drive. 
Benefits of IaaS 
One benefit of IaaS is the ability to reduce cost on data storage infrastructures such as servers and 
data centres. Users do not need to have a physical storage but a virtual one which serves the same 
purposes. IaaS enable users to pay only for the requirements they need which include storage disk 
space and memory on a pay as you go basis. 
Alternatively, users can increase and decrease the need for infrastructural services depending on their 
specific needs at any time they choose to. Hence lower the costs that allow expensing service cost 




FIGURE 2.1: CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICE DELIVERY MODELS [18] 
2.3.2  CLOUD SERVICE DEPLOYMENT MODELS 
The cloud services delivery model (SPI) shown above can be deployed on any type of deployment 
model to users or customers depending on the requirements and specification of the end users’ 
needs. This illustrates the services could be deployed for individual use, corporate use or the general 
public. Therefore the management of the cloud vary between deployment models. From cloud 
delivery models fully managed and hosted by CSPs to unmanaged ones managed by individuals or 
corporate organisations on premises and semi-managed, where management responsibilities are 
shared between cloud stakeholders. Depending on the structure of internal or external use and of 
course payment for the services, cloud services can be deployed solely for an organisation or 
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corporate need (private cloud) or the general public (public cloud) (see Figure 2.2). Hence, SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS can be hosted on either a private, public or hybrid (combination of both private and public) 
clouds. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: CLOUD SERVICES DEPLOYMENT MODELS [19] 
Private Clouds (Unmanaged): This cloud model provides a customer or organisation with the 
responsibility of management of cloud services hosted by the vendor or hosted by a vendor bound 
to a contractual agreement and policies setup by the customer or organisation. For example, an 
organisation can lease a data centre from a vendor and store resources on it which are very 
confidential to the organisation and its staff. Such an Organisation will request to have full control 
of managing the storage hosted by the vendor but will pay for just the infrastructure which will be 
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cheaper compared to having a large office space full of storage servers. Private clouds can also be 
developed and managed by organisation using existing software and hardware configurations to 
developed cloud based services specific for the organisation’s needs. A good example is using 
Microsoft’s System Centre packages to develop in house Platform-as-a-Service cloud environments. 
Public Clouds (Managed): A public cloud is hosted, managed and operated by a vendor or CSP 
from one or more data centres and provided for multiple clients [7]. It generally features customers 
from more than one Organisation sharing the same data centre or infrastructure with each other, 
which is known as multi-tenancy [20]. The security management of the private cloud is solely 
managed by the vendor. Customers pay for or lease the cloud services, with no knowledge of its 
security management and trust the vendors to manage that giving customers, limited control of 
security patches in the cloud. Most SaaS are hosted on public clouds. Examples of public cloud service 
providers include Amazon Web Services (AWS), Windows Azure, Google App Engine and 
Salesforce.com. 
Hybrid Clouds (Semi- Managed): This cloud deployment model consists of both private and 
public cloud services an organisation or customer has access to and is hosted by a CSP. It comprises 
of a mixture between private, community, and/or public clouds; which is important to support higher 
resilience, availability, and reliability [21]. An organisation may choose to have sensitive resources 
available and accessible on a private cloud and also require a public cloud service for other purposes. 
For example, an organisation may want to provide the infrastructure for storing their cloud 
application and on the other hand require the web application to be hosted by a vendor. Hence the 
application is hosted publicly while the infrastructure is in-house. Examples include Amazon Virtual 
Private Cloud, Amazon Direct Connect, Skytap Virtual Lab and CohesiveFT VPN-Cubed which are 
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hybrid clouds that work by creating IPSec VPN  tunnelling capabilities to connect public cloud 
physical resources to private cloud resources [22]. 
Community Clouds: The cloud infrastructure is shared by several organisations and supports a 
specific community that has shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and 
compliance considerations). It may be managed by the organisation or a third party and may exist 
on premise or off premise [15]. The defining factor for the community cloud is that different 
organisations are all assembled for the same cause and share resources towards this common 
cause[23]. 
Although cloud computing is still emerging, many users and corporate organisations are embracing 
the benefits it offers and adopting the cloud computing architecture and services offered by 
numerous cloud service providers using IT goals to achieve their business objectives. However, the 
security challenges and risks associated with traditional IT models are also prevalent in cloud 
computing and addressing these challenges are top priority to providers and customers alike. 
The following sections will discuss the security risks and challenges of cloud computing in detail. A 
detailed look at industry security frameworks and guidelines presently adopted to address issues, 
risks and challenges with reference particularly to information security management and information 
security governance are critically analysed. 
 CHALLENGES AND RISKS OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
The adoption of cloud computing innovation is still in its initial stage. Although many individuals and 
corporate organisations are adopting cloud delivery services offered by vendors for their benefits, 
the challenges and barriers in the adoption of cloud computing is still a major concern for a full scale 
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global adoption. One of the major barriers to cloud computing adoption is lack of trust in the cloud 
itself [24]. According to an EU report on the major issues and challenges of cloud computing [25], 
cloud models and technologies are yet to reach their full potentials and many capabilities to which 
cloud models are linked are yet to be developed to a full degree where all requirements can be met 
in relation to cloud usage [21]. 
 Early adopters of new technology innovations have embraced cloud services most of which are 
offered free of charge. Especially SaaS and IaaS, such as online social networking sites, to share 
photos and store data, access electronic books and journals, play online games, buy and download 
music from cloud vendors. Organisations and small scale businesses have also adopted cloud 
computing to reduce the cost of IT infrastructure. Many developers are now using tools provided on 
cloud platforms to develop web-based applications. 
However, the privacy, confidentiality, integrity, availability, reliability, interoperability, management 
and legal issues that affect traditional information technology are not limited in cloud environments 
either. A recent study found a total of 160 different standards covering different aspects of the cloud 
are currently being deployed or under consideration. Some of them bear strong similarities to one 
another [26]. From the study, the largest gaps of cloud computing challenges were identified to be 
in the field of management and IT governance process of the cloud architecture and services 
provided by cloud service providers. On the other hand, Mather et. al [7] concluded that the technical 
vulnerabilities of cloud architectures need to be addressed properly to preserve security and privacy 
of resources hosted in the cloud as well as the transparency of cloud service providers. 
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The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), a consortium of vendors and users, published top threats to cloud 
computing providing context in assisting organisations and customers in making educated risk 
management decisions regarding their cloud adoption strategies [27]. In the report, the fundamental 
issues were emphasised based on the characteristics of cloud computing and its on-demand nature 
and also in relation to the CSA’s Security Guidance Report for Critical Areas in Cloud Computing, 
published a year earlier. Remediation and recommendations were proposed for perceived security 
threats to cloud computing based on the sensitivity of customer information hosted in the cloud by 
vendors and external threats as well. However at the time of this study, standardisation of a cloud 
security framework that would govern cloud computing as a whole was yet to be proposed. 
In 2010, Ponemon Institute conducted a survey on cloud users. In the report, 46% of IT professionals 
responded that their organisations have stopped or slowed the adoption of cloud services because 
of security concerns, indicating a lot is yet to be done to continue advancing cloud computing 
adoption[28]. Their findings showed that cloud service providers are not particularly focused on 
cloud security. Rather their priority is to deliver the features their customers want such as low cost 
solutions with fast deployment that improves customer service and increase the efficiency of the IT 
function[29]. Further study in 2012 showed that an average of 4,140 business and IT managers 
surveyed across Europe and Latin America responded they were not aware of the security offerings 
provided by CSPs to protect their organisation’s data in the cloud[29]. According to the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) special publication[4],  the first step in selecting 
security controls for information systems is to choose the appropriate set of baseline controls which 
are based on the security requirements, type of assets and risks to those assets on the information 
system. It is also important to consider the architecture, performance and potential of the information 
system which the controls will be implemented on. 
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It is impossible to have unconditional security on any kind of information system. However, choosing 
the most adequate security control for an information system can make assets stored or shared 
within the system very difficult to compromise. In cloud computing, the security controls 
implemented and integrated is not different from traditional information systems although cloud 
computing presents different risks compared to traditional information systems due to virtualisation 
and management control of the architecture. Security management best practices such as the 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), CSA Cloud Control Matrix based on industry 
standards such as ISO/IEC 27000 series NIST SP-800 and ENISA, have been adopted by many cloud 
vendors and customers in managing information security in the cloud. Issues, challenges and risks 
differ amongst various vendors due to different cloud services they provide and the type of 
deployment model specified by customers. This also is a major source of concern. The top challenges 
in no particular order of severity are discussed below. 
INFORMATION SECURITY:  Confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and non-
repudiation are measures by which any security architecture is queried. They are described as the 
fundamental security attributes that can be affected by attacks in the cloud [30]. In cloud computing, 
CSPs host different organisations resources on the same server (IaaS) due to the scalability and 
flexibility it provides through multi tenancy.  The Cloud Security Alliance CSA[8] describes shared 
technology issues of the IaaS multi-tenant architecture underlying components such as CPU caches 
used to host the service, were not designed to offer strong isolation properties. However attacks on 
the cloud may not result in the compromise of all its security attributes but may be specific to affect 
one or a combination more than one security attributes. 
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At the network level in public cloud IaaS architecture, a flawed application programming interface 
(API) or virtual machine (VM) hypervisor, would enable individual tenants interfere or gain access to 
other tenants’ data in transit. A good example is the Black Hat DC Blue and Red Pill attack on Xen’s 
hypervisor [31]. Without a proper authentication and authorisation mechanism put in place, 
unauthorised access can permit modification of data by unauthorised users and hence compromise 
confidentiality. More sophisticated attacks can be initiated through VM relocation attacks. A process 
that allows a malicious insider to copy a victim’s VM to a remote machine or portable storage device. 
Data integrity requires only authorised users can change data and confidentiality and privacy means 
only authorised users can read data [4]. Keystroke timing attacks as described by Song et al. [32], 
which describes an attack which occurs when an attacker attempts to steal login credentials by 
eavesdropping on their keystrokes over the network. The possibility further discussed in a cloud 
environment [30], can occur over a secure shell (SSH) where the attacker’s goal is to measure the 
time between keystrokes while the victim is typing a login credential such as a password. 
Availability describes the process were resources hosted in the cloud are available when needed. 
Since migration to the cloud suggests organisations’ information are not on site and stored in CSPs 
data centres and server farms, which are also physical locations, environmental and natural disaster 
also pose a threat to critical information stored at these locations which can affect business 
continuity. A vulnerable hypervisor can be subject to a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack 
and disrupt availability of the service delivery model. A DDOS attacks are the most dominant attacks 
in the cloud [8], [30].   Once a DDOS attack occurs, data may not be available to the authorised users, 
thus violating the availability attribute [30]. On the other hand integrity and confidentiality may not 
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be affected by the DDOS attack. Therefore ensuring that data resources are made available and 
downtime reduced through data recovery and backup procedures needs to be put in place. 
INTEROPERABILITY:  Application Programming Interface (API) is unique to different CSPs. This 
makes interoperability difficult during migration from one service deployment to another and 
likewise between CSPs. An organisation intending to migrate from a private cloud to a public cloud 
may experience difficulties in integrating their current infrastructure to be compatible with the CSP’s 
existing one. 
Developers, who create web based applications on a particular vendor’s PaaS using certain toolkits, 
may experience challenges upon migration to another platform which means customers might be 
locked in to a particular CSP. This is sometimes referred to as vendor lock in.  The need for a polyglot 
environment where all programming languages can be supported on a particular vendor’s 
environment is still a challenge in cloud computing. There is a need for data access interoperability, 
a unique interface for accessing diverse databases which is related to a lot of standardisation issues 
[24]. 
MULTI-TENANCY:  Multi-tenancy refers to the sharing of a group of servers by multiple customers 
in the cloud[9]. The sharing method involves the creation of single instances for individual customers 
on the group of servers. In cloud computing, multi-tenancy adds a number of additional security 
concerns that need to be accounted for. Multiple client instances must be isolated, their data 
segmented and their service accounted for[33]. Cloud service providers are faced with the challenge 
of ensuring complete isolation of individual customer instances and that the compromise to one 
instance does not affect other instances running on their architecture. Instances of customers must 
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be invisible from each other while ensuring network and communication latency is reduced to 
improve system performance. 
SERVICE DELIVERY AND BILLING: Ensuring value for money and return on investment for paid 
services are challenges customers are faced with when they adopt the cloud. Compliance regulations 
by CSPs for downtime, cost of disaster recovery and hidden fees on support are still loop holes not 
standardised in cloud computing. According to Marks and Lazano[34],  “a critical set of potential 
cloud obstacles include governance, service level agreements (SLA), and the overall quality of service 
(QoS) assurance”. Weak authentication and verification mechanisms used to register users, 
encourage cybercriminals access to register for cloud services and conduct malicious activities on 
the cloud. With a valid credit card, anyone can register and begin to use cloud services 
immediately[27]. 
In order to address the challenges and risks of cloud computing, it is necessary to understand the 
fundamental security requirements for adequate security of cloud service delivery models. It is also 
essential to consider the responsibilities of cloud service providers in ensuring the security 
architecture and governance is enhanced to limit the barrier to cloud computing adoption. 
LEGAL ISSUES: Legislation surrounding datacentres where computer data and cloud resources are 
stored raises issues and concern about the adoption of cloud computing. Governing laws and 
jurisdiction of the country, city or state may grant the authorities or courts rights to customer data 
which are being stored in those locations. Knowing where your data resides and the laws that govern 
such regions needs to be considered in the adoption of cloud computing. Three key areas where 
litigation may ensue include personal data protection, contracting issues and liability for illegal data 
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[35]. The EU Data Protection Act, for example, strives to keep personal information within the 
European Union. Hence providers with European customers have to ensure customer data are kept 
within the region as having data outside the region may kick start litigations. This could be quite 
confusing as cloud storage could exist as a virtualised server or a mirror data storage. Having to 
pinpoint where the data is actually stored could be an issue. On the other hand, cloud service 
providers may be held liable for hosting illegal customer data which may not be illegal in the 
customer’s own region. Legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA, could affect how 
certain data hosted in the region should be stored. Moreover, the legislation in the USA does not 
protect data from a customer’s point of view. Customers have no constitutional rights over their data 
once it is placed in the hands of an external service provider, and the local authorities can request 
this data without a warrant[36].  
 CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
This section discusses detailed critical analysis of security standards, frameworks, regulations and 
guidelines that are generally accepted for implementing information security management. These 
standards have been adopted over the years by organisations to define the governance activities 
that will address information security to achieve their business goals. However these standards and 
frameworks have not yet been well adapted to cloud environments, although some of them are 
considered significant overall and a worthy starting point [23].  Cloud Service Providers tend towards 
having audits and certifications based on these frameworks. Since some of the standards and 
frameworks were written pre-cloud computing[37] and designed for the implementation of 
information security on traditional corporate systems, they serve as baselines for the development 
of concepts and guidance sufficient to protect and trust cloud computing[23]. Majority of Cloud 
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Service Providers strive to pass security audits based on these regulations and standards when 
providing cloud services for their respective customers. They aim to pass security audits based on 
one standard or regulation or more than one, depending on the type of cloud service being offered 
by the CSP. For IaaS and PaaS CSPs, gaining certifications through security audits based on industry 
standards and regulations is a key to customer acquisition based on customer security requirements. 
It is assumed that CSPs will at least aim to pass security audits based on the ISO 27001 standard[9]. 
However, there are many factors that govern CSPs’ compliance to specific regulations, frameworks 
and standards which can include the industry security requirements, data types stored and processed 
in the cloud and the location of the cloud service infrastructure. Therefore, based on these factors, 
there is no generic security regulation, framework or standard that addresses cloud security and 
management. On the other hand, cloud computing services are offered via three types of service 
deployment models as discussed in Section 2.3. Hence security standards, frameworks and 
regulations that is applicable on a particular deployment model may be considered unsuitable on 
another. CSPs could aim to pass more than one audit and become certified to meet its security 
requirements depending on the factor(s). 
The following sections discusses these standards, frameworks and regulations in an attempt to 
critically analyse their adequacies and limitations. 
2.5.1  THE ISO/IEC 27000 STANDARDS 
The ISO 27000 series of standards have been created and developed by the International Standard 
Organisation (ISO) and the International Electro-technical Commission for addressing Information 
Security issues and the development of Information Security Management Systems (ISMS). It consists 
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of series of major operational standards that are put together in separate documents to address 
various information security management issues [38], [39] 
Amongst the notable Information Security Management Standards (ISMS) in the series include the 
ISO 27001 and 27002 series. The ISO 27001 standard was published in October 2005, essentially 
replacing the old BS7799-2 standard. The objective of both standards is to provide necessary 
requirements for establishing, implementing and the continuous improvement of an organisations 
ISMS which is influenced by the organisation’s business needs and objectives. The 27001 standard 
describes in detail using a Plan-Do-Act-Check cycle model, the requirements an organisation must 
meet to achieve certification in the development of an ISMS. According to Disterer [39]and Barlette 
[40], concerns have been raised on the suitability of the standard for Small-Medium sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) and the fulfilment of the requirement must be developed and implemented based on an 
organisation’s specification. 
On the other hand, the ISO 27002 compliments the ISO 27001 by offering guidelines for 
organisations through the use of controls and policies to address specific requirements identified via 
a risk assessment. However since the standard provides direction through the use of policies, 
procedures and controls to mitigate business risks as well as IT system risks caused by vulnerabilities, 
specific tools and frameworks are needed to evaluate and review if the implemented controls meet 
the organisation’s security requirements. 
In summary, using the ISO 27001 Plan-Do-Act-Check cycle model requires specific tools not just to 
implement controls but to evaluate and review if the implemented controls satisfies the 
organisation’s security requirements and the controls are fit for purpose.                                                                                       
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2.5.2  COBIT 
The Control Objectives and Information Related Technology (COBIT) is a security framework that was 
created and developed by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) and its IT 
audit professionals as a provisional guidance for IT-related internal controls[41]. The business 
orientation of COBIT consists of linking business goals to IT goals, providing metrics and maturity 
models to measure their achievement, and identifying the associated responsibilities of business and 
IT process owners[20]. COBIT was specifically created as a guidance to help auditors within a business 
review IT related control using a set of objectives to achieve business goals through the use of a 
management framework. It consists of a model to review internal IT controls which are made up of 
system development, change management, security and computer operations which revolves around 
security governance. 
The essence of COBIT is to provide good practice that will ensure IT objectives meet laid out business 
goals. Hence for organisations willing to adopt cloud computing, COBIT can be used to set out 
requirements by the customer to have clear knowledge of what needs to be delivered by the CSP. 
For example in cloud computing, COBIT can be used by cloud customers keen on security to set 
security requirements which they expect the CSP to meet through security provisions in order to 
achieve success in their organisation. They can therefore proceed the review if the security 
requirements have been met by reviewing the business goals. However since there are numerous 
business goals  and IT objectives which security happens to be part of, monitoring and evaluating 
security controls implemented by CSPs to meet IT security requirements requires a tailored suit 
framework to evaluate if security requirements have been met before reviewing the business goals.  
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The Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), released a current guide aligned 
with the COBIT framework called Cloud Computing Management Audit/Assurance Program.  The 
objective in terms of security is to provide stakeholders with an assessment of the effectiveness of 
the cloud computing service provider’s internal controls and security. However, the scope of the 
framework is limited to the governance affecting cloud computing, the contractual compliance 
between the service provider and customer and the control issues specific to cloud computing [4]. 
Hence before such assessment can be made, it is important to evaluate security requirement areas 
such as Data management (for data transmitted and stored on cloud systems), Network perimeter 
security (as an access point to the Internet) and Identity management (if the organisation’s identity 
management system is integrated with the cloud computing system)[42]. The evaluation of these 
areas however require security expertise as well as frameworks suitable to identifying and evaluating 
security controls to meet various cloud service models. 
2.5.3  NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION (SP) 800 SERIES 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53, calls special 
approaches to managing information system boundaries and lifecycles[23]. With its version 3 and 
updated version 4, it relates especially to complex information systems such as cloud computing 
through the management of information system related security risks.  The standard presents The 
Risk Management Framework (RMF) which provides a disciplined and structured process that 
integrates information security and risk management activities into the system development life cycle 
[4]. The framework provides six steps similar to the Plan-Do-Act-Check cycle model of the ISO 27001 
standard. The RMF however acknowledges in its fourth step that security controls must be assessed 
using appropriate assessment procedures to determine the extent to which the controls are 
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implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to 
meeting the security requirements for the system[4]. 
The standard also acknowledges that for complex information systems, which cloud computing is, 
stakeholders managing such complex information systems should consider breaking down the 
system into more manageable subsystems. The publication points out that implementation of 
security controls within a complex information system can present significant challenges to an 
organisation. It admits that the security architecture of such systems plays a key part in the security 
control selection and allocation process of a complex information system. 
Hence an approach to implementation, evaluation and assessment of such security controls have to 
be tailored specifically to meet the security requirements of such complex information systems. In 
section 2.3.3 of the publication, the standard admits the ever changing technologies and the effect 
of information system boundaries. It describes complex information systems such as cloud 
computing as two important concepts. (i) Dynamic Subsystems:  This is described as complex 
information systems that may or may not be managed solely by the organisation or customer and 
having subsystems which are managed by providers or CSPs. The publication suggests in scenarios 
like this, the relative trust relationship between organisations and providers will shape how security 
requirements are met and how security evaluations are performed. (ii) External Subsystems: The 
publication describes complex information systems that have subsystems which are not controlled 
by the organisation. Hence the nature of such subsystems are different especially in organisations 
that employ external cloud computing services. The guideline suggest that there are numerous 
factors that can complicate trust levels between stakeholders and the consequence of such factors 
is based on the use of traditional methods of verifying the effectiveness of security controls. 
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In summary, the NIST Special publication concludes that the customers or organisations in such 
scenarios would have to either accept the risk or choose not to obtain the service from providers. 
This scenario indicates a need for a more suitable and adaptive method that puts the customer in 
control of verifying security controls implemented on the subsystems by service providers. 
2.5.4  ENISA 
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a European Union (EU) 
agency dedicated to EU member states and organisations in ensuring good practices are followed in 
the advancement of network and information security. 
In cloud computing governance, ENISA released in 2009, a report on the benefits, risks and 
recommendations for information security. The report provides a credible guidance for potential and 
existing users of cloud computing by providing an informed assessment of the security risks and 
benefits of using cloud computing. Based on a risk assessment and analysis of three use-case 
scenarios, the report highlights security risks cloud computing is exposed to whilst providing a 
security assessment and list of recommendations. 
The ENISA report highlights that the level of risks in cloud computing can vary significantly with the 
type of cloud architecture being considered[43]. This implies that the risks on different service 
delivery and deployment model differ and hence the security approach also will vary. In the report, 
ENISA identifies 35 risks that affect cloud computing and a host of vulnerabilities which are cloud 
specific and general information security mentioned revolve around poor or inadequate security 
controls implemented to provide information security in the cloud. The implementation which is 
either down to the service provider or cloud customer security responsibilities. 
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ENISA suggests cloud customers and providers should state clearly their respective security roles and 
responsibilities in the preservation of information security on cloud computing. The identified 
vulnerabilities include a poor system for identity and access management which consists of 
authentication and authorisation. Others mentioned are, the user provisioning vulnerabilities, remote 
access to management interface, hypervisor vulnerabilities, and poor key management and 
encryption vulnerabilities. For non-specific vulnerabilities, the report listed operating system 
vulnerabilities, poor provider selection and application vulnerabilities as significant loop holes to 
operational security in cloud computing. 
However, recommendation and key massages listed by ENISA through its Information Assurance 
Framework is for cloud customers to assess the risks of adopting cloud services to understand the 
pros and cons of migrating to a cloud environment. The framework also recommends users to 
compare different cloud providers service offerings and obtain quality assurance from their selected 
providers which should be clearly stated out and agreed upon via service level agreements (SLAs).  
Customers are recommended to ask questions from providers in order to achieve service quality 
assurance they will be offered through a list of information security assurance requirements. These 
requirements are grouped into categories with questions on what security offering is provided to 
ensure information security. 
However without a clear understanding of cloud architectures, stakeholders’ responsibilities and a 
method of assessing security provisions offered by providers, customers using the ENISA framework 
will find the recommendation list exhaustive. In summary, ENISA recommends that further research 
in certain areas needs to be considered to improve the security of cloud computing technologies. 
One key area where research needs to be improved includes the development of metrics for security 
in cloud computing to assess security requirements and also build trust in cloud computing. Another 
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area of research that has been recommended is the development of techniques for increasing 
transparency while maintaining appropriate levels of security in the cloud. 
2.5.5  FEDRAMP 
Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) created by the U.S government, is 
a unified, government-wide risk management program focused on security for cloud-based systems.  
The program provides a standard approach for conducting security assessments of cloud systems 
based on an accepted set of baseline security controls and consistent processes that have been 
vetted and agreed upon by agencies across the federal government[44]. In the Security Assessment 
Plan (SAP) Template created by FedRAMP, it describes an approach to security assessment, 
authorisation, and continuous monitoring for Cloud Service Providers (CSP) through the testing of 
security controls and in the provision of a plan for security control which ensures that the process 
runs smoothly.   
The SAP template document is intended to be used by independent assessors when testing Cloud 
Service Provider (CSP) security controls. However, with the clear knowledge that not all cloud service 
models are completely managed by CSPs and certain components of the cloud service architecture 
are managed by cloud customers, the FedRAMP does not offer a holistic approach in assessing cloud 
systems or services that have shared security management responsibilities between CSPs and their 
customers. In cloud service deployment models such as Private and Hybrid Clouds, the evaluation, 
review analysis and verification of security controls will require specific approaches.  
Although FedRAMP provides adequate guidelines for assessing security risks on clouds through the 
NIST Special Publication 800-144[4], the standard provides guidelines on security and privacy on 
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public cloud computing only. This however highlights that there are gaps that needs to be filled in 
the assessment of private and hybrid cloud deployment models. 
2.5.6  ITIL 
The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) 2011 edition, ITIL version 3, provides a more 
holistic perspective of the full lifecycle of services covering the entire IT organisation and all 
supporting components needed to deliver services to the customer[45]. As part of the core 
publications describing IT service management practices that make up ITIL, the publication is 
described as the core of the ITIL framework. The ITIL security management explains steps and 
procedures to ensure that effective information security measures are taken in the planning, 
implementation, evaluation and maintenance of information security. It provides guidelines for 
industry best practices in the delivery of IT services by an organisation to its customers. The onus of 
using ITIL framework is to ensure that customers get services they pay for with the right service level 
agreements (SLAs) in place. The framework further highlights that providers must offer security 
services which protect customer assets from unauthorised or malicious access, accountability and 
non-repudiation of service usage as well as create security zones between customer assets and 
service assets. Therefore both providers and customers must share the responsibility of 
implementing the ITIL service management framework to ensure service delivery and expectations 
are met as agreed in the SLAs. Therefore cloud customers need to come up with ways to evaluate 
security offerings as stated and agreed in the SLAs to ensure security requirements have been met 
or are being met as part of the ITIL strategy. 
Customers are more interested with how service providers can meet service requirements[46]. 
Therefore customers would evaluate the service levels that the service provider is offering. Providers 
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on the other hand must put in place a service level management process to gain customers 
confidence and the ITIL can be used to ensure this. In Thames’ publication[47], ITIL can be a valuable 
benefit to any IT organisation however it is not a direct fit to cloud computing management. The ITIL 
framework can be used to identify gaps in cloud computing however various types of cloud service 
delivery and deployment model suggests ITIL needs to be revamped and its capability extended to 
incorporate these types of cloud services[45]. The framework has also been suggested to be 
revamped to incorporate stakeholders’ responsibilities and control at various phases of the ITIL 
service management framework. 
In summary, the ITIL Version 3 provides high level description of many information technology best 
practices that prepare information technology for better services and service delivery. However, 
information technology cannot rest of past accomplishments of ITIL and the framework which 
provides practices and provide support and integration must adapt as technology advances [48]. 
2.5.7  CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE GUIDANCE 
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is a non-profit organisation that promotes the use of best practices 
for security assurance within cloud computing[37]. It aims to provide education on the uses of cloud 
computing to help secure all other forms of computing[49]. It is led by a collection of industry 
practitioners and key stakeholders in the area of information security and IT management. 
The CSA published a Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) specifically for cloud computing providers and 
customers. The CCM provide a control framework that provides detailed understanding of security 
concepts and principles that are aligned to 13 domains to address cloud computing security[23]. The 
Control Matrix consists of control baselines such as COBIT, ISO 27002/27002, NIST SP800-53, 
FedRAMP, PCIDSS and others such as the Jericho Forum. It provides cloud providers and customers 
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the ability to map the control baselines to each domain as described by the CSA. The CCM provides 
a starting point for customers to highlight controls, however it is not a one size fit all solution for all 
types of cloud computing services [23]. This is because security responsibilities differ on several cloud 
services where security responsibilities are shared between customer and providers.  
Although the CSA through its CCM provides a robust overview for ensuring industry standards are 
tailored to meet security requirements in cloud computing, understanding the relationships and 
dependencies between cloud computing models is critical to address cloud computing security. Each 
security control needs to be aligned to the architecture of respective cloud services. 
To support that user requirements can be tailored to cloud security offered by service providers, the 
CSA created a Security Trust Assurance Registry (STAR). This includes guidelines such as the CCM 
and The Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ), questionnaire which comprises of 
140 questions, provided by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) for cloud consumers and auditors to 
assess the security capabilities of a cloud provider. The questions are based on the security controls 
in the CCM simplified and converted into questions which cover best practices and security control 
areas of the cloud security guidance. Although the CCM coupled with The CAIQ offers a good starting 
point for customers to leverage the controls or assertion questions to validate that the provider has 
these controls in place [50], the architecture of cloud service models are significantly different and 
customers must be able to map these control assertion questions to subsystems within the cloud 
architecture. This can only make the CCM and CAIQ useful as without a thoughtful procedure on 
tailoring answered questions to specific user security requirements, providers and users alike can 
find the list exhaustive. The CSA in the guidance, admits that it offers an extensive recommendations 
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on reducing risks when adopting cloud computing but that not all recommendations are necessary 




















Scope Strengths Drawbacks 
ISO 27001/27002 Information 
Security 
Management 
 Outlines Security 
Controls. 
 Offers risk assessment 
approach. 
 Compliance with security 
standards. 
 Describes need for a 
security evaluation and 
assessment program. 
 Does not focus of security 
requirements gathering. 
 Does not guarantee security 
control efficiency. 
 No process for verification 
of effectiveness of 
implemented security 
controls. 

















 Focuses on metrics and controls. 
 Deals with security planning and 
integrates solution to business 
processes. 
 Focuses on security planning. 
 Links business goals with IT 
goals. 
 Enables the establishment of 
security requirements. 
 Designed to help ensure IT 
programs are implemented and 
managed effectively to maximize 
the investment of technology 
efficiently 
 Not designed for security 
evaluation and 
assessment. 
 Effectiveness of security 
controls is evaluated only 
by the business objectives 
and performance. 
 Not technical driven. 






 Focuses on IT processes, service 
level objectives and SLAs. 
 Compliance with regulation 
standards. 
 Based on the principles of ISO 
27001 series. 
 Must be adapted to suit 
the organisation’s needs 
and requirements. 
 Needs to be adapted to 

















 Offers risk management 
approach. 
 Assists in the selection of 
security controls. 
 Allows organisations to tailor 
assessment procedures and 
criteria to the characteristics 
of the IT environment. 
 Provides guidance and 
strategies for security 
control assessment.  
 Provides guidance for 
effective assurance of 
security controls. 
 Serves as baseline for 
evaluation and assessment 
of security controls. 
 Enables adequate security 
requirements gathering. 
 Is adapted to suit cloud 
computing environments. 
 Enables security 
requirements gathering. 
 Requires the need for 
additional strategies for the 
selection of tailored security 
controls. 
 Does not provide adequate 
strategy for mapping security 
requirements with security 















 Offers risk assessment 
approach. 
 Designed to prevent 
compromise of 
information security. 
 Offers security controls 
based on industry 
standards such as the ISO 
17799. 
 Offers strategy for 
mapping risks suited to 
specific threats as 
identified by 
organisations.  
 Adaptable for Cloud 
Computing environments. 
 Does not provide strategy for 
mapping risks identified through 
the risks assessment to 
components within the cloud 
architecture.  
  Does not provide strategy for 














 Designed to suit cloud 
computing environments. 
 Offers risk management 
approach. 
 Provides approach for 
assessing and monitoring 
compliance with industry 
standards. 
 Based on the ISO 
27001/27002 and NIST 
technical standards. 
 Standardized security 
requirements which are not 
tailored to suit organisation’s 
requirements. 
 No strategy for measuring 
the security level of 
standardized requirements. 
 Standardized requirements 
could be obsolete. 
 Is not suited for dynamic 
nature of Cloud Computing 














Scope Strengths Drawbacks 
CSA Guidance Information 
Security  
Management 
 Specifically designed for cloud 
computing. 
 Provides strategy for cloud 
transparency. 
 Provides strategy for customer 
assessment of cloud security 
provisions and offerings. 
  Promotes the use of best 
practices for providing 
security assurance within 
Cloud Computing. 
 Based on industry standards 
which include ISO 
27001/27002, ISACA COBIT, 
PCI, NIST, Jericho Forum and 
NERC CIP. 
 Provides security controls 
across several domains. 
 Security recommendations 
are not realistic to achieve 
on all deployment models. 
 Does not provide strategy 
for security requirements 
gathering. 
 Does not provide strategy 
for security control 







  GENERIC CLOUD SECURITY MODEL 
Security requirements in the cloud are characterised by having security standards and policies that 
govern security, roles and responsibilities of stakeholders involved in ensuring that the security 
requirements are met. It also includes the service level agreements, risk assessment analysis, security 
controls and auditing techniques that ensure compliance and security implementations are met 
according to specific industry standards. A generic cloud security model revolves around all cloud 
deployment models and service delivery models offered by the CSP. It ensures that the information 
security of data and assets that reside in the cloud are protected from perceived threats by offering 
guidance for security requirements in cloud environments. 
According to the CSA[27], this model can be grouped into two domains which highlights the areas 
of concern for cloud computing. The Governance domain which consists of guidance with 
governance and risk management, compliance and audit, information management and data 
security, legal, portability and interoperability issues. The Operational domain is however focused on 
more tactical security concerns and implementation within the cloud. Each domain however consists 
of recommendations and guidance on how to address the issues focusing primarily on the roles each 
stakeholder has to play to ensure compliance and customer satisfaction beyond the architecture 
requirements of the cloud. This ensures that customers can demand better service and CSPs alike 




FIGURE 2.3: GENERIC CLOUD SECURITY MODEL  
Service Level Agreement (SLA):  A SLA is a formal contract used to guarantee that consumers’ 
expectation of service quality can be achieved [51].  In a study by Verma [52], SLA is defined as an 
explicit statement of expectation and obligations that exist in a business relationship between two 
organisations; that is, a service provider and a customer. A SLA is drafted to improve relationships 
between both parties where service level objectives are specified according to a scope and jointly 
agreed upon.  
Therefore, a comprehensive SLA can be different between both parties depending on the services 
rendered by a specific provider to a specific customer. In cloud computing, a close examination of 
SLA use cases of the most famous CSPs such as Amazon Web Services and Windows Azure[51], 
revealed that service commitment by providers is focussed specifically on the annual uptime and 
availability of the services with little or less commitment on security. For instance, Amazon’s EC2[53] 
describes its SLA as a policy governing the use of Amazon Web Services under the terms and 
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conditions between AWS and the customer as a service commitment to provide at least 99.95% of 
annual service uptime provision and offers credits in terms  of service downtime with no detail on 
security as a service. 
Policies: Industry-accepted security standards, regulations, and controls frameworks such as the ISO 
27001/27002, ISACA COBIT, PCI, NIST, Jericho Forum and NERC CIP all provide similar guidelines to 
provide information security within business organisations and service providers. The Cloud Security 
Alliance (CSA), a consortium of organisations and security experts, published a Cloud Controls Matrix 
(CCM) which is a baseline set of security controls using the set of these existing security standards, 
regulations and control frameworks to assist organisations evaluate cloud providers and guide 
security efforts. In addition, the Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) provides fundamental security principles 
to guide cloud vendors and prospective consumers in assessing the overall security risk of a cloud 
provider, thereby establishing a strong trust level between the two and establishing a market 
reputation of the provider[54]. 
However, the CCM is focused much more on compliance as it allows the customer negotiate with 
the service provider in drafting of SLAs. It helps strengthen trust and facilitates transparency between 
both parties in an attempt to provide a standard for security measures by providing control 
specifications by recommending industry standards to its control domains. Therefore it offers a list 
of requirements and controls they would suggest their cloud service provider to implement [50] but 
does not provide specific technical details of the kind of controls or where they should be 




Controls and Abstraction: Security controls, mechanisms and solutions implemented in the cloud 
are no different from those implemented on traditional IT systems. The difference however is the 
implementation and configuration of these controls and how they are integrated to meet cloud 
computing security requirements. Abstraction on the other hand refers to the process of hiding core 
components of the hardware by providing layers of representation similar to the component itself. 
The concept of abstraction is fundamental to computer science, and examples can be found in other 
software systems such as compilers, databases, and file systems[55]. For instance, a hypervisor 
provisions abstractions of virtual machines and virtual networks to the end user. A detail discussion 
of cloud computing security and management is provided in Section 2.7. Controls and abstractions 
can be categorised under the CSA’s operational domain. 
Risk Assessment: This can be described as the process of recognizing or finding risks that could 
affect the achievement of stated objectives [39]. It involves the analysis in order to understand the 
likelihood and impact of certain risks to determine whether it could be accepted or mitigated. 
In cloud computing, assessment of the risks of a cloud service delivery model offered by a CSP is a 
good indication for drafting SLAs, implementing policies and security controls to mitigate such risks. 
Risks can be categorised as high, medium or low. Risk assessment can be categorised under the 
CSA’s governance domain. 
Requirements: This describes the specific service and security functions that the cloud service must 
perform through its design. This requirements can be considered as security as a service. Basic 
security requirements are implemented at the design phase of the system development lifecycle of 
the cloud service. These requirements include the ability of the cloud service delivery model to 
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withstand attacks or recover as soon as possible from potential attacks without compromise of the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the cloud service or assets stored, transmitted or 
processed in the cloud. In a systematic review by Iankoulova and Daneva [56], cloud computing 
security requirements were categorised into 9 groups. These are access control, which includes 
identity and access management, attack and harm detection, integrity, privacy and confidentiality, 
security auditing, non-repudiation, security auditing, recovery and prosecution.  
Monitoring and Data Protection: Data monitoring and protection in the cloud involves the 
compliance of data protection laws and legal requirements by cloud service providers. Depending 
on the type of cloud service delivery used, the cloud provider's responsibilities could include 
providing infrastructure, physical security of the premises, operating system and network security. 
The cloud customer, on the other hand, will be the data controller, actively processing the data for 
its own business purposes. Depending on the service model used, responsibilities could include 
controlling the virtual infrastructure and any application security[57]. Consistent monitoring of the 
cloud service by the customer and cloud service provider needs to be maintained at all times to 
ensure no security breach and details of the SLA are met. A description of security management in 
the cloud typical to cloud delivery models is presented in section 2.7. 
Figure 2.3 shows the generic cloud security model that is made up of governance and operational 
domains which revolves around the different types of cloud deployment models. Our focus is on the 
controls implemented on public clouds and developing a framework that can be used to evaluate 




 CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT- 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND ISSUES 
The level of responsibility a cloud service provider takes on depends on which cloud service model 
and deployment model is chosen by the cloud service customer. Customers must not solely rely on 
cloud providers for security but must take a different approach to security by applying security best 
practices to ensure security on the selected cloud models[9]. The problem at the moment is that 
service level agreements (SLAs) provided by CSPs to customers are centred on service related aspects 
such as availability and performance, and very few terms are related to security[58]. However, it 
becomes difficult for cloud customer, or their agents, to audit the services provided by CSPs[59]. The 
boundaries between these responsibilities is not always clear cut, and can depend on the agreement 
signed by the customer and other factors[37]. Therefore having a full understanding of stakeholders’ 
responsibilities in the management and security of cloud service delivery and deployment models is 
a huge step forward in applying best practices and ensuring accountability of not just quality of 
service rendered but also security implementations put in place in cloud architectures. Figure 2.4 
shows the various cloud service delivery models and the stakeholder responsible for the 
management of the service.  Unlike traditional IT systems, where the IT administrator is responsible 
for providing security and management of the entire architecture, cloud computing offers shared 
management between stakeholders involved. However, this shared management responsibility is 




FIGURE 2.4: CLOUD COMPUTING MANAGEMENT[60] 
2.7.1  SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS (SLAS) 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) can be described as a contractual agreement that guarantees 
minimum Quality of Service (QoS) and clearly set of expectations for that service between a Cloud 
Service Provider (seller) and Cloud Customer (buyer)[10][22]. It can also be described as a formal 
agreement between two parties sometimes called a service level guarantee designed to create a 
common understanding about services, priorities and  responsibilities[61][62].Given the global 
nature of the cloud, SLAs usually span many jurisdictions, with often varying applicable legal 
requirements, in particular with respect to the protection of the personal data hosted in the cloud 
service. Furthermore different cloud services and deployment models will require different 
approaches to SLAs, adding to the complexity of SLAs[63]. 
On the other hand, different types of cloud customers from single to multiple users and small 
businesses to large organisations determine how service level objectives are defined which are clearly 
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laid out in different types of SLAs. SLAs are also drafted based on the security responsibility of both 
stakeholders in ensuring security objectives and requirements are met depending on the level of 
control. In Cloud Computing security, SLAs are established based on the level of security offered by 
the provider and also the security level expected and requested by the customer. A customer must 
understand his security requirements and what controls and federation patterns are necessary to 
meet those requirements. A provider on the other hand, must understand what they must deliver to 
the customer to enable the appropriate controls and federation patterns [48]. Customer requests 
and expectations are clearly influenced by how the security level of the cloud service model can affect 
business assets and business objectives. These objectives can be defined as the security requirements 
of the cloud customer which are expected to be met by the providers as described in relevant SLAs. 
Considering different types or users and service cloud models, SLAs could come in various types. The 
current market offers two types of SLAs for customer’s specific requirements[64]. These are 
categorised into negotiable and non-negotiable SLAs. 
Non-Negotiable SLA- A non-negotiable SLA is described to be less expensive than a negotiable one 
but is not acceptable to customers with critical applications and data [64]. However it is offered by 
most CSPs of public clouds as a one size fit all policy where customers can receive a form of 
compensation if service needs described in the agreement are not met by the CSP. When this type 
of SLA is offered, the CSP administers those portions stipulated in the agreement [65] and customers 
have to continuously be on the look out to ensure the service agreements are met. If not satisfied, 
customers could choose to stop using the service, however they cannot negotiate the terms to suit 
their own needs with the CSP. The offerings in this type of SLA is static and does not address the 
individual needs of every customer. A consequence which is described as customers having a limited 
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set of offerings in terms of security features, often without knowledge of how  such security 
mechanisms are implemented[58]. 
Negotiable SLA- This type of SLA is described as one where the rules for the negotiation are 
established including the option to negotiate manually, and a template with the stakeholders where 
the negotiated parts are clearly expressed [66]. In Cloud Computing, negotiable SLAs are more like 
traditional information technology outsourcing contracts. They can be used to address an 
organisation’s concerns about security and privacy policy, procedures, and technical controls[4]. This 
type of SLA is more applicable to organisations with critical data and applications and compromise 
of such data may affect the organisation significantly. The outcome of the negotiation however 
depends on the size of the organisation and the influence it can exert[4].  
Although the negotiable SLA may contain numerous service level objects which the customer may 
want to negotiate with the CSP, the importance of computer systems security, its intricate 
characteristics and the growing of outsourcing scenarios, including the outsourcing of security 
services, security service levels need to be agreed[67]. This will include who is responsible to 
implementing security features and who would assume responsibility when a problem occurs. 
Therefore the core fundamentals of customers negotiating SLAs is down to security. It is specific to 
deal with metrics related to security requirements or demands which include security mechanisms 
such as cryptography, data packet filtering, redundancy of hardware and software, security backup 







Cloud computing is an emerging technology that spans across providing computing resources to a 
wide industry of businesses and academic users. Governed by policies, frameworks and publications 
that provide guidance to its security, the challenges and risks to its promising future revolves around 
security management of the environment’s architecture and responsibilities of its stakeholders.  
These standards and guidelines only offer direction in IT governance, risk assessment and ensuring 
good practices are followed in regards to security in the cloud. The service level objects offered by 
CSPs and understood by customers have to be agreed and clearly documented through service level 
agreements. Although cloud computing offers several benefits which includes return on investment 
and increased performance, security of the cloud architecture and customer data are faced with 
growing security threats, challenges and issues. With the use of industry standards and guidelines, it 
is certain cloud customers must work closely with CSPs to ensure security and management 
responsibilities are clearly stated and met. A cloud security model which embraces industry 
guidelines and standards needs to be developed to ensure security management specific for 







 SECURITY IN PLATFORM-AS-A-SERVICE (PAAS)  
 INTRODUCTION 
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) service delivery model describes an environment where a developer can 
create customised applications within the context of development tools that the platform offers [15]. 
The environment allows developers to deploy developed applications using specific development 
languages which the CSP offers on the platform. In the PaaS service delivery model, CSPs offer 
customers a subscription where application and software developers can access an environment to 
develop web based applications. Service provided can include an application toolkit also known as 
Software Development Kit (SDK) which is downloaded and installed on the client machine or can be 
web based. The SDK serves as the code building blocks and consists of programming languages and 
applications which are used to initiate the developer’s environment to develop applications. Once 
the applications are developed, the customer can also deploy the application to be hosted on the 
CSPs web/application server using the subscription credentials. 
The deployed applications run in the cloud which can be accessed via a URL by the end users for 
which the application is built. Other services provided include database storage and management, 
programming language on-demand scalability and security services. Although the first generation 
PaaS CSPs such as Google App Engine, Windows Azure and Force.com, required that customers use 
specific programming languages on their platforms, other CSPs have emerged who support the use 




PaaS delivery model provides a lower cost entry for developers by supporting the development of 
web/ mobile applications, thereby eliminating the need for additional acquisition of hardware and 
software resources; hence developers can put their web applications and distribute them on the 
cloud [7],[16]. The PaaS service delivery model enables application developers to develop and deploy 
web applications at a low cost as software required for development and environment for 
deployment are provided by the vendors. This encourages web based application development and 
reduces the complexity of installing and maintaining infrastructures and software used to develop 
web based applications. 
This chapter discusses Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) security and management as well as a detailed 
background on some of the issues and challenges that surround the cloud service. It also discusses 
the industry security requirements that are expected to be met through security controls and policies 
implemented on the service delivery model. The chapter also discusses related works and research 
that have already contributed to the evaluation of security and security provisions and 
implementations in cloud service models including PaaS clouds. 
 PLATFORM-AS-A-SERVICE SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT 
The cloud service customer and cloud service provider have a shared responsibility for securing the 
cloud services, when leveraging the cloud[9]. Depending on the nature of the deployment, new risks 
are introduced and ownership of controls and management will shift between providers and 
customers alike[23]. 
In PaaS Clouds, security and management shift between cloud customers and providers depending 
on the cloud deployment model which could be Public, Private or Hybrid. The amount of 
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responsibility shouldered by each party can change depending on the model adopted[65]. Hence, 
the sensitivity of the data being stored as well as the target industry are significant factors that 
determine what type of PaaS cloud service deployment model customers’ purchase and the level of 
their security expectations. For instance, the security and management of a Public PaaS Cloud is 
significantly different compared to a service deployed on Private or Hybrid models. In Public PaaS 
Clouds, the cloud service provider is responsible for the security of the components of the cloud.  
The CSP manages the underlying infrastructure, networks, storage devices and operating systems. 
Tasks like monthly security patching, logging, and monitoring, scaling, fail over, and other system 
administration related tasks are provided by the vendor. This type of PaaS cloud model is called 
“Managed PaaS”, hence it is managed by the provider.  
In Private PaaS cloud environments, the customer is responsible for the security of the underlying 
infrastructure as well as the security and management of the cloud components. CSPs do not provide 
the abstraction of the infrastructure as customers have access and control to the underlying platform 
resources. This is also known as “Unmanaged PaaS”.  The customer is responsible for the entire 
security implementation and configuration on this cloud and has complete control over the 
underlying infrastructure and software. However, security provisions and their capabilities once 
implemented are provided by the CSP as security features in such on-premises clouds. 
In Hybrid PaaS Clouds, providers are responsible for security and management of the PaaS 
components, however the underlying infrastructure as well as data storages are managed by the 
customer. It offers the capability to deploy the PaaS software on both a private and public cloud but 
at the sacrifice of requiring the customer to manage the application stack and underlying 
infrastructure or resources[9]. In some Hybrid PaaS clouds, its architecture comprises of having 
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certain services within a Private PaaS cloud outsourced to be managed by a CSP or cloud vendor. 
This type of PaaS cloud model is also known as Semi-Managed PaaS, because both provider and 
customer share the responsibility of cloud security and management. 
Therefore, cloud service providers depending on the service they provide or customer base, need to 
come up with different service level agreements (SLAs) or terms and conditions of their security 
management in regards to customers’ security expectations. In most cases, organisations and 
businesses tend to adopt the Private or Hybrid PaaS Cloud services. This is typical as they require a 
higher level of security and relatively hold data they consider sensitive or are subject to government 
regulations to provide data confidentiality and avoid security breaches. On the other hand, customers 
who provide web based application or services such as social media data or a start-up or smaller 
company,  may be very risk tolerant and rank getting their web application services running at a low 
cost as a higher priority than investing in security and will considerably adopt a Public PaaS cloud 
service[9]. 
 PLATFORM-AS-A-SERVICE CUSTOMER TYPES 
Corporate Customers:  Cloud corporate customers in this category include private and public 
organisations, educational systems, government organisations, small businesses and multinational 
corporations. They constitute multiple or group of users and IT administrators that handle certain 
cloud service management roles and resources such as development of end user applications. Private 
and Hybrid PaaS cloud service models are common amongst large corporate cloud customers with 
small businesses much inclined to public cloud models during start-ups. However many large 




Individual Customers: Customers in this category include non-business or commercial cloud users 
such as single application developers and cloud enthusiasts. This type of customers do not own on-
premises infrastructures or datacentres which needs to be migrated to the cloud or linked in form of 
hybrid cloud services. Most single cloud customers subscribe to public cloud service models to 
provide top to bottom production PaaS cloud resources.  On the other hand, single customers could 
adopt private PaaS cloud models for test bed environments in the development of web applications. 
 PLATFORM-AS-A-SERVICE SECURITY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
Preserving the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and computer resources are critical 
security challenges of cloud computing. In addition to these, security considerations on PaaS include 
access and authorisation issues, working with distributed applications, and storage and data security 
[4]. Since the scalability of PaaS supports multi-tenancy, which allows many tenants deploy their code 
and share a common resource pool on a single data centre, security policies regarding how data is 
stored, secured and shared between multiple customers has to be made very clear[68]. This raises 
serious concerns when organisations and developers decide to go down the PaaS route. 
Since the security implementations on PaaS cloud environments are quite ambiguous and not 
properly communicated through SLAs and policies, understanding the cloud architecture, its 
components, security vulnerabilities, security risks, security mechanisms and controls implemented 
to mitigate such risks, are very significant in the adoption of a specific PaaS cloud platform. The ISO 
highlights the major security issues of PaaS as security of the PaaS platform itself (i.e., runtime 
engine), and security of customer applications deployed on a PaaS platform[7]. However, other issues 
such how data is stored and who has access to the data contributes to the challenges faced by this 
cloud delivery model. 
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PaaS customers have to constantly depend on both the security of web-hosted development tools, 
security of their developed applications as well as the security of the underlying infrastructure on 
which the cloud platform runs; which they do not have the assurance that the development 
environment tools provided by a PaaS provider are secure. These security issues are prevalent in 
cloud computing due to the overwhelming vulnerabilities presented through insecure interfaces and 
APIs, vulnerabilities in virtual machines, hypervisors, virtual networks, and virtual machine images. As 
with many evolving technologies, the lack of virtualisation industry standards has resulted in a 
number of vendor-specific best practices and recommendations that may or may not be applicable 
to a particular environment. Entities need to understand and evaluate their own environments to 
identify the unique risks virtualisation brings[69]. The following are detailed description of threats 
and vulnerabilities prevalent in PaaS Clouds. 
3.4.1  PAAS CLOUD VULNERABILITIES 
Nature and Characteristics of PaaS Cloud Environments:  The cloud’s distinctive nature of on-
demand self-service requires a management interface that’s accessible to cloud service users. The 
probability that unauthorised access could occur is much higher than for traditional systems where 
the management functionality is accessible only to a few administrators[70]. When an attacker gets 
possession of a legitimate client identity by theft or some other means, an authentication attack is 
initiated[71]. Hence, the nature of PaaS cloud environments like other cloud service models shares a 
common ubiquitous network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service. On the 
other hand, PaaS architecture is more prevalent to attacks as it is in the middle of the cloud 
deployment stack with access one part of the cloud facing an internal backend and the other facing 
multiple users via public internet. 
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Core-Technology Vulnerabilities: Web applications and services, virtualisation, and cryptography - 
have vulnerabilities that are either intrinsic to the technology or prevalent in the technology’s state-
of-the-art implementations[70]. These technologies have increased the exploitation of design and 
weaknesses inherent in the architectural design and technological issues relating to distributed 
integrated systems such as clouds. In PaaS Cloud models, the lack of security reviews at different 
phases of the security development lifecycle of PaaS cloud environments has created gaps which can 
be exploited by insider threats or external attacks. For instance, threats such as injection attacks, 
DDOS attacks and wireless security attacks have increased on cloud architectures due to various 
communication and network channels prevalent of ubiquitous on-demand technologies 
implemented on the cloud. On PaaS clouds, the network infrastructure is a significant component of 
the cloud. Communication between components of the cloud and resources creates an avenue for 
increased attacks through communication endpoints. The virtualised nature of the PaaS cloud 
environment also make network security difficult to implement when being compared with 
traditional distributed environments. 
Security Control Defects: The security controls and implementations in the cloud are known to be 
important in ensuring a holistic security approach is maintained in the cloud.  Apart from the core 
technologies mentioned as a vulnerability earlier, security controls such as cryptography and other 
security implementations have been fundamental. This is because it is unthinkable without the use 
of cryptography to protect the confidentiality and integrity of data in the cloud. Vulnerabilities and 
threats concerning insecure or obsolete cryptography are highly relevant in cloud computing[72]. 
Inadequate Security Offerings and Implementation: Buyers of commercial cloud services, 
especially software as a service (SaaS), are finding security provisions inadequate[73]. This is also 
66 
 
prevalent in other cloud deployment models such as IaaS and PaaS. Security provisions offered on 
various PaaS clouds by vendors differ. The ability to scale up security in the cloud can also depend 
on numerous factors from service level agreements to architecture and nature of the PaaS cloud 
environment. Security offering adequate to meet the needs of a particular user on PaaS clouds may 
seem inadequate to meet security requirements of other cloud users.  
3.4.2  THREATS TO PAAS CLOUDS 
Service- Level Threats: These threats are common to web services components and architectures 
within the cloud service model. These threats are prevalent on communication interfaces and end 
point channels of the PaaS cloud architecture.  The threats include man-in the-middle, brute force, 
injection, dictionary attacks and replay attacks. Others are cross-site scripting and session hijacking. 
The cloud is exposed to these threats due to vulnerabilities or weakness in the cloud design and 
security control defects in the cloud service model[71]. Other factors include the lack of security 
awareness during different stages of the development lifecycle of the cloud environment. These 
threats attack inadequacies found in security implementation used in the authorisation, 
authentication and access control of user credentials.  
Host-Level Threats: The Host on PaaS cloud architectures suggests servers that host web services, 
applications, operating systems, core kernel technologies and middleware libraries. It also include 
virtualisation technology hosts and communication channels to and from such hosts. Intrusive 
malicious software also known as Malware include Trojan horse, Spyware, Worms and Viruses all 
constitute serious host-level threats to PaaS Cloud architectures. Access control vulnerabilities can 
allow perceived threats such as eavesdropping due to unauthorised access. 
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Infrastructure- Level Threats: There are various infrastructures that make up the PaaS cloud model 
architecture which consists of mostly physical resources that support the network and storage 
services. Although they consist of physical servers, they constitute the backbone architecture of the 
distributed system that make up the cloud architecture. Threats to these infrastructures include 
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDOS), Hacking, Routing Attacks, Man- in- the- Middle Attacks, 
Spoofing, Eavesdropping and Replay Attacks. 
 PAAS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND DOMAINS 
Security requirements are engineered to specify a systems’ security policies and both policies and 
requirements should address security risks. Security mechanisms are then architected to fulfil the 
security requirements. Some of these concepts influence the engineering of security requirements, 
whereas others for instance security mechanisms, security vulnerabilities, and attacks, are influenced  
by the security requirements[74]. These concepts that influence security requirements by which they 




FIGURE 3.1: CONCEPTS THAT INFLUENCE AND ARE INFLUENCED BY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS [74] 
The Cloud Security Alliance suggests that with any area of security, organisations should adopt a risk 
based approach to moving to the cloud and selecting security options[49]. This should include a full 
risk assessment and a methodology for determining their security requirements. These security 
requirements are forged from a taxonomy of perceived user needs, security standards and practices 
and prioritised risk scenarios[75]. Depending on the nature of the deployment, new security risks will 
be introduced as well as the ownership of security controls will shift which may require more or 
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different types of controls[23]. However regardless of the nature of deployment, customers must 
have adequate governance and control over their entire environment. The onus of responsibility is 
on cloud customers to recognise their compliance objectives and requirements, establish a control 
environment and meet those objectives and requirements, and then validate that control 
environment is effective to the appropriate level[23]. Capturing security requirements is considered 
a tedious task, as good security requirements needs the requirements specified to be aware of the 
threat environment, regulatory compliance, security policies, security classification, service level 
objectives and knowledge of evolving security vulnerabilities[71].  
On the other hand, protecting and carefully managing customer requirements are crucial for 
establishing trustworthy Clouds and are the responsibility of CSPs[21]. Customer risks will vary 
depending on the CSPs and it is difficult for CSPs to meet individual needs of each customer. Hence 
CSPs try to obtain third party accreditation of their security claims which could relatively be time 
consuming and expensive[76]. The increase of third party accreditation is much on the rise by CSPs 
and indicates a good trend in cloud computing security, however what is important is for cloud 
customers to identify if given PaaS providers meet their requirements and how PaaS Cloud Service 
Providers rank against other PaaS CSPs. 
 In disparity to private cloud security, public cloud users do not have the luxury of being able to 
review details of or examine the security implementation, processes, and procedures of a public 
cloud. Not only is it not prudent for a CSP to expose technical details of cloud security, it also isn’t 
cost effective to meet the needs of individual consumers by sharing such information to win their 




However, customers still need to evaluate security controls implemented by CSPs to be certain they 
meet their requirements and mitigate risks that may affect business goals as identified through their 
risk assessment. It is common for cloud owners to assume that a move to the cloud will in some way 
reduce the need to validate or verify security controls operating effective[23]. Unfortunately, vendor 
claims about security are often made without sufficient justification—as the reality of vulnerability 
exposure and often poor security practices evidence. In addition, many cloud service providers may 
make vague representations of their security while also transferring all liability to customers[76]. 
Therefore in PaaS cloud service models, customers need to understand the environment, 
requirements and risks, define security control objectives as well as verify that controls in place are 
operating effectively. To evaluate security and privacy requirements, the  Cloud Standards Customer 
Council[10] suggests: 
 “A critical initial step for ensuring sufficient cloud security is establishing a classification scheme that 
applies throughout the enterprise, based on the criticality and sensitivity of enterprise data. This scheme 
should include details about data ownership, definition of appropriate security levels and protection 
controls, and a brief description of data retention and destruction requirements. The classification 
scheme should be used as the basis for applying controls such as access controls, archiving or 
encryption”. 
Our approach to this classification scheme is presented in Chapter 6. Customer requirement 
specifications  are enormous and could be delegated at different layers in the cloud[21]. These 
requirements consists of functional and non-functional requirements. Functional security 
requirements on PaaS clouds describes the security of the system and service operations. It 
comprises of the service model workflow operations, who has access to each part of the service and 
the security of the environment where applications are developed and deployed. Non-functional 
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requirements on the other hand, describes how the service model architecture function on each layer 
and how they comply with security and privacy of data in transit or at rest. The security requirements 
that determine the architecture of security solution are: confidentiality, authentication, single sign-
on, trust management, monitoring and logging, intrusion detection, data protection and isolation, 
and denial of service[71]. These requirements have been forged from the CSA’s cloud security 
domains which highlights areas of critical focus where security requirements as identified by 
customers could be mapped into. Careful categorisation of customer requirements would simplify 
their management and help in the direction of providing enforcement assurance measures[77]. The 
CSA focuses security guidance on two broad domain categories of cloud computing environments. 
The governance domain discusses the policy issues around cloud computing environment while the 
operational domain discusses the tactical security concerns and implementation within the 
architecture. Using this guidance, customer in depth security requirements are focused around the 
operational domain in PaaS, which highlights guidance with in depth security defence mechanisms 
which are linked to specified security controls. 
These security requirement specifications have been carefully identified and categorised based on 
operational security domains and are the ones relevant to PaaS cloud service models and not all 
other Cloud Computing delivery models as identified by the CSA Security Guidance. They include 
Identity and Access Management, Encryption and Key Management, Virtualisation Security, Network 





D1-Identity and Access Management: This requirement domain refers to the security and 
management of individual identities, authentication, authorisation and access to assets in an 
information system governed by policies and controls with appropriate privileges within the system. 
It is concerned with questions on, how is access restricted to protected resources and what kind of 
controls can be placed on such access? How are identities verified?[78]. In PaaS, customers have 
access to the environment via a web portal or management API. The whole identity and access 
management encompasses the ability of the PaaS and controls implemented to confirm and manage 
the life cycle of an assured identity (human/device/process), assigned properties of entities, manage 
permissions to perform an action in the cloud and also manage the lifecycle of digital credentials 
through authentication[79].  
This includes the management of the API as well as the security of the web portal interface. In multi-
tenant cloud environments such as PaaS, providers must segregate customer identity and 
authentication information while the identity and access management components should also be 
easily integrated with other security components on the cloud[80]. Identity and Access Management 
encompasses the trio of authentication, authorisation and access control of users within the cloud 
environment and revolves around API management and Web Security.  The service model must be 
able to identity and authenticate authorised customers while keeping out malicious and 
unauthorised users. Also in the process, it should also be able to ensure the session created by the 
authorised user is not hijacked before, during or after the authentication authorisation processes 
have been completed. The management of the API which involves use RESTful or SOAP services to 
prevent session hijacking and how session keys are exchanged during the authentication and 
authorisation handshakes between the customer and the PaaS cloud interface. As well as the  Web 
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Security should encompass the security of data in transit or channel during the authentication and 
authorisation handshakes to ensure the channel or session created is not hijacked or injected by 
malicious and unauthorised users.  
D2- Encryption and Key Management: Encryption of data before storage in the cloud is essential 
on public clouds due to the multi-tenant model. Ability to utilise cloud storage controls perhaps built 
in controls to enable encryption and segregation of data. One of the most difficult processes in public 
cloud computing typical to PaaS, is the management of symmetric or asymmetric keys used in the 
encryption of data. Maintaining proper key management and storage from unauthorised users is 
essential for security of data stored on public clouds. Managing access to keys securely is what 
separates a weak encryption from a strong one. Although data encryption helps protecting data 
confidentiality, it also obsoletes the traditional data utilisation service based on plain text keyword 
search. Thus, enabling an encrypted cloud data search service with privacy-assurance is of paramount 
importance [81]. On the other hand, keeping encrypted copies of same data in the cloud may affect 
system performance and incur high computational cost[82]. There are several types of encryption 
that should be considered which include storage, application level, network and edge of the cloud 
encryption. When strong encryption or cryptography is deployed properly, it is virtually difficult to 
break even by the most determined attacker[83]. This requirement domain expresses the strength of 
the encryption methods, access to encryption keys as well security of encryption key storage within 
the PaaS cloud service model. 
D3-Virtualisation Security: Virtualisation is the concept by which cloud computing is established. It 
is the mechanism that abstracts the coupling between the hardware and operating system [49] by 
presenting the host platform virtually. It refers to the abstraction of the underlying physical resources 
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to improve agility, flexibility, reduce cost and enhance return on investment. A virtualised 
environment ensures that each partition is completely isolated  from other partitions; as isolation is 
a fundamental property of virtualisation[71].  Basically virtualisation in the cloud is of different types 
which include server, storage and network virtualisation[49]. Having virtual machines run on the 
cloud brings about various challenges as well. Encryption of virtual machine images to prevent 
modification and theft at rest or when they are running. Access through virtualisation to resources 
and service running in the cloud requires protection against failovers through hardware load 
balancing. However, CSA[49] suggests providers have tried to satisfy virtualisation security as a 
service on a cloud platform but because these services take many forms and lack transparency 
regarding deployed security controls, they have caused market confusion and complicated the 
selection process of adequate controls. Virtualisation takes many forms. System virtualisation, also 
commonly referred to as server virtualisation, is the ability to run multiple heterogeneous operating 
systems on the same physical server. Other forms of virtualisation include storage virtualisation and 
network virtualisation, namely logical representations of the physical storage and network 
resources[84].  
In PaaS cloud service models, virtualisation security encompasses the security of the virtualised host 
or abstraction of all physical resources that enables the Middle-Tier and Front End stacks to run 
(storage and network virtualisation). It also comprises of the security of the virtual appliance, which 
is described as a pre-packaged software image designed to run inside a virtual machine[69]. Security 
requirement that encompasses virtualisation expresses the need to secure the abstraction from core 
physical platform resources and ensure isolation of multiple tenants using the same cloud service 
resource pool. It also expresses the security of the operating system and all other software or physical 
resources that make up the system. The timely application of security patches to the software and 
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reconfiguration or replacement of physical resources that host the abstraction layer as areas which 
virtualisation security covers.  Virtualisation security also constitutes file integrity management which 
is the method of ensuring that files such as sensitive system or application configuration files are not 
corrupted or changed to allow unauthorised access or malicious behaviour[85]. 
D4-Network Security:  This domain surrounds and expresses security and auditing mechanisms that 
are implemented to ensure the underlying security of the Front End and Back End architecture of the 
cloud. This include the security of the physical platform resources as well as the repository database 
management services. It also includes the security of communication channels and how they interact 
with the cloud environment. Although PaaS clouds are built upon physical infrastructures which will 
include traditional networking security implementations, it is important to note that the virtualised 
services it runs are not as mature as their traditional networking counterparts and  it is important to 
be aware of the current state of these virtualised services and what controls may need to be 
implemented at the virtualised and traditional network boundary[85].  
Network security requirements demand the isolation of networks through Virtual Local Area 
Networks (VLANs) and tunnelling. It involves the proper segregation of tenants and networks within 
the multi-tenant architecture. Giving tenants the ability to create applications and application 
containers from a list of allocated resource pools without interference or data leakage. It involves the 
appropriate methods of network isolation and segregation which is supported by identity and access 
management policies put in place. Network security requirements in this domain expresses the need 




D5-Database Security: Requirements in this domain are expressed through the security controls 
implemented on logical storage containers such as object/file storage, databases or VHDs, where 
data is stored or archived on a digital storage location. The entire data security lifecycle incorporates 
two aspects of where the data is located and who has access to these storage location from the 
creation of data to its sharing or destruction. In the developed framework which will be presented in 
Chapter 5, it highlights the monitoring and encryption of data in transit at the Middle-Tier layer of 
PaaS and also on the Back-End of data at rest. Security controls and implementation that mitigate 
risks of data leakage, modification, vulnerable host operating system, virtual machines and 
hypervisors can be provided by cloud providers as components of the platform cloud. Data stored 
however must not be stored in clear text [86] but encrypted using industry standard cryptography 
techniques and encryption/decryption keys properly managed [87][88]. Authorized access to data 
stored on PaaS requires a secured channel via the API which is more or less highlighted in the network 
security and identity and access management implemented on this channel.  
 EXISTING APPROACHES 
There have been an increasing number of studies and attempts in recent times to provide 
fundamental security management guidelines and techniques for assessing cloud computing 
security. These studies have offered various approaches in the area of security evaluation and 
assessment on PaaS and cloud computing in general. However, gaps have been identified which this 
research study fulfils in areas highlighted in the contributions to knowledge section of Chapter 1. 
This section discusses in detail,  a critical analysis of existing related research studies, developed 
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frameworks and approaches in the area of security management and implementation of PaaS cloud 
architectures and cloud computing. 
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria[89] developed in the U.S and issued in 1983, sets 
the basic requirements for assessing effectiveness of computer security controls implemented on 
computer systems. It was designed to evaluate security implementations in computer systems as well 
as to provide a standard to manufacturers as to what security features to build into their new and 
planned, commercial products in order to provide widely available systems that satisfy trust 
requirements (with particular emphasis on preventing the disclosure of data) for sensitive 
applications [89]. However an entity can only be classed as trustworthy if the parties or people 
involved in transactions with that entity rely on its credibility and trust in a cloud environment 
depends heavily on the selected deployment model, as governance of data and applications is 
outsourced and delegated out of the owner’s strict control[90]. 
The CSA Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) version 3.0 was designed for this purpose to provide a control 
framework that gives detailed understanding of security concepts and principles that are aligned to 
the Cloud Security Alliance guidance in 13 domains[49]. However, the CCM provides a more generic 
framework for all cloud services which recommends security controls to existing cloud delivery 
models and not specific controls for each individual model.  Although the CCM is a good starting 
point and provides guidelines in ensuring security on cloud service models, it is not mapped to suit 
individual cloud service model architectures and not based on security requirements of cloud 
customers. The CCM does not provide a systematic way for cloud customers to evaluate cloud 
providers based on the security requirements identified by the customer. 
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The CSA through the CCM provides control specifications which emphasises business information 
security control requirements by combining existing industry standards to reduce security threats 
and vulnerabilities in the cloud. The Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire v3.0.1 (CAIQ) 
on the other hand provides an exhaustive list of questions which customers can ask providers based 
on security offerings and implementation. However with the answered questions, cloud customers 
are faced with the tasks of evaluating the cloud architecture to ensure security provided by the 
provider is fit for purpose. 
In a survey conducted by Subashini and Kavitha[91], a taxonomy presented which compared the 
similarities and differences between architectures of existing cloud service delivery models. Although 
few security controls implemented on different PaaS clouds were identified, the study did not 
describe what risks they mitigated. The study also did not provide in detail, security mechanisms 
implemented in the cloud and how they meet industry standard requirements. 
In a study by Wu and Buyya[45] a detailed approach was provided for  evaluating security and privacy 
in cloud computing by comparing security provisions offered by Amazon EC2, Windows Azure and 
Google App Engine. The study also attempts to answer security concerns raised by cloud customers 
who are curious to know what CSPs are doing to ensure security of their data in the cloud. Although, 
the study is useful for novice customers who are sceptical about cloud adoption and security, it does 
not provide security professionals with extensive details of the type of controls implemented to meet 
industry security attributes or requirements. The study also did not highlight security mechanism 
implemented within cloud components or demonstrate how they are integrated to meet specified 
security attributes. However, the research serves as a source of motivation and offers an initial 
strategy in the identification of security provisions offered by these CSPs. 
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In a study by Da Silva et al.[92], an approach was put forward for management of cloud computing 
security using the GQM (Goal-Question-Metric) methodology to develop a security metrics hierarchy 
to produce a security index as a criteria by which cloud security can be measured. This approach 
provides the avenue to evaluate security based on management priorities. 
A developed framework was presented in the study by Kalloniatis et al.[93] to support selection of 
cloud providers based on security and privacy requirements. The framework provided a systematic 
and structured approach that enables software engineers to identify security and privacy 
requirements. Although the framework is useful for corporate cloud customers to identify their 
security requirements based on their organisational goals, it does not support individual customers 
and how their requirements can be identified. The study also does not address the evaluation process 
based on the identified requirements to understand risks in the selection of cloud providers. 
Customers will still require the use of an evaluation framework, depending on the cloud service 
architecture; to conduct a security risk assessment to ensure identified requirements are met by 
providers. 
In Abbadi’s cloud security and management study[21], emphasis was made on the analysis of cloud 
properties in an attempt to assess operational trust of services delivered by cloud service providers 
and ensure cloud customers make the right choice in the selection of IaaS CSPs. Although cloud 
properties listed as reliability, resilience and availability; which revolve around information security 
were identified; the security parameters and domains that govern these properties were not 
described. The study concluded the types and terms of SLAs can help determine cloud security 




In a study by Nabeel et al.[77], a framework was proposed to evaluate trust on IaaS clouds. The 
framework presented a data gathering process of logs within the cloud service and the 
corresponding result can be used to determine the level of trust. However, the study did not discuss 
in detail, how trust is measured and how trust on IaaS clouds can vary depending on the security 
implementations configured on the cloud service. 
In a study by Saripalli and Walters[94], a quantitative impact and risk assessment framework for cloud 
security was proposed. The framework proves useful in assessing and identifying the risk on cloud 
environments based on a scale of high, moderate and low; which can therefore be used to evaluate 
security implementations in such cloud environments.  A new methodology for security evaluation  
in cloud computing was presented as an extension of the ISO 27001:2005 standard in an attempt to 
add more control objectives and make the standard robust. 
Subashini and Kavitha[95] in their work suggested the development of a framework 
conceptualisation of the cloud security based on real world security system where it security depends 
on the requirement and asset value of an individual or Organisation. They concluded that the 
heterogeneous nature of cloud service models makes them dynamic and hence a dynamic approach 
on security should be considered. Therefore the strength in security is directly proportional to the 
value of the asset it guards on such clouds. 
In a study by Probst et al.[96], an approach for security evaluation and analysis in cloud computing 
was proposed. The approach is focused on evaluation of access control policies within the cloud 




In a study by Almorsy et al.[97], a tenant oriented security management architecture was presented 
which allows service providers to enable their tenants in defining, customising and enforcing their 
security requirements without having to go back to application developers for maintenance or 
security customisations. Their research study however is specific and relevant to SaaS cloud 
environments and security of already developed applications. 
In a study by Zardari and Bahsoon[98], they presented an approach by using obstacles for 
systematically modelling, analysing and mitigating risks in cloud adoption. Although the approach 
proves effective in performing a match between customer service goals and features of a cloud 
service provider, they however concluded that the analysis of managing risks and mismatches is 
down to the judgement of the evaluation team. They also concluded that a requirement engineering 
framework is needed to help cloud users in elaborating and specifying user requirements and 
matching it to the cloud provider’s features. They added that such dynamic selection of cloud with 
respect to user requirements is challenging to achieve. 
 SUMMARY 
Security on Platform-as-a-Service cloud models involves the understanding of the security and 
management responsibilities shared by customers and cloud service providers. It also involves 
identifying different types of customers and service delivery models. In this chapter, a detailed 
discussion on the relevant operational security requirements using the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) 
operational domain to categorise and identify security requirements specification relevant to 
individual customer needs in PaaS clouds.   
Existing and related works that contributed to and motivated this study were also discussed as well 
as gaps in these studies were analysed in detail. These related research studies agree that for a cloud 
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to be trustworthy and secure, security requirements need to be assessed and evaluated against 
certain criteria to ensure they are fit for purpose. These requirements include requirements laid out 
by customers and adhered to be security provisions offered by CSPs. Although major input in the 
field provide baselines and guidelines for establishing security and trustworthiness in cloud 
computing, an approach for identifying and evaluating PaaS security implementations based on 
customer demands are yet to be developed. This is however due to the difficulties surrounding 
gathering and classification of requirements specific to customers and unique to different cloud 
service deployment and delivery models. 
This research uses existing and related works in the field as a spring board to develop a framework 
that can be deployed to identify customer security requirements, classify them into categories of 
security levels and assess whether security provisions offered and implemented are able to meet the 












 RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGIES 
 INTRODUCTION 
The pragmatic approach to research for this study involves the use of mixed research methods to 
achieve the aims and objectives stated earlier in Chapter 1. The approach involves using the method 
which appears best suited to the research problem. Mixed methods research is an approach to 
inquiry involving collecting both quantitative and qualitative data, integrating the two forms of data, 
and using distinct designs that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical 
frameworks[99]. The research approach for this study constitutes a multiphase mixed methods 
design introduced using a research process cycle which is common in the fields of evaluation and 
program interventions. In this cycle, concurrent or sequential strategies are used in tandem to best 
achieve the aim of the study and highlight the original contributions to knowledge. 
 RESEARCH METHODS 
4.2.1   PRIMARY RESEARCH 
Evaluation Methodology 
The security evaluation, testing, risk assessment, and protection profiling (PPs) of information 
systems are processes in which the evidence for assurance is analysed against criteria for security 
functionality and assurance level[100][101]. This method involves a process in which the evidence for 




According to Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM/ISO/IEC 
21827)[102], security metrics are important indicators of how well security services are present in an 
information system and can be used to measure its security maturity level. This includes identifying 
security goals, assessing security posture and supporting security life cycle of the information system. 
In this research, the evaluation method involves development of a security evaluation framework 
made up of control specifications from IT industry security standards, security requirements for PaaS 
clouds and security parameters which serve as criteria for measuring security functionalities and 
assurance level of the cloud architecture.  Therefore, the identified criteria forges a baseline for the 
use of the evaluation methodology in the assessment of security controls and implementations on 
PaaS cloud environments. 
In the initial phase of the framework development, a critical evaluation and analysis of PaaS cloud 
architectures was conducted. This enabled the segregation of the cloud architecture into layers which 
enables the identification of components within the cloud architectures. The segregation into cloud 
layers as well as identification of components in each layer is termed a reference model for evaluating 
PaaS cloud architectures.  Components of the framework that will be used to evaluate each layer of 
the cloud architecture are forged and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
The second phase of the evaluation method involves the deployment of the developed framework 
to assess and evaluate security provisions and their implementations in PaaS cloud models based on 
scenarios. The deployment of the framework is aimed at the objective of testing the effectiveness of 
the framework in the evaluation process. Techniques that are considered for the evaluation 





To classify customer security requirements that are expected to be met by security 
implementations in PaaS cloud models, a set of scenarios is developed. These 
scenarios represent profiles for individual PaaS cloud models and includes their 
respective security requirements.  The scenario comprises of a storyline describing 
the intended cloud service usage, service level objects, perceived threats and use 
pattern for the cloud model by the customer. They therefore create baselines for the 
customer’s security requirements analysis. 
b. Simulation 
This technique involves the building of computer simulations and models that represent the 
actual system in order to perform experiments or tests. 
Using this technique, the researcher intends to use findings from the evaluation and 
developed framework to set up a PaaS environment simulated on a single computer or 
distributed computer systems. Security mechanisms prevalent on existing PaaS cloud 
architectures will be implemented in this environment. This will create a test bed for the 
experimental approach to determine the effectiveness of the developed framework and how 
security mechanism implemented on the platform meet security requirements on PaaS 
private clouds. 
c. Experiments (Testing and Assessment) 
To find out how effectively the security framework meets the requirements and addresses 
security issues, it is necessary to perform an experiment on the simulation model already 
built.  According to [16] “Since models are a description of reality, it is important to assess 
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these models and test their validity.  In order to assess a model, the scientific methodology 
consists of making hypotheses and testing them through experiments”.  
The security mechanisms architecture in PaaS cloud models in the scenarios will be assessed 
based on security implemented in the simulation environment and tested for security 
vulnerabilities.  This internal testing and assessment process will involve conducting series of 
vulnerability assessments and audits with the intention of verifying the capabilities of security 
implementations in the cloud models. It will involve the assessor adopting privilege access to 
the cloud models in order to conduct the assessment.  In addition, a vulnerability log is 
produced which highlights layers and security domains within the cloud architecture where 
threats can be launched. The assessment and analysis will help determine how effective the 
framework is, in the evaluation of security in PaaS clouds based on security mechanisms 
implemented on each component of the cloud. Techniques that will be used in the security 
assessment and testing are categorised and described as follows: 
 Manual Techniques 
In this study, the use of manual techniques for security testing and assessment by actively interacting 
with the PaaS Cloud models without the use of automated tools. These manual techniques include: 
1. Privilege Elevation- This involve the intentional elevation of an attacker’s privileges to 
ensure how well the system can be compromised once authorised entry is gained into the 
system. It creates the avenue for the exploitation of vulnerabilities by the attacker. 
2. URL Manipulation -URL manipulation is the process of manipulating the website URL query 
strings & capture of the important information by hackers. This happens when the application 
uses the HTTP GET method to pass information between the client and the server. 
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3. Reconnaissance - It also involves gathering information by observing how the security 
implementations are coordinated to perform security verifications, validations, 
authentications and authorisations in order to gain first-hand knowledge. 
4. Security Examination- This involves the checking, inspecting, reviewing, observing, 
studying, or analysing one or more assessment objects to facilitate understanding, achieve 
clarification, or obtain evidence on the security behaviour of a system. The security 
examination technique in this study involves exploiting privileged access to inspect, review, 
observe and study the extent to which an attacker which similar privileges would be able to 
access data and information resources in order to compromise security in the cloud. 
 Automated Tools 
This involves the use of automated tools to scan the system for compliance with host 
application usage and security policies and security vulnerabilities. A vulnerability 
assessment is an automated scan to determine basic flaws in a system. This can be either 
network or application vulnerability scanning, or a combination of both. The common factor 
here is that the scan is automated and generates a report of vulnerabilities or issues that may 
need to be addressed. It also involves the process of identifying live components and services 
that exist on those components in the PaaS cloud model. For the purpose of the testing 
methodology, we considered the use of various software applications which perform both 
reconnaissance and scanning. 
[1] Microsoft Baseline Security Analyser (MBSA) - This software tools enable checks for 
updates of the operating system, data access components (MDAC), MSXML (Microsoft 
XML Parser), .Net Framework and SQL Server. The tool enables information gathering 
through scans for insecure configuration settings. The tools will be used to scan security 
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configurations within the private cloud architecture and server infrastructure for possible 
vulnerabilities. 
[2] Microsoft Baseline Configuration Analyser (MBCA) - This tool will help scan for issues 
within the private cloud architecture to maintain optimal system configuration and 
analyse against a predefined set of best practices and reporting results of the analyses.  
These analyses will be performed on the server that hosts the Windows Azure Pack. This 
enables the scan to be performed across all layers and components within the cloud 
architecture.  
[3] Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 
Nessus is a remote security scanning tool, which scans a computer and raises an alert if it 
discovers any vulnerabilities that malicious hackers could use to gain access. It is one of 
the most widely used application for vulnerability, configuration and compliance 
assessments.  It supports a broad range of operating systems, databases, applications in 
physical, virtual and cloud infrastructures. It also supports non-credentialed, remote 
scans; credentialed, local scans for deeper, granular analysis of assets; and offline auditing 
on a network device’s configuration.  It consists of lightweight programs that collate 
vulnerability and compliance data and relays its findings as a report. Nessus also provides 
the ability to locally audit a specific machine for vulnerabilities, compliance specifications, 
content policy violations, and more [103]. 
In this study, Nessus will be deployed as part of the security assessment for private PaaS 
cloud environment to detect possible vulnerabilities and generate reports in the 
evaluation and assessment of security implementations in private PaaS cloud model. 
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4.2.2  SECONDARY RESEARCH 
Grey Literature Survey 
Grey literature is an important source of information. Though not scholarly, it is produced by 
researchers and practitioners in the field.  It can often be produced more quickly, have greater 
flexibility, and be more detailed than other types of literature. The use of grey literature in this 
research enables the gathering of up to date information on security provisions and mechanisms 
published through technical reports and white papers by cloud service providers and cloud security 
analysts. It provides a valuable source of information on existing cloud architectures, security 
features, security mechanisms and configuration capabilities that surrounds PaaS cloud security 
requirements domain.  Rather than conduct a primary research through questionnaires and surveys 
to find out security capabilities and limitations offered by certain cloud service provider in the 
scenarios, the use of grey literature allowed the collation of widely accepted and publicly available 
resources, considered to be valuable with little or no cost to acquire.  
Documentation Review 
This approach under secondary research requires the gathering of known industry security 
assessment documentation that discuss details of similar technologies and security implementations 
used in PaaS cloud environments. This includes established reports, templates, journals and articles 
that provide evidence to security reports and vulnerabilities in the security evaluation and assessment 
process. It also focuses on technical accuracy and completeness which include security policies, 
architectures, and requirements; standard operating procedures; system security plans and 
authorisation agreements; memoranda of understanding and agreement for system 




In summary, this chapter discusses the research methods that are relevant and applicable to the 
study. The primary research methods considered for this study enables proper resource gathering 
and support procedures necessary to conduct an evaluation. The use of various methods and 
techniques that constitute a thorough evaluation and assessment of the PaaS cloud architectures 
and security controls were clearly presented. The secondary research method provides adequate 
evidence from literature which helps in the gathering of information which would have been difficult 





 FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter discusses the development of an adaptive security framework which has been designed 
to evaluate security controls and mechanisms implemented on each layer of the cloud model. A 
detailed description of each phase of the framework processes is discussed and presented in a table 
including security risks that affect each layer of the cloud architecture and how the framework can 
be adopted by PaaS cloud customer and security auditors to evaluate security mechanisms 
implemented on PaaS cloud models.  
 PAAS SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROCESS CYCLE 
Similar to the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) Management Cycle or Deming Cycle in Information 
Security Management Systems (ISMS) is an iterative method for the control and continuous 
improvement of security processes and products. In this study, the PaaS security management cycle 
(Figure 5.1), describes specifically, the various phases of the information security management 
processes considered in the evaluation, assessment and review of security controls on PaaS cloud 
models. 
The cycle is used to present a wider picture of how the research presented in this thesis contributes 
to existing knowledge and developments in the area of security assessment and management. As 
presented in figure 5.1, the PaaS security management cycle, developed as part of this work, aligns 
with the ISMS and consist of 8 processes that are required for the security requirements identification 
and management. The security framework presented in this chapter is designed to be used across 7 


































FIGURE 5.1: PAAS SECURITY MANAGEMENT CYCLE 
[1] Service Level Objectives- In this process the generic service level objectives are identified 
by the cloud customer otherwise known as business requirements. It allows customers to 
describe several expectations and service level offerings expected to be delivered by the 
cloud service provider. This phase creates a typical scenario for security requirements 
amongst other functional and non-functional requirements a user may have. There are 
several factors that determine a customer’s service level objectives. These include the value 
of the data assets, programming language of choice supported by the platform, uptime and 
downtime statistics, security risks and risk assessment, scalability, cost and return on 
investment. 
[2] Identification of Security Requirements- This process allows the establishment of the 
scenario for the evaluation of the PaaS cloud model. PaaS cloud customers are expected to 
specify their desired security requirements using the security classification which describes 
the level of security controls and implementations. For each specified requirement, a scenario 
emerges and statistics generated which are used to determine the critical security areas of 
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focus as well as essential security requirements. An approach for identifying and classification 
of security requirements is presented in this study. 
[3] Segregation of PaaS Cloud Architecture- During this process the PaaS cloud architecture 
is segregated into three: Front End, Middle Tier and Back End layers. The segregation enables 
us to identify components of the cloud architecture that provide different services and how 
the cloud infrastructure is integrated to support the environment. The segregation of the 
cloud architecture enables the identification of security areas within the cloud where controls 
and mechanisms are implemented for the purpose of security evaluation. A generic three 
layer architecture reference model has been developed in this study which can be used for 
various PaaS cloud service delivery and deployment models. 
[4] Identifying Critical Security Areas of Focus- The identification and classification of security 
requirements and priorities enable customers to identify critical layers in the PaaS cloud 
architecture where security evaluation needs to be focused. Using a quantitative method of 
data gathering, customers can identify areas within the cloud architecture where their security 
requirements are prioritised as well as where security evaluation should be centred.  A security 
mapping matrix, developed as part of this study has been designed to establish the critical 
areas within the cloud architecture where security requirements and provisions can be clearly 
identified. 
[5] Cloud Layer Management /Responsibility- The objective of this process is to identify 
stakeholders responsible for the security management of a specific security area of focus or 
layer. This could either be the CSP or customer or both. The security mapping matrix 
presented in Chapter 6, clearly highlights stakeholders responsible for the security 
management in each layer of the PaaS cloud. 
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[6] Identification of Security Controls- The objective of this process is to identify the security 
controls implemented on the critical area of focus layers of the PaaS cloud architecture. It 
also relates to the security provision or capabilities that could be configured to enhance 
security on the critical area(s) of the PaaS cloud model. The security evaluation framework 
developed and deployed in this study enables the identification of security mechanisms and 
controls within security domains and architecture layers of the PaaS cloud. 
[7] Cloud Layer Security Assessment - This process allows identification of security 
vulnerabilities or gaps that are not mitigated to an acceptable level after the evaluation of 
security controls and implementations phase. The objective of this phase is to determine if 
the risks of each layer of the cloud is reduced based on the security controls implemented of 
each layer or the security implementation capabilities it enables. A significant result of the 
analysis and assessment result will help determine the risk (High, Medium or Low) and 
vulnerabilities of each layer in the cloud service model. 
[8] Evaluation of Security Controls- The objective of this process is to assess the identified 
security controls against the security requirements and classifications identified by the 
customer. This phase involves the assessment of the security features and offering of the 
cloud service considering the implementation of security controls and configuration to 
determine the security capabilities and limitations of the cloud service model. The process 






 ANALYSIS OF PAAS CLOUD ARCHITECTURES 
This section discusses the segregation of PaaS Cloud models and architecture into three distinct 
layers, which lead to development of the PaaS layers reference model. It further discusses the 
components of each layer and how they integrate to provide the service through its design and 
architecture. The most compelling challenge associated with distributed systems is the issue of 
security. Like all distributed systems which cloud computing is, the complexity of issues arises from 
the different points of vulnerability that exists in a distributed system[71]. The PaaS cloud architecture 
is made up of several components which consists of software tools and resources that are fully 
integrated as part of the development environment. This include physical resources, databases, 
services and system software over a distributed network accompanied with development languages 
and application frameworks. These components provide the building blocks for  developers to create 
from simple websites to complex applications[105]. In order to consider it as a cloud computing 
offering, PaaS clouds must offer a way to create user interfaces, and thus support standards such as 
HTLM, JavaScript, or other rich media technologies[33]. 
Customers must be able to interact with the PaaS  service model to enter and retrieve data, perform 
actions, get results and to the degree that the provider allows it, customise the service involved[33]. 
The PaaS should have built-in scalability of deployed applications including load balancing and 
failovers. It should also integrate with various web services and databases using common industry 
standards for flexibility. These components within the cloud architecture provide the service and 
experience for the customer in the development and deployment of applications.  
Identifying how these components are stacked within the cloud architecture and how they integrate 
to provide secured communication of data in transit, data at rest and isolation of multi-tenant 
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customers’ instances, provides the basis for the PaaS cloud model and the mitigation of security risks 
in the cloud. On the other hand, the identification of these components enable us to also pinpoint  
the security mechanisms and controls implemented on these integrated software tools and physical 
resources in the evaluation and assessment of information security on PaaS clouds. Figure 5.2 shows 
the PaaS cloud architecture segregated into layers. At the bottom of the stack is the platform physical 
resources that hosts the abstraction and operating system and network nodes. Access to this layer 
depends on the type of PaaS cloud model and responsibility of stakeholder managing the layer. 
The segregation of PaaS cloud into three distinctive layers was done based on the functionality of 
the environment and the architecture of distributed systems of this nature. Although some CSPs may 
offer combined IaaS and PaaS or SaaS and IaaS cloud services on a single cloud service model, the 
segregation represented in our reference model consists of components and system functionalities 
that are centred to the provision of PaaS clouds only.  A rigorous study of various existing PaaS cloud 
environments which include Windows Azure[106], Google App Engine[107] and OpenShift Origin[2] 
were conducted in order to understand PaaS cloud architecture (See Appendix A). The similarities in 
PaaS cloud architectures having components that include compute, storage and networking as the 
main service provisions that facilitates application development coupled with physical resources and 
application programming interfaces that allow these components to communicate, integrate and 
function seamlessly. It enabled the development and description of a three layer model that 
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FIGURE 5.2:  PAAS CLOUD LAYERS AND COMPONENT -REFERENCE MODEL 
 
The remainder of this section provides a detailed description of each cloud layer and their respective 
components. 
Layer 1 – Front End:  This layer combines the developer user interface (UI) and service management 
portal. The Front-End presents the web services commonly known as the service- level. The interface 
consists of the application programming interface (API) which serves as the interface between the 
developer and the Platform-as-a-Service cloud environment. APIs present a user or developer with 
the platform to interact with the cloud service or have access to the cloud service to develop web 
based applications. It controls data flow and communication with the software and physical resources 
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depending on the provider and stakeholder management responsibility. The user is only able to 
access the PaaS using the API provided by the CSP or using an open standard API which is compatible 
with the PaaS as recommended by the service provider. Most APIs are web based and are 
implemented to support Representational State Transfer (REST) and or Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP). The developer interface serves as the first line of entry to the abstraction layer for 
any user developing web based applications on PaaS. These APIs are designed to provide access and 
functionality for the platform cloud environment. This means integration with databases, messaging 
systems, portals, and even storage components[108].  
The API comprises of software and applications libraries which enable it to interact with application 
development tools hosted on the Middle-Tier Layer. Software libraries made up of the service 
oriented-architecture (SOA) sits in between the API and OS to perform API calls which include service 
requests and response.  The libraries ensure seamless integration of the various common and 
uncommon components of the PaaS cloud environment to interact with the front end user API and 
also with the Backend and logical storage databases of the platform. In Windows Azure for instance, 
the API is referred to as a Service Management API (SMAPI)[109]. Access to the PaaS storages or 
services is through the SMAPI over web services which enable customers to manage their data store 
and developed apps. On the other hand, customers can have access made through API programming 
command lines downloaded and installed via a Software Development Kit (SDK) such as Virtual 
Studio Web Express. A cloud service that provides just user management access through a web 
browser alone is regarded as a SaaS but alternatively through a command line API is a PaaS. The 
Front End layer in PaaS cloud architectures provide the avenue for the developer to ensure that 
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developed and deployed web based applications function correctly and are monitored on the 
platform. 
Layer 2 – Middle-Tier:  This layer sits in the middle of the stack, hence the name. It consists of the 
Abstraction (Virtualisation), Runtime Engine, Software Development Kit (SDK) and Operating System. 
The layer also hosts the application container and application database management system and 
communicates with the Front End and Back End layers through APIs or network communication 
channels allowed by the CSP. End users of developed applications have access through interfaces 
dedicated to applications and repository resources useful to the applications as shown in Figure 5.2. 
The runtime engine consist of modules that convert the programming language to machine 
language and services such as compiling, debugging, generation of source code and deployment of 
application to the application container. It interacts with other components on the platform by 
making API calls. Coupled with the Runtime Engine is the SDK. The SDK contains various executable 
files and software tools that invoke the runtime engine and enables the customer to develop 
applications based on the programming language. Both the Runtime Engine and SDK make up the 
runtime system or environment. In Windows Azure, this environment is known as the Development 
Fabric and on Google is referred to as the App Engine runtime environment.  
The abstraction component provides a virtualised representation of the underlying hardware where 
the Middle-Tier layer sits. Abstraction invokes the physical resources such as processors, memory, 
disk and network capacities, combined with the operating system to create instances of the runtime 
environment for multiple customers. It also provides access to storage devices which are often 
replicated for redundancy[33].The pool of resources ranging for physical to storage resources are 
shared through load balancing which not only shields the customer from the service-based 
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architecture but also enables the PaaS delivery to be scaled in order to  improve high availability and 
reduce service failover. In most PaaS cloud architectures, the Middle-Tier layer comprises of the 
computer, storage and network which are abstracted from the underlying hardware resources. These 
represent processing power to compile and execute software codes and libraries, store some sort of 
data on a repository and also connect several multi-tenant nodes through a network to resource 
pools of the underlying physical platform resources and dedicated nodes. 
Layer 3 - Back End: This layer is made up of physical platform resources that hosts the PaaS 
architecture and network nodes. Depending on the type of PaaS service cloud model, platform 
physical resources could be in form of virtualised servers or bare metal servers that run within a 
distributed network. The layer also consists of a repository Database Management System (DBMS) 
that hosts the entire cloud data. The DBMS stores data for different customer accounts, profiles and 
instances of multi-tenant cloud customers which could be stored on either object/files storage, 
databases or virtual hard drives. Since the abstraction presents a logical representation of the Back 
End, the storage component of PaaS presents logical storage capacity for the backend data. For 
example, if a developer’s application deployed in the cloud requires a backend data pool for 
resources to run correctly, the data can be stored on these logical storage allocations to serve this 
purpose. Certain virtual hard drives (VHDs) store guest OSes which enables the creation of virtual 
machines that run on the cloud platform. However, this is peculiar to PaaS clouds that support the 
creation of virtual machine instances as part of the cloud service solution offered by the vendor. 
The hardware and network consists of the network nodes and disk allocation space on the physical 
machine or datacentre. This ensures that the right disk space is allocated during the creation of VMs 
and ensures that multi-cloud tenants can share resources from the same datacentre. This component 
also maintains failovers and availability of the cloud platform. Access to the Back End is done via 
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APIs, which enables a connection to be established from the Front End through the Middle-Tier. The 
repository DBMS can be accessed via a connection string through identification and access 
management parameters configured for authentication and authorisation of users. 
 PAAS SECURITY EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
The PaaS security evaluation framework was developed to be used in different phases of the security 
requirements identification and management process cycle. The framework is designed to provide a 
security mapping tool for cloud customers to assess the security implementations put in place to 
mitigate security risks on the cloud. It is aimed at providing a detailed template for understanding  
the security mechanisms, security methods, security threats and security requirements domain that 
enable security evaluation and assessment to be conducted on various PaaS cloud models once 
security requirements have been identified by the cloud customer. The overall architecture of the 


























These can be described as characteristics, features, or measurable factors that can help in defining 
the security provisions and offerings of a particular system. They are the measurable factors by which 
security provisions in the PaaS clouds are defined. The security parameters for the evaluation 
framework are defined as follows: 
 PaaS Components:  Components within each layer of the PaaS Cloud model. 
 Security Domains: These are a list of security operational domains which focus on tactical 
security concerns and implementation within the cloud architecture as described by the 
CSA[49]. 
 Security Threats: List of events or actions that could cause loss of data or damage to the 
cloud environment. Threats exploit vulnerabilities within the cloud security architecture and 
sources of risks to the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of components, 
resources and assets in the cloud. They are categorised into three types which are Service, 
Host and Infrastructure level threats discussed in Chapter 3. 
 Security Methods:  This describes the procedures or techniques that are used to secure the 
layer of cloud architecture from vulnerabilities, threats and risks. 
 Security Mechanisms: It describes a group of security features and methods such as tools, 
protocols, applications or procedures for enforcing security policies in the PaaS cloud 
environment. 
 Security Controls:  Describes a type of security mechanism that provides security capabilities 





The framework architecture’s foundations rest on industry best practices of identifying security 
domains that surround customer security requirements and tailoring these requirements into a 
security architecture framework. This enables customers to understand where specific security 
controls are being implemented within the cloud architecture. As an evaluation framework, it 
provides clarity and can be scaled to customer security requirements in an information security 
management system to access security compliance, capabilities and limitations in order to provide a 
gap analysis. The elements in each component of the framework are presented in Table 5.1 where 
security controls can be identified and completed into the table, once the security evaluation and 
analysis have been conducted. The framework consists of security parameters applicable to each 
cloud layer. These are presented in table in columns and rows. Each row closely matches with the 
PaaS three layers, while the seven columns highlight the security parameters that help define the 
security architecture of the PaaS cloud service deployment models. The detailed description of each 
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Database Security Encryption Method 
 

























































Encryption Method  
 















Access Control Methods 

















Data Isolation Mechanism 
 
 






















Asymmetric/  Symmetric Encryption 
 
 
Custom Key Management 
 













Note: In the Table above, the Security Controls column is blank. Security controls relevant to each 
cloud layer and component will be indicated in the column once security evaluation is completed. 
Customers intending to use the framework to evaluate security implementations in a PaaS cloud 
architecture would be required to complete the column with relevant controls found in reference to 
their security requirements as identified from their security evaluation of their chosen PaaS cloud 
model. 
 SUMMARY 
Security evaluation and assessment is a process that has to be reviewed constantly to ensure the 
security controls implemented are fit for purpose in mitigating identified security vulnerabilities and 
threats. The Framework described in this chapter provides a granular detailed approach for security 
evaluation of security controls on PaaS cloud models. It provides cloud security analysts with a model 
which can be used to evaluate security solutions implemented in each layer of the PaaS cloud 
environment. The security parameters serve as components for the framework which allows specific 





 IDENTIFYING CRITICAL SECURITY AREAS OF FOCUS 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes a systematic and adaptive approach in identifying critical security areas of 
focus within the PaaS cloud architecture.  The chapter begins with an overview of layered security 
which is used to describe security levels based on classification of security objects such as security 
mechanism and features. The criteria used in the classification of security requirements in each 
security domain, is based on the multi-level security attributes of security mechanisms and features 
implemented to mitigate security threats and vulnerabilities. With the use of a security mapping 
matrix, customers are able to determine critical areas in PaaS cloud model architectures where their 
security implementations can be assessed, evaluated and reviewed. The security mapping matrix uses 
a quantitative method of analysis to gather security requirements classified as high, moderate or 
basic from the customers service level objectives to determine critical security areas of focus in the 
cloud architecture. 
6.1.1  LAYERED SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE 
The use of multi-layered security also known as defence in-depth, describes a defensive strategy 
featuring multiple defensive layers that are designed to slow down an attacker or intruder [110]. A 
holistic security approach should consist of multiple methods - user training, strengthened security 
policies and compliance screening, threat monitoring and targeted application protections, network 
and user access controls, encryption and system auditing, to protect against data loss[111].Therefore 
the security level of such holistic approach depends on the layer of security implemented and how 
strong the defence mechanism is.  
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It should be obvious that many common security mechanisms can be described as classifiers or have 
important aspects that fit into the framework of classification[112].With this approach in mind, 
security levels can be drafted based on the layers of security mechanisms implemented to provide 
security within security domains in PaaS clouds. The more rigid the security layers are, the higher the 
security level.  On the other hand, these layered security must be compliant to industry models 
relevant to the data, assets and resources shared, stored or transmitted in the cloud. Examples of 
these compliance models include the PCI DSS, GBLA, FISMA, HIPAA and HITECH. 
 SECURITY LEVEL CLASSIFICATION 
The classification of customer security requirements and security provisions implemented  in PaaS 
clouds can be classified based on information security objectives and impact levels associated with 
information security, which affects the confidentiality and integrity of information should it be 
compromised[113]. Security requirements specifications and security provisions alike can be 
classified based on the potential impact to the preservation of security in the cloud. Table 6.1, shows 











TABLE 6.1: POTENTIAL IMPACT DEFINITIONS FOR SECURITY OBJECTIVES [114]
 Potential Impact 
Security Objectives Low Moderate High 
Confidentiality The unauthorised disclosure of information 
could be expected to have a limited adverse 
effect on organisational operations, 
organisational assets, or individuals. 
The unauthorised disclosure of information 
could be expected to have a limited adverse 
effect on organisational operations, 
organisational assets, or individuals. 
The unauthorised disclosure of information 
could be expected to have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse effect on organisational 
operations, organisational assets, or individuals. 
Integrity The unauthorised modification or destruction 
of information could be expected to have a 
limited adverse effect on organisational 
operations, organisational assets, or 
individuals. 
The unauthorised modification or destruction 
of information could be expected to have a 
serious adverse effect on organisational 
operations, organisational assets, or 
individuals. 
The unauthorised modification or destruction of 
information could be expected to have a severe 
or catastrophic adverse effect on organisational 
operations, organisational assets, or individuals. 
Availability The disruption of access to or use of 
information or an information system could be 
expected to have a limited adverse effect on 
organisational operations, organisational 
assets, or individuals. 
The disruption of access to or use of 
information or an information system could 
be expected to have a serious adverse effect 
on organisational operations, organisational 
assets, or individuals. 
The disruption of access to or use of 
information or an information system could be 
expected to have a severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect on organisational operations, 




In this section, security level classification is based on two areas: 
[1] Customer Security Requirements that needs to be satisfied to achieve best security standards 
and practices on PaaS cloud models. They are security requirement specifications that are 
demanded by the cloud customer based on service level objectives expected to be met by the 
CSPs’ security mechanisms and implementations in the cloud. 
[2] CSPs’ Security Provisions offered by CSPs by default, configuration or demand. These security 
provisions include security mechanisms and controls that are implemented to preserve the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of customer data and resources and also secure the PaaS 
environment from being compromised. 
The security requirements specification and security provision classifications are forged from 
security risks and potential impacts to assets stored and assessed on the cloud as well as other 
security and service level objectives identified by the customer. The security levels of each 
requirement and provision are described in detail and ranked into four unique classes which are 
High, Moderate, Basic and None.  Each security level from High, Moderate, Low and None are 
assigned numeric values 3,2,1,0 respectively. The numeric values represent the security mechanism 
description for each classification based on the multiple layers of security features which meet 
requirements on each domain. PaaS cloud customers can therefore align security requirements they 
expect to be met by security features and controls implemented on the cloud architecture to reduce 
technical risks as described in ENISA report based on the estimation of risk levels on ISO/IEC 
27005:2008 [94][43].  Each PaaS security classification is discussed in detail: 
TABLE 6.2: SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SCALE 
 
Classification None Basic Moderate High
Scale 0 1 2 3
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High: This security level classification describes a multi-layer security mechanism to be put in place 
to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive data. The potential impact of 
security risks to data in this category is high from a risk assessment conducted by the cloud customer 
depending on the value of the assets in the cloud. Description for high security requirements 
comprises of customer’s need for multiple layers of security mechanisms and controls that enhance 
security and also ensure that the system recovers quickly when under attack. It is suggested that 
having multiple complementary layers of protection defends against a broader range of threats and 
mitigates the risk of any single countermeasure being circumvented[115].  For instance in Identity 
and Access Management domain, a high security level classification requires that a security 
mechanism should consist of a strong authentication feature. An authentication which comprises of 
multi-factor authentication methods requiring two simultaneous but independent authentication 
methods commonly referred to as “something you have and something you know’’[116]. The security 
mechanism must also consist of more than one implemented access control policy that governs who 
has access to certain layers or assets within the cloud architecture. For a customer requirement to be 
considered high, the multi-layered security description must satisfy detailed description shown in 
Table 6.3. It includes a combination of security best practices and a multi-level security architecture 
that suits security domain to ensure sensitive data is protected from security risks that could cause 
severe impacts on a layer(s) of the cloud architecture. 
Adequate security controls can therefore be evaluated and reviewed to determine whether they meet 
the requirements set by the cloud customer for individual security requirement domain in a security 
audit process. 
Moderate: This security level classification describes requirements for security mechanisms put in 
place to preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data in transit and at rest on the 
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PaaS cloud environments where the value of data if compromised will result in moderate impact. 
However security implementations that meet this moderate requirements are considered as the 
minimum expected to be offered or provisioned to suit medium security risk impact. High level 
security controls that are fit to mitigate severe risk impacts, would be expected to meet a moderate 
requirement. A moderate security level classification also requires a multi-level security 
implementation to put in place on the cloud layer. However, the level is not as robust as a high 
security level and serves as a baseline between maximum security and minimum security 
implementations to ensure security on PaaS clouds. For example in secure data communication, a 
moderate security service would have HTTPS or TLS implemented between communication channels. 
However security services that include One-Time Passwords (OTP) or Tokens and Biometric 
authentication offers much stronger security and is considered a higher security service. 
Basic: This security level classification describes security mechanisms put in place to preserve the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of data in transit and at rest on PaaS clouds where the 
value of data if compromised, the impact is considered low or acceptable. A basic security level 
classification does not describe the non-existence of security mechanisms and controls standards, 
however it is considered as minimum security implementation and does not consist of multiple 
layers of security mechanisms implemented on the cloud layers stack. For instance, the provision of 
a password alone (single/ one-factor authentication) as the method of identification, authentication 
and authorisation will be considered as basic compared to a multi-factor authentication method 
when combined with other access management controls to form a strong identification and access 
management mechanism. As described in Table 6.3 below, basic security level classification 
describes having security implementations that provides at least a single layer of defence perceived 
to be required to mitigate low security risks. 
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None: This security level classification describes security mechanisms put in place to preserve no 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of data in transit or at rest. There are no baselines of 
security implementations in the criteria or description as risks are either non-existent or security 
controls are not applicable. 
Once security requirements have been classified, adequate security controls implemented to meet 
such requirements can therefore be evaluated and reviewed to determine whether they meet the 
requirements set by the cloud customer for individual security domains in a security audit process. 
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TABLE. 6.3: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CLASSIFICATION 
Security Domain Multi-Layered Security Mechanism Description Security Level Classification 
D1- Identity and Access 
Management 
Multi-Factor Authentication Mechanism: includes a Single Factor 
authentication +Second-Factor biometric authentication. 
 
Access control mechanism includes more than one Access Control Policy 
combined. 
High 3 
Multi-factor authentication: Single Factor + Second-Factor Non-biometric 
authentication mechanism. 
 
At least one or more access control policy implemented. 
Moderate 2 
Single Factor Authentication + Single or multiple access control policy. Basic 1 
 Security requirement not applicable or described.  None 0 
D2- Encryption and Key 
Management 
Endpoint to endpoint proprietary encryption with at least 256-bit PKI 
encryption key lengths.   For instance, 256-bit (with ECDHE) or 2,048-bit 
(with RSA) for data in transit. 
 
Authentication and Key Exchange with at least 128-bits symmetric 
encryption. 
 
Certificate issued by Third Party CA. 
 
All data are stored in encrypted format/Hash using proprietary encryption 
mechanisms. (Data at Rest).  
 
Master or Key Encryption Keys are managed on a dedicated external host 
with restricted access control policies. 
High 3 
Endpoint to endpoint Proprietary encryption with at least 192 -bit encryption 
keys (Data in Transit) 
 






Certificate issued by Third Party CA. 
 
Master Key Encryption Keys are managed by an internally hosted key 
management system/solution. 
Endpoint to endpoint proprietary encryption + at least 128-bit shared keys 
(Data in Transit). 
 
 Authentication and Key Exchange with at least 1024-bits encryption 
algorithm. 
 
Certificate issued by Third Party CA. 
 
Master Key and Key Encryption Keys are managed locally with access control 
policies. 
Basic 1 
Certificate issued locally and other Security requirements not applicable or 
described. 
None 0 

















Host Intrusion Detection System+ Automatic Operating System patches and 
driver updates + In-built proxy firewalls. 
 
System log enabled. 
High 3 
Host Intrusion Detection System + Stateful firewalls+ manual Operating 
System patches and driver updates. 
 
System log enabled. 
Moderate 2 
Host Intrusion Detection System + static stateless packet-filter firewalls 
 
System log enabled. 
Basic 1 


























Network is accessible over  specific IP address pool/Virtual Private Network 
 
Remote Access to Network restricted. 
 
Proxy Firewall-Packet Filtering Mechanism implemented. 
 
Network Intrusion Detection System implemented. 
High 3 
Network is accessible over a specified IP address pool/virtual private network 
 
Remote access restricted. 
 
Stateful-Firewall Packet filtering mechanism enabled. 
 
Network Intrusion Detection System  
Moderate 2 
 
Network is accessible over public domain 
 
Remote access is restricted/permitted 
 
Static Stateless- Firewall Packet filtering enabled 
 
Network Intrusion Detection System  
Basic 1 
Network is accessible over public IP address  
 
Remote Access permitted 
 












D5- Database Security Database allocated into schemas (Data at Rest) 
 
Database is encrypted using proprietary encryption. 
 
All data tables and columns are stored in encrypted format/ Hash using 
proprietary encryption mechanisms. (Data at Rest).  
 
Data store keys are issued dynamically and stored externally protected by a 
Master Key (Data at Rest) 
High 3 
Database allocated into schemas (Data at Rest) 
 
All or Specific data tables and columns are stored in encrypted format/ Hash 
using proprietary encryption mechanisms. (Data at Rest) 
 
Data is encrypted using proprietary encryption. 
 
 
Data store keys are dynamically issued and stored within, protected by a 
Master Key (Data at Rest). 
Moderate 2 
Database allocated into schemas (Data at Rest). 
 
All or specific data tables and columns are stored in encrypted format/ Hash 
using proprietary encryption mechanisms. (Data at Rest).  
Data is encrypted using proprietary encryption. 
 
Data Store keys stored within and protected by a password. 
Database password must be changed manually. 
Basic 1 




 SECURITY MAPPING MATRIX 
Mapping customer security requirements and CSP security provisions involves a method used to 
identify critical security areas of focus and prioritise customer security requirements within the PaaS 
cloud architecture. It requires matching and aligning identified security requirements into 
classifications of High, Moderate and Basic and then calculating the sum of identified requirements 
on each row in relation to the PaaS cloud layers. Likewise, security mechanisms provided and 
implemented by CSPs can be mapped. Mapping involves an operation that associates each element 
of a given set (the domain) with one or more elements of a second set (the range). To identify critical 
security areas within a PaaS cloud architecture, customers will have to manually feed their respective 
security requirement classification numeric value for each security requirement domain into each 
column and row of the customer requirements section in the matrix (Table 6.3).  Each layer of the 
cloud is linked to management stakeholders as well as security requirements applicable on each 
layer. The summation of numeric values fed into the matrix is calculated; based on the summation of 






Where C is the sum of numeric values of each row in the matrix. The sum of each row implies:  
Critical Area of Focus =   𝐷1+𝐷2 + 𝐷3+𝐷4+𝐷5 
Table 6.4 shows the security mapping matrix which consists of four sections on the top columns 




TABLE 6.4: SECURITY MAPPING MATRIX 
 
 CUSTOMER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PRIORITIES 
PaaS cloud customers can choose security requirement classifications, described in Section 6.2, based 
on their service level objectives and potential impact to confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computing resources and assets in the cloud. For each domain, security requirement values can be 
added to determine the domain with the highest value based on the mapping and identification of 
critical areas of focus. The domain with the highest value across the columns in the matrix table, 
highlights the security requirement with the highest priority to the customer. Hence the security 
mapping matrix does not only identify critical areas of security focus but also can be deployed to 
PaaS 
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determine the security requirement priorities based on the classification of security requirements 
entered and generated using the mapping matrix. 
 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a quantitative approach to identify critical security areas of focus or otherwise 
security requirements areas of interest within the cloud architecture. Based on customer 
requirements identified from the classification description and referenced using the scale, the 
mapping matrix enables customers to quantify their security requirements which can be compared 
to the security provisions offered by cloud service providers. The chapter also highlighted customer 
a method of identifying customer security priorities based on their requirements using a graphical 
representation of all security domain areas from the mapping result and analysis. Subsequent 
chapters in the thesis is focused on the security evaluation of PaaS cloud models and a presentation 
of analysis and results based on the evaluation findings. These will be based on the concepts 








 FRAMEWORK DEPLOYMENT AND TESTING 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the deployment of the developed framework to evaluate two PaaS cloud 
models. The evaluation process as shown in Figure 7.1, involves the gathering of customer security 
requirement specifications and cloud provider’s security offerings provisioned through the security 
mechanism and implementations in the cloud. These sets of data are classified using the security 
classification descriptions to generate two sets of data. The data sets are fed into the security 
mapping matrix individually to generate an output of the analysis which can be represented using a 
bar chart. 
The output of the analysis of both sets of data are then compared to determine whether security 
provisions offered by the CSP meet the customer’s security requirements. A security assessment is 
then conducted to determine which components within the cloud model architecture is vulnerable 
to security threats or attacks. With the use of scenarios to identify customer service level objectives 
and security requirements for each security requirement domain, this chapter is focused on 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the developed framework and mapping matrix in the evaluation 













































The evaluation methodology presented in Chapter 4, described the use of scenarios in the evaluation, 
testing and assessment of security implementations in PaaS cloud models. This section presents two 
scenarios with an overview of the security requirements for a Public (managed) PaaS and Private 
(unmanaged) PaaS clouds. Security requirements will be collated from the overview as well as security 
provisions offered in both clouds for evaluation and assessment using the techniques and methods 
from the proposed research approach and methodologies. The deployment of the framework, which 
has been conducted for the testing purposes for both scenarios is aligned with the PaaS security 
management cycle presented in Section 5.2. 
7.2.1   SCENARIO 1 
Managed Platform-as-a-Service Cloud  
Bob is a lead IT security administrator and analyst for a start-up SME that intends to develop 
applications for their customer base in the UK.  The SME wants to adopt a cloud service provider that 
complies with the industry standards such as ISO 27001/27002, SOC 1/SSAE 16/ISAE 3402 and SOC 
2 and Cloud Security Alliance (CCM). Bob and his team are concerned about the security challenges 
and issues in PaaS cloud environments and have a security paperwork of requirements that they 
expect the CSP security implementations to meet. Bob considers choosing Windows Azure, a public 
(managed) PaaS cloud and is tasked with evaluating the cloud platform to determine if the service 





Security Requirements Mapping (PaaS Security Management Cycle: Process 2) 
D1. Identity and Access Management- Identity service offered by the CSP should include or be 
compatible with multiple security authentications that allow customers to be authenticated and have 
access to the administrative management portal and backup servers. Security authentication should 
include multi-factor method of authentication and authorisation to provide additional checks and 
verification to the database repository, key repository or store and also retrieval of encryption keys. 
Access to sensitive components of the cloud architecture should be restricted to the role of the 
authorised customers. 
D2. Encryption and Key Management- Security requirement provisions should include encryption 
of communication channels over a secure network. Additionally on the public network all 
communications between the cloud interface and end users of developed applications must be 
secure. The cloud systems should support only RSA 2048 keys or higher and provide customers the 
ability to generate keys which are stored on an attached standalone server (HSM), external to the 
platform cloud. Access to the HSM should be restricted to authorised customers with adequate role-
based authentication and access control policy and backup initialised. The requirement also entails 
that the Organisation is in control of the key life cycle and can monitor key usage.  
 
D3. Virtualisation Security- Operating systems should be hardened with regular automatic updates 
and a host-based logging audit that provides integrity of the files and software libraries. Proper 
secure boot technology must be integrated into the cloud platform to ensure that proper hardware 
and software modules are authenticated before they are executed within the platform. 
D4. Network Security- Security service provided must provide or accommodate the creation of a 
segmented isolated network used for management and administration which is not accessible over 
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the public internet. The network security service should offer the capability for customers to create 
private networks for communication between components of the PaaS cloud. Each end user should 
be isolated on the network and prevented from interfering with each other. PaaS cloud should 
provide host-based network intrusion-detection tools (NIDS) or be compatible with open source 
NIDS; which have the capability of log analysis, file integrity checking, policy monitoring, and rootkit 
detection. 
 
D5. Database Security- Security provision should include encryption options for storage and 
storage backups. The logs for the backup server must be monitored daily and be accessible to an 
authorised administrator. Cloud service should support the encryption of data volumes, databases 
and access to data should only be allowed through secure channels. Hardware Security Module 
(HSM) should be generate random security keys used to secure the data store and the server kept 
external from the cloud platform. 
Security Requirements Analysis  
With the use of the classification matrix, the customer’s security requirements are analysed and 
classified into the description categories of High, Moderate, Basic and None. The security 
requirement mapping framework is then used to identify critical security areas of focus in the PaaS 
cloud architecture. A bar chart of the security requirements analysis is then generated showing the 







TABLE 7.1: SCENARIO 1- SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CLASSIFICATION 
Security Domain Security Mechanism Description Security 
Level 
Classification 
D1. Identity and 
Access Management 
Multi-factor authentication: Single Factor + Second-
Factor Non-biometric authentication mechanism. 
At least one or more access control policy implemented 
Moderate 2 
D2. Encryption and 
Key Management 
Endpoint to endpoint Proprietary encryption with at 
least 192 -bit encryption keys (Data in Transit) 
Authentication and Key Exchange with at least 2048-
bits encryption algorithm. 
Certificate issued by Third Party CA. 
Master Key Encryption Keys are managed by an 




Host Intrusion Detection System patches and driver 
updates + In-built proxy firewalls. 
System log enabled. 
+ Automatic Operating System  
High 3 
D4. Network Security Network is accessible over a specified IP address 
pool/virtual private network 
Remote access restricted. 
 Stateful-Firewall Packet filtering mechanism enabled. 
Network Intrusion Detection System 
Moderate 2 
D5. Database Security Database allocated into schemas (Data at Rest) 
Database is encrypted using proprietary encryption. 
All data tables and columns are stored in encrypted 
format/ Hash using proprietary encryption mechanisms. 
(Data at Rest).  
Data store keys are issued dynamically and stored 









TABLE 7.2: CRITICAL SECURITY AREA OF FOCUS ANALYSIS (REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS) 
 
The data from the security mapping matrix can be represented with a bar chart to highlight critical 
areas of focus in the PaaS cloud. As in Figure 7.2 below, security requirement specification for each 
security domain are clearly shown with the critical area of focus highlighted in the graph.  The graph 
indicates the Middle-Tier layer with frequency of 10 as the critical area where security requirements 
are more prevalent with network security requirements with frequency of 9, being the prioritised 
requirement across all domains.  
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 FIGURE 7.2: SCENARIO 1- CRITICAL AREA OF SECURITY OF FOCUS BAR CHART (REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS OUTPUT) 
Segregation of Windows Azure PaaS Architecture (PaaS Security Management Cycle: 
Process 3) 
The Windows Azure Platform is Microsoft’s cloud platform that combines Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offerings that runs on servers and related network infrastructure 
located in Microsoft data centres and is connected to the public internet[117]. According to 
Microsoft[118], Windows Azure is a combination of managed and unmanaged services that allows 
cloud customers build, deploy and manage applications. The architecture of Windows Azure was 
considered from existing literature and documentation provided publicly by Microsoft in their 
Windows Azure security overview[106]. The architecture consists of three major components that 
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facilitate the service amongst others and are placed on different layers of the PaaS cloud 
environment. These are network, compute and storage. The network provides the underlying 
infrastructure with the resources to connect with the PaaS environment while the compute 
component provides the platform for the provisioning of virtual machines (VMs) and the 
development of logic apps and web apps development before being deployed for hosting on the 
public internet domain. The storage component however provides backend storage resources for 
developed apps within the PaaS cloud as well as storage of VM instances and customer subscriptions 
on Microsoft data centres. Access to these components are made possible via interfaces and RESTful 
services which form part of the networking component described earlier and managed by the 
application and fabric services (AppFabric Services). 
Segregating the Windows Azure PaaS architecture into layers, enables the identification of critical 
security areas of focus as well as mapping security requirements domain to components of the cloud 
where security implementations are being offered. From our initial analysis of PaaS cloud 
architectures described in Chapter 5, we considered the architecture presented in Kaufman[106]. 
However since 2010, the architecture of Windows Azure has evolved as all cloud environments due 
to their dynamic nature and more documentations have discussed components within the cloud 
architecture.  
Layer 1- Front End:  The initial point of entry for Azure developer and IT administrators to the cloud 
service is the Windows Azure Development Portal[117]. Currently known as the Azure management 
portal, it is a web based interface for managing the cloud platform. It has a dashboard that gives an 
overview of the cloud environment where developers can develop and deploy logic applications from 
templates provided through the CSPs template gallery. The portal, provides an avenue for 
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administrators and developers alike, to manage the health of developed and deployed applications, 
manage their subscriptions, configure security provisions, integrate their existing platform with an 
on-premises cloud, manage data analytics and review subscription billing. 
The portal requires the customer to have a Windows Live account from which they can subscribe for 
a plan to access services provisioned according to the plan offered by Microsoft. This portal can also 
be accessed through a standard web browser or via a command line interface known as the Service 
Management Application Programming Interface (SMAPI)/ Azure PowerShell command line .The web 
browser UI consists of navigation frameworks and data management APIs. Monitoring of application 
data traffic and the performance of the environment can be done through the portal. The SMAPI 
allows for API calls to be made from the Software Development Kit (SDK) once applications are 
deployed or published; they can be viewed via the web portal or the source code previewed via the 
SMAPI. 
Layer 2- Middle-Tier: In Windows Azure, the middle-tier layer is made up of the hosted service, 
storage service and the runtime environment that offers application source code execution and runs 
application services. Through the management portal, certain applications can use either the hosting 
or storage accounts or both. The accounts enable developers to host and deploy applications on the 
Windows Azure platform[119]. This layer offers the compute service; where developers can create 
VM instances, Websites from templates as well as other cloud services. VM instances are served by 
OS Virtual Hard Disks and Data Virtual Hard Disks supported by the underlying platform resources 
or Microsoft data centres. These are the IaaS capabilities and offerings offered on Windows Azure. 
To focus on the PaaS side, Windows Azure supports application development which are managed 
by automated cloud services such as worker and web roles. The web role is provisioned for web 
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applications and supported by Internet Information Service (IIS) while the worker role supports 
underlying features of the web role. Coupled with these cloud services is the developer tools and 
services. These include Visual Studio and Azure SDKs. Microsoft currently provides language-specific 
SDKs for .NET, Java, PHP, Node.js, Ruby, Python and C++.  They serve as application development 
building blocks which developers use to build applications in the cloud which are deployed and 
hosted on applications containers known as PaaS VMs. On the other end of the Middle-Tier Layer is 
the Storage services of Windows Azure. It consists of object/files storage, databases and virtual hard 
drives known as Azure Blobs, Azure Tables, Azure Queues and Azure XDrives.  These logical storages 
serve as backend databases for applications which can only be accessed via RESTful AP or HTTP calls. 
However the XDrives are VHDs created for the purpose of running VM instances on allocated storage 
drive spaces. The logical storages coupled with their application resources both reside in a container, 
known as the app container. Application end users have access to the application and applications 
can make calls to respective logical storages via Restful APIs or HTTP calls. 
The underlying infrastructure that supports the compute and storage services of the Windows Azure 
platform is the Abstraction and Operating System. They are referred to within the architecture as 
Windows Azure App Fabric and App Fabric Services. Managed by the Azure Fabric Controller 
functions as the kernel of the Azure operating system, this capability is handled by providing a scale-
out feature within the platform to manage a sudden increase in the volume of users accessing the 
system[119]. Coupled with the App Fabric Services, the Fabric Controller performs virtual tailored 
networking operations that link the tables, queues and blob storages with the hypervisor and the 
cloud core infrastructure components. It performs load balancing to manage failovers of the multi-
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tenant customers sharing resources over the underlying resource pool. The App Fabric is the 
Abstraction and Operating System of Windows Azure coupled into one. 
Layer 3- Back-End: This physical platform resources and database management system (DBMS) on 
Windows Azure is represented by Microsoft servers and SQL Azure Databases. Although these 
resources are hosted on physical servers on remote datacentres, they are however presented to the 
customer virtually via logical servers in geographic locations known as regions and accessed via the 
Front-End Layer. Customers can create or provision SQL databases and VMs which will live on these 
logical servers and deployment applications to be hosted on VMs and that have data access to the 
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FIGURE 7.3: WINDOWS AZURE PAAS ARCHITECTURE AND COMPONENTS (REFERENCE MODEL ILLUSTRATION) 
Security Evaluation of Windows Azure (PaaS Security Management Cycle: Process 4, 5, 6) 
D1. Identity and Access Management 
 Single Factor Authentication- Customers or IT administrators of this environment only 
require a Microsoft account formerly known as Windows Live ID to register to log in to the 
cloud service and register for a service subscription. The subscription account is setup with 
an email address and password with a credit card and mobile number as proof of identity. 
135 
 
These credentials are then sent to a Microsoft authentication server to be authenticated and 
verified using OAuth 2.0 tokens and Windows Identity Foundation (WIF) as customers only 
need the Microsoft Account email address and password to log in each time into the service 
subscription account.  This feature is provided by default as having a Microsoft account 
enables Single Sign On (SSO) as Microsoft serves as the identity provider (IdP) for 
authenticating and validating user credentials. 
 Multi-Factor Authentication- Window Azure provides comprehensive identity and access 
management solution by enabling administrators to implement multi-factor authentication 
(MFA) to authenticate users using security features provided at the Front End dashboard. 
MFA requires the use of more than one authentication and authorisation method to verify 
users. Alternatively, administrators can setup MFA to verify access to organisation cloud data 
and application resources. Moreover, MFA service can be implemented in Azure Active 
Directory to give users access to custom or on-premises applications. Administrators would 
have to manage MFA service on Windows Azure using an organisational credential and not 
Microsoft account. According to Kaufman[120], every administrative account of a Windows 
Azure subscription can get additional protection by enabling this core multi-factor 
authentication functionality. So an administrator that wants to access Azure portal to create 
a VM, a web site, manage storage, mobile services or any other Azure Service can add multi-
factor authentication to his administrator account. 
Authentication Options Available of Windows Azure include the use of Multi-Factor 
Authentication (MFA) apps which are (Notification and One Time Passwords (OTP), 
Automated Phone calls and Text messages.  These options involve the use of a mobile device, 
for instance a phone which is registered to the user’s account, and serves as the second factor 
136 
 
authenticator. Once MFA is implemented, a customer or administrator would have to provide 
a Multi-Factor authentication consisting basically two methods of authentication: 
 Single Factor- Something they know; typically a password. 
 Second Factor- Something they have; a device such as a mobile phone or tablet  
a) Notification option- For the notification MFA to be configured, the customer or 
administrator would have to download a MFA app on the registered mobile device. Once the 
administrator provides the single factor through the Front End layer on Windows Azure, a 
dedicated Microsoft authentication server sends a push notification to the administrator’s 
mobile device upon the first stage of authentication which is the provision of a typical 
password in this case during sign in. The administrator receives the push notification on the 
mobile device and is prompted to either accept or deny the notification. On acceptance, the 
administrator is authenticated at the Front End. 
b) One Time Password (OTP) and Text Messages option: In this instance, provision of the 
single factor (password) upon sign in, the MFA app serves as a software token and generates 
a passcode which is displayed to the administrator. The administrator then provides the 
passcode at the Front End as verification using a second factor mobile device for 
authentication. Invariably, the text messages function just like the OTP. In this case, the 
administrator is sent a text message to the registered mobile phone with a passcode. He then 
provides this second factor at the Front End to verify authorisation and authentication is 
completed.  
The OTP uses the hash chain algorithm [121]:   h (ℎ𝑥−1(p)) = ℎ𝑥(p) 
Where (p) is password supplied by user and is hashed (h) of a finite digit (x) and stored on 
the server as hx(p). For authentication, the user supplies password (p) which is hashed again 
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as (hx−1(p)). The authentication server computes the initial stored hash with the new hash to 
produce a match where     h (hx−1(p)) = hx(p) and the user is authenticated. This cycle is 
repeated for every hash value of (p) provided for a match with the initial hash value of 
(hx−1(p)) stored by the authentication server during successful logins.  
 
c) Automated Phone Calls: This MFA presents a mode of authentication by using a phone call 
as the second factor to verify and authenticate authorised users. The user or administrator 
receives a phone call and is prompted to press a digit on the phone keypad for authentication.  
The authentication mechanism requires a series of steps: 
1. The user provides his Windows Live ID credentials as a single factor authentication via the 
Front End. 
2. Front End verifies credentials against stored hash value and redirects user to place 
authentication call to the user’s registered phone number setup by the administrator. 
3. The call is placed through and the user is prompted to enter a specific digit from the phone 
keypad. 
4. The digit is verified by comparing the stored hash value of the digit initiated by the 
authentication server with the one placed through by the user. 
5. Upon authentication success, user is redirected to the Front End management dashboard. 
 
 Active Directory Federation Service (ADFS) -Access Control policies at the Front End layer 
on Windows Azure is governed by roles and policies implemented when administrators 
configure Active Directory Federation Service (ADFS) on Windows Azure to manage access 
control restrictions. This ADFS is similar to an on-premises ADFS but service is hosted in the 
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cloud and not on-site. The ADFS allows administrators of the Windows Azure account to 
authenticate both additional internal admin accounts and end user accounts using the ADFS 
hosted on Microsoft Datacentres.   
D2. Encryption and Key Management 
 Asymmetric Encryption-Windows Azure [120] stores certificates and private keys in the 
PKCS12 (PFX) file format uploaded through its Front End. The PKCS12 is Public-Key 
Cryptography Standards (PKCS), published by RSA Laboratories, which defines a file format 
commonly used to store X.509 private keys with accompanying public key certificates, 
protected with a password-based symmetric key. The communication from the Front End to 
the certificate store is encrypted over SSL channels giving administrator privileges to upload 
and not download private keys at any time. The private keys and certificates are used by the 
Fabric Controller to initiate roles especially when deployments or application containers (PaaS 
VMs) are created by the administrator registered to a specific subscription.  
 Key Distribution- These certificates and private keys used by the PaaS VMs are kept in the 
certificate store or key vault. Windows Azure provides a Key Vault which is an internal 
Hardware Security Module (HSM) for secure key management and storage of cryptographic 
keys and passwords. However for the PaaS VMs or applications to have access to database 
resources as well as storage resources, administrators would have to provide access to the 
key vault (HSM).  The key vault provides SQL Server encryption to leverage the Azure Key 
Vault service as an Extensible Key Management (EKM) provider to protect its encryption keys.    
These keys are then passed on to applications that require the resources. Moreover, security 
of communication channels with application containers (PaaS VMs) and within the VMs are 
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protected with SSL and mutual authentication[59]. Windows Azure provides access to 
industry cryptography functionalities such as MD5 and SHA and encryption standards such 
as AES. These standards are provided by the .NET Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) 
provided in Windows Azure. 
 Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) -Data and resources stored at rest at the Back End (SQL 
Azure Databases) can be encrypted using the Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) which is 
used to encrypt an entire database using AES-256 symmetric key. The key is protected by a 
built-in certificate and kept in the Azure Vault which is rotated by Microsoft (CSP) every 90 
days.   
 Column Level and Back up Encryption- Windows Azure provides column level and back up 
encryption for the Azure SQL databases on different fronts. With the use of symmetric key 
encryptions such as AES 128, AES 192, AES 256, and Triple DES, information in each data 
column of the database is encrypted. It also ensures that the backed up data or entire 
database can be encrypted using any of the symmetric key algorithms for backup and 
retrieval decryption. These keys are stored with the key vault. 
D3. Virtualisation Security - In Windows Azure, virtualisation security is provided on different fronts 
and closely integrated with network security. They include VM security, Abstraction security and OS 
hardening. PaaS VM security and isolation is provided by App Fabric Services and Windows Azure 
App Fabric while the IaaS VMs are isolated by the computer host which serves as a Hypervisor, 
coupled with the network functionality of the FC.  
 Virtual Appliances- The use of virtual appliances such as web application firewalls (WAFs) to 
prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) and injections. The web application firewall prevents attacks 
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to the application container (PaaS VMs) where user applications and stored. Hence 
preventing a VM within the Middle-Tier from being compromised which can be used to 
instigate attacks to other VMs within the cloud architecture. However this security service is 
not provisioned by the default and would require the administrator to implement third party 
WAFs and integrate it within the cloud architecture.   
 Third Party Virtualisation Security- In our evaluation, we considered the use of Barracuda 
Web Application Firewalls (WAFs)[122] which can be used to protect applications developed 
and deployed on Windows Azure once networking security configurations have been 
implemented to protect the PaaS web roles. The third-party WAFs can be integrated 
seamlessly to inspect network traffic serving as an intrusion detection and prevention system 
(IDS/IPS). What is provided by default is the restriction of inbound traffic from the Internet 
on a VM created through the Front End with the exception of ports used for remote 
management. 
 Microsoft Antimalware- This antimalware agent can be enabled by the administrator in the 
Middle-Tier layer to offer protection to runtime environment which includes the Web role, 
Worker role, VM role and VMs. The antimalware can be scheduled to run to monitor the 
health of the cloud layer and collate events logs. The antimalware can be deployed via the 
SMAPI, using the SDK such as visual studio or via the PowerShell command prompt.  
D4. Network Security- 
 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) - the abstraction which consists of the App Fabric Services 
and Windows Azure Fabric coupled with the functionalities of the FC. This abstraction layer is 
restricted to only accept inbound requests through dedicated IP subnets with an exception 
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to internet IP address or customer VMs. This thus prevents the abstraction from being 
compromised at any point.  Moreover, coupled with virtualisation security discussed above, 
administrators can configure virtual private networks (VPN) to isolate communication and 
restrict communication between VMs. At the Back End, communication to the Logical Servers 
are restricted to the public internet and separation of various customer accounts and 
subscriptions (multi-tenants) using private networks. Communication between the Middle-
Tier and the Back End Layers are cryptographically protected through secure SSL channels 
which allows administrators secure access to logical storage locations such as the Azure SQL 
repository DBMS. 
 Network Access Control Lists- Like firewalls, Windows Azure implements Network ACLs to 
provide logical isolation of the customers’ cloud environment.  This enables the 
communication between VMs within a private network hosted in the cloud.  The ACLs permit 
communication between endpoints or IP addresses only specified by the administrator.  This 
mechanism is also deployed to provide isolated communication between multiple 
subscriptions of an individual cloud customer.  
 Built-in Firewalls (Windows Firewall) - Windows Azure provides two sets of firewalls which 
have to be configured by the administrator to enable communication to the SQL databases. 
By default, all communications are blocked.  The administrator can either specify firewall rules 
at the server or database level.  The server level rule allows cloud tenants access to  the entire 
logical database server while the database level govern rules which allow cloud tenants to 
individual databases within the administrator’s  Azure SQL Database server. 
 Network Security Groups- Cloud customers or administrators can deploy network security 
groups within Azure as part of the security implementation provisioned by the CSP. This helps 
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to control traffic to specific VMs hosted in the Middle-Tier Layer of the cloud architecture.  It 
acts like a filter for inbound and outbound network traffic which can be implemented on an 
entire subnet of VMs. The rules of a network security group must be enforced on the source 
and destination IP addresses as well as the port and protocol used. 
 Azure ExpressRoute- Windows Azure provides Azure ExpressRoute sure as a security 
functionality that ensures security communications between the Microsoft Datacentre and 
customer on-premises datacentre. Typical for a hybrid or semi-managed PaaS cloud 
environment, the ExpressRoute uses communication channels provided by two types of 
providers to connect the on-premises datacentre with Microsoft’s datacentre. These 
communications is achieved using point-to-point Ethernet links or VPN connection. 
D5. Database Security 
 Shared Access Signature Token- As mentioned in the identity and access management 
provisions offered on Windows Azure, Data Store security is a supported security mechanism 
to protect data stored in the Back End repository storage accounts. Storage accounts provide 
access to data stores such as DBMS repositories (Tables, Blobs, and Queues) and SQL Azure; 
are protected by a security mechanism called a Shared Access Signature Token (SAS). This 
token is generated by a pair of 512 bits Storage Access Keys which secure the storage 
account. The token is simply used for authentication requests when calls are made from a 
service or application that requires access to the storage as an attachment to the HTTPs URL. 
Each key is a 512 bit storage key used for authentication when the storage account is 
accessed. The primary key is used for authentication while the secondary is used in place of 
the primary key until new sets of keys are generated.  
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 Key Rotation- Administrators can generate new sets  of keys each time to avoid the keys 
being compromised by an attack but will have to deploy the new key to applications that use 
cloud storage services as backend where initially the old keys have been configured to use to 
access the cloud storage services. For instance, when an administrator renews the primary 
key, application using the key could use the secondary key pending the time a new key is 
generated to save downtime. Changing the storage account keys associated with a storage 
account is done via the Front End Layer using administrator’s credentials. 
 Back up- To backup data and files in Windows Azure, a backup vault or data store would be 
created in a geographic region where the data will be stored. This feature is available through 
the recovery services offered in Windows Azure that allows data to be backed up in the 
remote vault. Windows Azure offers the use of a certificate which is registered with the vault 
to allow data to be backed up or sent to the vault.  The certificate also known as vault 
credentials, consists of a set of keys used to authenticate the machine that is being backed 
up to the remote vault. The public key is used to identify the machine which belongs to a 
vault while the private key is used to authenticate the backup process which are stored on 
the user’s local machine.  These credentials have a 48hr lifespan and are rotated to generate 
new sets of keys which are valid for recovery services.  
The evaluation of Windows Azure is presented in Table 7.3 using the framework. Security 
parameters relevant to each layer of the cloud are mapped and security controls identified from 
the evaluation are shown in the Security Controls column.
144 
 


















































Access Control Methods 























































































Security Methods Security Mechanisms Security Controls 
 
 
Middle-Tier   

































































Data Isolation Mechanism 
 
 















Database Security Encryption Method 
 






AES 128, AES 192, 
AES 256, and Triple 
DES 
 
Encryption + Key 
Management 





























Database Security Encryption Method  
 
Data Recovery Methods 
 
Asymmetric/Symmetric 





AES 128, AES 192, 
AES 256, and Triple 
DES 
 




Access Control Methods 

























Data Isolation Mechanism 
 
 



































Custom Key Management 
 









MD5, AES 128, AES 






Based on the security evaluation of security provisions offered on Windows Azure PaaS Cloud, 
results from the security provision analysis on each security domain are classified based on the 
security mechanism descriptions.  Table 7.4 shows the classification of security mechanisms 
provided on each domain of Windows Azure using the classification criteria. 
 
TABLE 7.4: SECURITY PROVISIONS –WINDOWS AZURE 
 
Security Provision Mapping  
Windows Azure provides security features and mechanisms by default, while others have to be 
configured by the administrator.  To evaluate whether the security provisions offered meets the 
customer security requirement specifications, we considered the following 4 steps: 
Security Domain Multi-Layered Security Mechanism Provision Security 
Level 
Classification 
D1: Identity and 
Access Management 
Multi-factor authentication: Single Factor + Second-Factor Non-biometric 
authentication mechanism. 
At least one or more access control policy implemented 
Moderate 2 
D2: Encryption and 
Key Management 
Endpoint to endpoint Proprietary encryption with at least 192 –bit 
encryption keys (Data in Transit). 
Authentication and Key Exchange with at least 2048-bits encryption 
algorithm. 
Certificate issued by Third Party CA. 





Host Intrusion Detection System+ Automatic Operating System patches 
and driver updates + In-built proxy firewalls. 
System log enabled. 
High 3 
D4: Network Security Network is accessible over  specific IP address pool/Virtual Private 
Network 
Remote Access to Network restricted. 
Proxy Firewall-Packet Filtering Mechanism implemented. 
Network Intrusion Detection System implemented. 
High 3 
D5: Database Security Database allocated into schemas (Data at Rest) 
All or Specific data tables and columns are stored in encrypted format/ 
Hash using proprietary encryption mechanisms. (Data at Rest) 
Data is encrypted using proprietary encryption. 
Data store keys are dynamically issued and stored within, protected by a 




1. Data from the classification of security provisions is mapped using the security mapping 
matrix. 
2. A bar chart showing critical areas of focus where the security offerings have been 
implemented within the architecture is generated.  
3. Mapping of security provisions is compared with security requirements mapping using bar 
charts. 
4. Security provisions offered on each layer with regards to each security domain is compared 
based on the security mechanism description and classification. 
Table 7.5 shows the classification of each requirement domain mapped into the matrix to identify 
critical areas in the cloud where security provisions are focused.  
 
 
































Customer 𝟎 2 𝟑 𝟑 𝟑 
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Back End Provider Customer Customer 𝟐 𝟐 𝟎 𝟑 𝟐 
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The data from the mapping matrix are used to generate a bar chart which clearly shows each security 
provision in each domain and the layer of the cloud architecture. The prioritised security domains 
where security are enhanced are also represented in the chart on the right (Figure 7.4). 
 
 
FIGURE 7.4: WINDOWS AZURE – SECURITY PROVISIONS CHART
SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEST (PAAS SECURITY MANAGEMENT CYCLE: PROCESS 7) 
Identification of perceived vulnerabilities and threats in Windows Azure was limited to manual 
techniques alone. The use of security automated tools which include scanning and exploitation tools 
were not initiated. This is because permission and ethical l approval would have to be sought from 
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Microsoft in order to conduct tests on the cloud service. Hence reconnaissance and observations 
were considered the preferred evaluation methodology. 
Security assessment was conducted in Windows Azure with emphasis on security domains to 
determine perceived threats to security requirements domains with the cloud architecture. A 
noticeable number of security vulnerabilities were found during the evaluation of the cloud service.   
The following security requirement domains were assessed and perceived vulnerabilities and threats 
were found. 
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7.2.2  SCENARIO 2  
Unmanaged Platform-as-a-Service Cloud 
Alice is a lead IT administrator and security analyst for an application development SME. The SME 
has a security requirement paperwork and would want a cloud service that complies with industry 
standards such as ISO 27001/27002, SOC 1/SSAE 16/ISAE 3402 and SOC 2 and Cloud Security Alliance 
(CCM).The SME are considering adopting Windows Azure Pack, private (unmanaged) cloud 
environment where test applications can be developed before being pushed to a production 
environment for future releases. Alice and her team are required to evaluate the security offerings 
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on the private cloud to determine its capabilities and limitations and how it fits for purpose to meet 
security requirements highlighted by the SME. 
Security Requirements Mapping (PaaS Security Management Cycle: Process 2) 
D1. Identity and Access Management- The private cloud should enable the configuration of two-
factor authentication for all users and the implementation of an external identity service for 
authentication. Access control policies should be integrated to allow authorised access on the 
management network for administrators only and deter unauthorised access. Features to enable the 
security of communication channels and endpoints using SSL or TLS should be available. Access to 
management and administration of cloud environment should be restricted only to the internal 
network and internal authorised users. 
 
D2. Encryption and Key Management- Private Cloud should support the implementation of 
industry standard encryption such as AES 256-bit to encrypt data at rest and keys stored in a secure 
location protected by a key. Security feature should allow the rotation of encryption/decryption keys.  
The Private PaaS should enable the implementation of a certificate issued by a trusted certification 
authority with at least RSA-1024 bit encryption or higher. 
 
D3. Virtualisation Security- Security feature should enable the isolation of tenant VMs. Proper 
secure boot technology must be integrated into the cloud platform to ensure proper hardware and 
software modules are authenticated before they are executed within the platform. Private PaaS must 
support the virtualisation memory firewall and antimalware to prevent untrusted application from 




D4. Network Security- Security feature must enable the monitoring of traffic to and from the cloud 
environment. Implementation of a secured Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that logs and alerts 
network traffic and issues relating to irregularities in the network and malicious attacks.  
D5. Database Security- Security features that should enabled include the following 
 The implementation of unauthorised access to database schemas and enforce row level data 
access. 
 Minimise access to databases through the implementation of access control policies. 
 Support the implementation of Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) using industry standard 
encryption algorithms. 
 Enable the monitoring of the database store with firewalls to prevent database injections. 
 
Security Requirements Analysis Output 
With the use of the security level classification as shown in Table 7.7, the customer’s security 
requirements are analysed and classified into the description categories of High, Moderate, Basic 
and None. The security requirement mapping framework is then used to identify critical security 
areas of focus in the PaaS cloud architecture. A bar chart of the security requirements analysis is then 









TABLE 7.7: SCENARIO 2 -SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CLASSIFICATION 
Security Domain Security Mechanism Description Security 
Level 
Classification 
D1. Identity and 
Access Management 
Multi-factor authentication: Single Factor + Second-
Factor Non-biometric authentication mechanism. 
At least one or more access control policy 
implemented 
Moderate 2 
D2. Encryption and 
Key Management 
Endpoint to endpoint proprietary encryption with at 
least 256-bit encryption keys. (Data in Transit) 
Authentication and Key Exchange with at least 3072-
bits encryption algorithm. 
Certificate issued by Third Party CA. 
All data are stored in encrypted format/Hash using 
proprietary encryption mechanisms. (Data at Rest).  
Master or Key Encryption Keys are managed on a 





Host Intrusion Detection System+ Automatic 
Operating System patches and driver updates + In-
built proxy firewalls. 




Network is accessible over  specific IP address 
pool/Virtual Private Network 
Remote Access to Network restricted. 
Proxy Firewall-Packet Filtering Mechanism 
implemented. 




Database allocated into schemas (Data at Rest) 
Database is encrypted using proprietary encryption. 
All data tables and columns are stored in encrypted 
format/ Hash using proprietary encryption 
mechanisms. (Data at Rest).  
Data store keys are issued dynamically and stored 








TABLE 7.8: CRITICAL SECURITY AREA OF FOCUS ANALYSIS (REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS) 
 
The data from the security mapping matrix can also be represented with a bar chart to highlight 
critical areas of focus in the PaaS cloud. Similar to scenario 1, security requirement specification for 
each security domain are clearly shown with the critical area of focus highlighted in the chart.  The 
chart in Figure 7.5, indicates the Middle-Tier layer with frequency of 12 as the critical area where 
security requirements are more prevalent. Network and Encryption/ Key Management domains with 
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FIGURE 7.5: SCENARIO 2- CRITICAL AREA OF SECURITY OF FOCUS BAR CHART (REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS OUTPUT) 
 
SEGREGATION OF WINDOWS AZURE PACK ARCHITECTURE  
(PAAS SECURITY MANAGEMENT CYCLE: PROCESS 3) 
 
Windows Azure Pack is a PaaS private cloud offering provided by Microsoft. Based on Microsoft’s 
Windows Azure technologies, the platform runs on a type 2 hypervisor host Windows Server 2012 
R2 Operating System and Windows System Centre 2012. Similar to Windows Azure public PaaS 
model, Windows Azure pack provides capabilities for customers to setup a private cloud datacentre 
on premise and offer their tenants (customers) cloud services such as virtual machine clouds, website 
clouds, storage and networking services.  
With the use of the reference model presented in Chapter 5, the PaaS cloud model is into three layers 
and components within each layer of the cloud are identified.  The simulation and build of the private 
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cloud within a controlled laboratory environment, enabled adequate understanding of the 
architecture and segregation of this private PaaS cloud into layers. It also enabled the identification 
of existing components and technologies that provide the service.  The simulation was configured 
using hardware that consists of servers joined in a domain and are dedicated to provide services and 
functionalities within the private cloud architecture.  
Layer 1- Front End:  This layer comprises of a user interface which allows administrators and their 
tenants to manage and configure cloud services depending on their roles within the cloud 
architecture. This layer offers functionalities through a Service Management Application 
Programming Interface (SMAPI) or through the use of Windows Power Shell command prompt. 
These interfaces are RESTful APIs that are set using the port numbers to issue URL requests. There 
are two SMAPIs used by administrators and tenants to manage resources on the private cloud 
platform.  
Service Management Application Programming Interface (SMAPI)/ Web Portal 
Windows Azure Pack Admin Management Portal – Enables the administrator to complete 
management tasks through the management portal user interface. The API serves as a management 
portal for administrators to manage cloud resources, create user accounts and subscriptions as well 
as interact with the cloud internal components and security configurations.  
Windows Azure Pack Tenant Management Portal – Enables tenants to manage their subscription 
web and cloud services provisioned on Windows Azure pack. It also serves as the interface for which 
service management can be performed which includes the creation of web applications, virtual 
machines and storage databases.  
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Both interfaces were provisioned by a dedicated server, wap.cloud.local, which hosts the Windows 
Azure Pack Express Installation and running on Windows Server 2012 R2 operating system. The server 
hosts the server management APIs which include the Windows Azure Pack Tenant API, a dedicated 
Tenant public API which is exposed to the internet to allow tenants access to the management portal. 
The server also hosts the administrator’s management portal which includes the Windows Azure pack 
Admin API and an internal Tenant API which is not exposed to the internet. 
Layer 2- Middle Tier: This layer consists of components that serve as the runtime environment, SDK 
for web application developments which is then deployed and hosted on application containers 
relative to storage containers and databases.  It also consists of the abstraction and operating 
systems that enable services to be hosted and provisioned with the cloud architecture. The 
components that provision these capabilities on the private PaaS are described below:  
a) Runtime Environment- This component is provisioned by dedicated servers that host virtual 
machine and web application cloud services.  These servers include the SPF server, VMM 
server, and Runtime Database Server.  
Service Provider Foundation (SPF) – enables tenants to access virtual machine services 
through the Front End by interacting with the VMM that hosts the virtual machine resources. 
The VM services also known as the IaaS service is provisioned by the Service Provider 
Foundation.  
Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) – manages the PaaS Virtual Machines, host virtual 




Runtime Database- Comprises of a database that supports tenant developed and deployed 
applications within the cloud service. This includes website clouds and virtual machine clouds.  
b) Application Container and DBMS- The Web Application Services consists of PaaS Services 
that are provided by the servers in the Server Farm.  These servers have individual roles that 
host resources and files for developed and deployed web applications. Hence they serve as 
application containers, database servers for tenants as well as end point communication 
channels to deployed applications which can be accessed by the end users.  Although these 
servers can be hosted by physical servers, in our simulation, the web application services were 
hosted by virtual machines joined to the domain “cloud.local”. 
c) Abstraction and Operating System- This component is serviced by the hypervisor that 
provisions VMs using the VMM hosted by a server. The abstraction on our simulation build 
was hosted by Windows Hyper-V which serves as the abstraction between the Runtime 
environment and the underlying physical resources provisioned on the Back End layer.  
Layer 3- Back End:  Windows Azure Pack is supported by underlying physical resources that 
support the entire PaaS cloud architecture. From the private cloud simulation, the Back End 
component consists of servers in a domain which includes the following: 
a) Physical Platform Resources- This component is serviced by a collection of servers as part 
of the infrastructure level of the cloud architecture. The servers and their functions are 
described as follows: 
 Domain Controller (DC) Server – DC manages identity of other servers in the domain 
through Active Directory and Active Directory Federated Services (ADFS) installed. 
 VMM Server- Hosts the System Centre Virtual Machine Manager. 
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 Hyper-V Host Server- Hosts the Abstraction Type-2 Native Hypervisor. 
b) PaaS Database Management System (DBMS): 
 SQL Service Management Database Server- serves as a failover cluster as well as instances 
for Windows Azure Services and serves as database for the VMM Server. 
Figure 7.6 below shows the segregated layers of Windows Azure Pack and its components using 
the PaaS cloud Reference Model presented in Chapter 5. 
Tenant
Server Farm + Tenant  
(MySQL/ SQL Server)Web, Worker and VM Roles + 
Azure SDK/ Visual Studio
Domain Controller + VMM Server + SQL 
Server+ Hyper-V Host Server + System 
Centre 2012 Host Server
Power Shell  
Command Line







Microsoft Systems Centre (VMM, WAP) + Service Provider Foundation
Developers/ Cloud Administrator






APIs and Service 
Bus
FIGURE 7.6: WINDOWS AZURE PACK- PAAS CLOUD ARCHITECTURE AND COMPONENTS (REFERENCE MODEL ILLUSTRATION) 
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SECURITY EVALUATION OF WINDOWS AZURE PACK  
(PAAS SECURITY MANAGEMENT CYCLE: PROCESS 4, 5, 6) 
 
Security scan of Windows Azure Pack was conducted using the Microsoft Baseline Configuration 
Analyser 2.0 software tool to gather information about the security implementations across the cloud 
architecture.  Figure 7.7 shows a screenshot taken from the use of the analyser to evaluate Windows 
Azure Pack installation and configuration on our private cloud proof of concept.  
 
FIGURE 7.7:  SECURITY CONFIGURATIONS IMPLEMENTED IN WINDOWS AZURE PACK 
A clear description of security implementations found across each security domain are described in 
detail: 
D1. Identity and Access Management 
Identity and Access Management of Windows Azure Pack is facilitated with the configuration of 
Identity Providers using different security features and mechanisms. They include: 
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a. Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) – Windows uses ADFS through the Domain 
Controller (DC) to server as an identity provider for computers and users joined to the 
domain. This security is available and needs to be configured to ensure both the management 
portal and tenant management sites on the Front End trust ADFS for authentication and 
authorisation of credentials. Once the security feature is added on the DC, the portals can 
therefore be configured to trust ADFS.  This is enabled by running the respective lightweight 
command “Set-MgmtSvcRelyingPartySettings” from Windows PowerShell on servers hosting 
the management and tenant portals.  
b. Secure Token Service (STS) – Secure communication between components at the Front End 
and Middle Tier layers on Windows Azure Pack is provisioned by claim based token and a 
basic authentication to validate user credentials from the Front End to ensure secure 
communication to components in the Middle Tier handled by the Service Foundation 
Provider. Once a user (management or tenant) logs in at the front end, the portal redirects 
the user to a STS which in turn redirects the user to a login page where credentials are 
entered. 
Once the credentials are validated, a claim based token is issued which is added to the user’s 
URL and timed. It is then passed on to the SMAPI which authenticates the user with access to 
the Middle Tier layer with assistance from the SPF using basic authentication. 
The SPF governs access control using a Role Based Access Controls (RBAC) based on user 





D2. Encryption and Key Management 
Security features for encryption on Windows Azure Pack are provisioned using encryption keys, 
algorithms and passwords to secure endpoint communication and data security.  The following are 
the security features provisioned on Windows Azure: 
 Asymmetric Encryption (Data in Transit) – Windows Azure Pack provides security of the 
communication channels and endpoint through SSL and TLS asymmetric cryptographic 
protocols to ensure data integrity. This requirement complements network security using 
X.509 certificates by ensuring packets received during the communication have not been 
modified as servers in the domain during communication compare hashes of encrypted data 
received to see if there is a match. If not the packets are dropped or destroyed. The 
configuration of SSL and TLS are not enabled by default and have to be configured and 
implemented on the cloud service.   The encryption algorithm and keys used during 
encryption have to be rotated manually by the administrator and key securely in a 
configuration store secured using a machine key.  
Encryption Algorithm Use is AES with a key size of 256.  Authentication and Validation of 
credentials uses SHA 256 with a Key Size of 512. These resources were gathered based on the 
use of self-signed certificates. 
 Security of the Service Provider Foundation ensures only encrypted calls are made through 
dedicated HTTPS ports and that only such encrypted requests are accepted. The security 
mechanism used SSL asymmetric encryption on the data communication channels and that 
only authorised credentials registered on the domain have privileges to make such requests. 
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 Symmetric Encryption (Data at Rest) – Database resources in Windows Azure Pack are 
hashed and stored in rows and columns within schemas of the database server. Access to the 
database is protected using a password which is authenticated using Windows authentication 
which is preferred to a mixed mode authentication. Kerberos can also be enabled to provide 
enhanced security that is based on master keys and encrypted tickets. 
 Distributed Key Management- During installation of the VMM Server, Windows Azure Pack 
through Microsoft System Centre provides the option of storing encryption keys used to 
encrypt data on the VMM server or on the Domain Controller.  To enable distributed key 
management, encrypted credentials, VMM roles as well as VMM disk property resources are 
encrypted by default by performing a symmetric encryption on the RSA asymmetric 
encryption keys used to encrypt data. This process requires a simple cryptographic 
application programming interface called Data Protection Application Programming Interface 
(DPAPI), available to Windows Servers including Windows Server 2012 R2 used in the build 
simulation. The cryptographic keys are stored in a container on the DC which has to be 
manually created by the administrator during installation. 
D3.  Virtualisation Security 
 Disaster Recovery- Windows Azure provides failover recovery for the Hypervisor, Hyper-V 
Host and VMM Server, by provision of the Hyper-V Recovery Manager which prevents data 
loss during OS patching of the VMM. The Recovery Manager has to be manually downloaded 
and installed on the VMM Server that hosts and provisions VMs or can be automated to 
monitor any changes in the environment prompt the replication through the Recovery 
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Manager. It creates a replica of the VMs in a VM cloud in case of a failover or recovery in case 
of an outage by replicating the environment to a secondary location. 
 OS Patching- Through automatic and manual security updates on Windows Servers, 
Windows Azure Pack operating systems are updated with regular security updates to ensure 
the latest versions are installed are up to date. These include Service packs, hotfixes and 
security patches.  It requires that servers in the Windows Azure Pack private cloud architecture 
having an endpoint connection with the public internet to enable these updates to be 
downloaded and installed. 
 Third Party Virtualisation Security- Hyper-V security on Windows Azure Pack can be 
configured with security solutions such as “5nine Cloud Security” for Hyper-V. It is an 
agentless security solution that provides Intrusion Detection System (IDS) as well as antivirus 
and firewall security on Hyper-V environments. In as much as “5nine Cloud Security” provides 
security on the Hypervisor, it also supports tenant security integration to provide security as 
a services for tenant VMs. 
 Security Monitoring and Audit- Security monitoring and assessment on Windows Azure 
Pack can be initiated with the use of the Microsoft Baseline Security Analyser.  The software 
tool helps to assess security updates and settings of components within the cloud 
environment. The software has to be downloaded and then used to scan servers that have 
Windows Azure Pack components installed on them. These include the System Centre Host 
Servers that host the WAP, SPF and VMM.  A security report is then generated with a list of 





D4. Network Security 
Network Security is enhanced on Windows Azure pack through several security features and security 
configuration. They include: 
 IP Filtering – To prevent infrastructure and service level threats such as DoS attacks. The 
configuration in our simulation required setting a range of IP addresses that can access the 
web site cloud.  This also helps prevent unauthorised access through the network to servers 
in the cloud. 
 Setting Quotas- Quotas were set through the Front End management portal to prevent DoS 
attacks to stop excess traffic sent to web applications hosted in application containers. The 
process involves halting traffic during a DoS attack by stopping network traffic been fed to 
the server hosting the resource. 
 Firewall Configuration- By default, Windows servers have host-based firewalls that can be 
configured to monitor network traffic to and from servers hosting services in Windows Azure 
Pack architecture.  The host firewall only responds to inbound traffic and restricts unsolicited 
network traffic once firewall rules are set. 
 IP Security- Windows Server Firewall security is equipped with IP security feature to configure 
various connection security services to network traffic.  It involves setting rules in Windows 
Firewall with Advanced Security that detects the characteristics of the network traffic to 
protect, and the nature of the protection to be applied. It also enables the configuration of 
encrypting data packets that travel through communication channels and endpoints with the 
use of cryptography. This ensures that integrity of data packets sent through the channels 
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are maintained and prevents service level and infrastructure level threats for instance Man-
in-the-Middle attacks. 
 Virtual Networks- Windows Azure Pack allows the configuration of virtual networks to 
isolate VMs and resources within the multi-tenant cloud environment. In this way, data 
isolation is initiated and also reduces the chances of IP address conflicts as VMs on different 
subnets can have the same IP address without any network conflict and configuration. The 
virtual local area network configuration on Windows Azure Pack supports the IEEE 802.1Q 
standard that supports the tagging of Ethernet frames.  
D5. Database Security 
Database security on Windows Azure Pack are provisioned via the following security features: 
 Single Factor Authentication – All server on Windows Azure Pack which include the 
application container DBMS, tenant database and the service management database on both 
the Middle-Tier and Endpoint layers are safeguarded using a single factor authentication 
method using passwords.  The passwords have to be configured during installation of the 
database servers and have to be changed or rotated to ensure security. All physical resource 
providers at the Back End DBMS and Middle Tier DBMS are protected using passwords which 
have to be rotated or changed to provide data integrity and confidentiality.  It requires 
running some commands in Windows PowerShell command line on each of the database 
servers. 
 Backup- PaaS cloud services and resources can be backed up on Windows Azure Pack. This 
also includes VMM database, VMs, encryption keys and credentials. For website cloud 
services, the backup involves backing up the Server Farm Website Controller, Runtime 
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Database and the File Server in the Middle Tier Layer. It involves running command line scripts 
on Windows PowerShell. 
Moreover, the VMM and its resources can be backed up and restored. This involves backing 
up the SQL Service Management Database which hosts the VMM database and resources 
necessary for administrator and tenant accounts to run. However, backup has to be done 
manually as the administrator with privilege account has to run scripts on the service 
management database.  The File Server which hosts website contents and web applications 
resources developed and deployed by the cloud tenants can be backed up by running a script 
using administrative privileges to backup individual tenant files and folders stored on the 
server. 
In Table 7.9, the output from the evaluation of security mechanism and controls implemented 
in Windows Azure Pack are presented in a table. The table clearly shows the security controls 
implemented by default and also those that cloud be configured in each cloud layer. 
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Security Provision Mapping  
Windows Azure Pack provides security features and mechanisms by default, while others have to be 
configured by the administrator.  To evaluate whether the security provisions offered meets the 
customer security requirement specifications, we considered the following 4 steps which are identical 
to the mapping procedure used in scenario 1: 
 
1. Data from the classification of security provisions is mapped using the security mapping 
matrix. 
2. A bar chart showing critical areas of focus where the security offerings have been 
implemented within the architecture is generated.  
3. Mapping of security provisions is compared with security requirements mapping using bar 
charts. 
4. Security provisions offered on each layer with regards to each security domain is compared 
based on the security mechanism description and classification. 
Table 7.10 shows the security provisions and mechanisms implemented in Windows Azure Pack. 









TABLE 7.10:  SECURITY PROVISIONS –WINDOWS AZURE PACK 
Security  Domain Multi-Layered Security Mechanism Provision Security 
Level 
Classification 
D1: Identity and 
Access Management 
Single Factor Authentication + Single or multiple access control policy. Basic 1 
D2: Encryption and 
Key Management 
Endpoint to endpoint Proprietary encryption with at least 192 –bit 
encryption keys (Data in Transit). 
Authentication and Key Exchange with at least 2048-bits encryption 
algorithm. 
Certificate issued by Third Party CA. 





Host Intrusion Detection System+ Automatic Operating System patches 
and driver updates + In-built proxy firewalls. 
System log enabled. 
High 3 
D4: Network Security Network is accessible over  specific IP address pool/Virtual Private 
Network 
Remote Access to Network restricted. 
Proxy Firewall-Packet Filtering Mechanism implemented. 
Network Intrusion Detection System implemented. 
High 3 
D5: Database Security Database allocated into schemas (Data at Rest) 
All or Specific data tables and columns are stored in encrypted format/ 
Hash using proprietary encryption mechanisms. (Data at Rest) 
Data is encrypted using proprietary encryption. 
Data store keys are dynamically issued and stored within, protected by a 




Table 7.11 shows the classification of each requirement domain mapped into the matrix to identify 









TABLE 7.11: CRITICAL SECURITY AREA OF FOCUS ANALYSIS (WINDOWS AZURE PACK SECURITY PROVISIONS) 
 
The data from the mapping matrix are used to generate a bar chart which clearly shows each 
security provision in each domain and the layer of the cloud architecture. The prioritised security 
domains where security are enhanced are also represented in the chart (Figure 7.8). 
 
FIGURE 7.8: WINDOWS AZURE PACK-SECURITY PROVISIONS CHART
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SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEST (PAAS SECURITY MANAGEMENT CYCLE: PROCESS 7) 
Security evaluation and assessment was conducted in Windows Azure Pack post installation and 
configuration of security implementations using the chosen automated tools. The Microsoft Baseline 
Security Analyser and Microsoft Baseline Configuration Analyser tools were used to scan the security 
of the entire cloud service, host and infrastructure environment for vulnerabilities and threats. 
The Nessus vulnerability scanner was also deployed to explore vulnerabilities of security 
implementation and impact within the cloud architecture. 
The results showed the configuration and security implementations were configured properly in 
accordance with security principles adequate for a proof of concept controlled environment for test 
and analysis purposes. However, security threats were found due to vulnerabilities found in the cloud 
architecture.  Manual technique were then deployed to exploit of these vulnerabilities in order to 
validate the security vulnerabilities found in each layer of the PaaS cloud. A detailed report of the 
assessment and validation test is provided in the subsequent sub-sections. 
a. Configuration Analysis of Windows Azure Pack Environment 
A configuration scan was carried out on Windows Azure Pack using the Microsoft Baseline 
Configuration Analyser. Out of a total of 357 results gathered, 41 items were tagged as non-
compliant with adequate configuration settings. (See Figure 7.9).  The severity level on each scanning 









FIGURE 7.9: MBCA CONFIGURATION SCAN SHOWING NON-COMPLIANT WARNINGS WITHIN WAP 
Severity Level Description 
Non-Compliant The component does not satisfy the conditions of a  rule 
Compliant The component satisfies the conditions of a rule 
Warning The component is compliant as it is operating currently but might not satisfy the conditions 
if changes are made to its configuration or policy settings. 
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The scan results offered resolutions to resolve the security issues identified during the scan. The 
resolutions could either be excluded, fixed due security implementations which were either not 
properly configured, missing or inadequate. 
 
b. Security Analysis of Windows Azure Pack Infrastructure 
With the use of Microsoft Baseline Security Analyser (MBSA), a scan on the architectures of the cloud 
environment was conducted after security implementations were configured.  The initial results from 
the scan identified a number of security issues which include security updates that needed to be 
installed on individual servers in the private PaaS cloud simulation. These included administrative 
password issues and security updates that needed to be installed. 
Once the updates were installed, a scan was again conducted which satisfied all security updates 
were installed and security settings within the cloud architecture had been met. 
 A detailed report of the security scan reports can be found in the appendices (See Appendix C). 
c. Nessus Vulnerability Scan- Cloud Infrastructure Audit 
Vulnerability audit scan was conducted using Nessus 6.4 to scan for vulnerabilities in the PaaS cloud 
architecture. The severity of vulnerabilities were categorised into Critical, Medium and Low. The 
results were similar to scan results obtained using the MBCA.  A detailed report of the scan and 
vulnerabilities found can be seen in the Appendix C.  
A detailed security assessment was conducted on Windows Azure Pack to assess security 
vulnerabilities that could allow possible threats and attacks that could compromise information 
security of data and resources in the cloud. The assessment was conducted by exploiting security 
vulnerabilities which were exposed due to the inadequate security provisions that are offered in each 
layer of the cloud.  Table 7.13 below, highlights the vulnerabilities on Windows Azure Pack and 
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threats that risk the preservation of the confidentiality, availability and integrity of data and resources 
in the private cloud environment. 
Vulnerabilities 
Similarly, a number of non-compliant warnings emerged which showed security vulnerabilities 
within the configuration of the WAP.  
 
FIGURE 7.10: SSLV2 PROTOCOL WARNING 
Issue- Inadequate Security Control Implementation/ Security Control Defect: 
The above warning indicates that SSL version 2 is enabled by default in the configuration. 
Impact (Severe): SSL version 2 is considered an insecure protocol and could make services vulnerable to man-
in the-middle attacks and poodle attacks. 
Resolution: Disabling the protocol on the WAP Server. 







FIGURE 7.11: SSLV2 PROTOCOL DISABLED AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH CONFIGURATION SETTINGS 
Issue: Tenant SQL password can be changed by attacker with authorised log in credentials through 
the tenant portal without prompting for old password. 
Impact (High): Service unavailable to tenant and possible data leakage. 






FIGURE 7.12: SQL PASSWORD CHANGE PROMPT ON WINDOWS AZURE PACK 
Issue: Publish Settings for cloud web app download contains unencrypted credentials.  
Impact (High): Service unavailable to tenant and possible data leakage. 






FIGURE 7.13: PUBLISH SETTINGS DOWNLOADED FROM TENANT SMAPI 
The table shows a detailed list and description of vulnerabilities found on each layer of Windows 
Azure Pack PaaS cloud environment and threats associated with each vulnerability. The security 
mechanisms and controls implemented in each layer which failed to prevent the threats after 
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STS Tokens  
 
 Inadequate Security Control 
Implementation:  
 
Compromise of login password credentials 
could allow malicious attacker have access to 
the SMAPI. 







and data theft. 
 


























Core Technology Vulnerability: 
 
By default, application source code settings 
also known as publish settings can be 
downloaded through the tenant portal as it 
contains username, password and database 
connection string credentials. 
Service Level Threats- 
 




























Inadequate Security Control 
Implementation: 
 
Single-Factor Authentication- Compromise of 
login password credentials could allow 
malicious attacker have access to the platform 
physical DBMS without a strong authentication 
mechanism implemented to validate user 
identity.  






and data theft. 
 









Security Scan Asymmetric 
Encryption: SSL v2 
and SSL v3 
Inadequate Security Control 
Implementation/ Security Control Defect: 
 
By default, SSL v2 and SSLv3 are enabled in 




Man in the Middle Attacks. 
 












Core Technology Vulnerability: 
 
Key management system on Windows Azure 
Pack allows for encryption keys to be stored 
within in the configuration file which serves as 
an internal HSM for the cloud platform. Hence 
making the keys vulnerable to possible 
unauthorised access. 





















Core Technology Vulnerability:  
 
Remote Desktop Protocol Vulnerability- 
Possibility of malicious attacker to remotely 
run codes due to the RDP being exploited. 
 
 
Host Level Threats- 
 













Inadequate Security Control 
Implementation:  
 
Home web application cloud credentials can 
be edited by attacker with authorised access 
through the SMAPI. Which allows Middle-Tier 
Layer services to be compromised.  
 
Service Level Threat- 



















Nature and Characteristics of PaaS Cloud 
Environments:   
 
Since the vault credentials is stored and 
managed by the cloud customer (user), there 
is the possibility of the vault credentials to be 
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Core Technology Vulnerability: 
 
Changing of tenant database string credentials 
which can be used to access to database 
remotely. 
Host Level Threats- 
 




and data theft. 
 
Remote Code (Query) 
execution initiated 







Segregation of Windows Azure and Windows Azure Pack using the reference model from the 
scenarios enabled the identification of components in each cloud architecture.  It also enabled 
security domains that govern each cloud layer to be accurately mapped to security parameters as 
described in the evaluation framework. In the chapter, the evaluation of security provisions offered 
by the CSP on both cloud models were evaluated against a set of customer security requirements 
gathered from the scenarios. This enabled a proper audit check to determine whether the provisions 
meet the requirement specifications by comparing both provisions and requirements based on the 
data set generated from the mapping matrix.  
Results from the security assessment test exposed vulnerabilities within the cloud layers which can 
be linked to vulnerabilities and security mechanisms implemented in each layer of the cloud 
architectures. The results presented from the assessment highlights vulnerabilities which are linked 
to security domains in each layer of the cloud models. The analysis of the results gathered from the 







  ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents analysis of the results and findings from the security evaluation of each scenario 
and PaaS cloud models considered. Security audit, test and vulnerabilities assessments conducted in 
both scenarios are analysed in detail.  
  ANALYSIS 
The security assessment tests highlighted vulnerabilities within the PaaS cloud architectures which 
can be linked to specific security requirement domains and cloud layers. Results also indicate cloud 
layers where such vulnerabilities can be found which could be linked to management responsibilities, 
security mechanisms and controls used to secure the respective cloud layers. Although Windows 
Azure and Windows Azure Pack have similar architectures, the evaluation showed components within 
the cloud architectures differ as well as security implementations. The security audit check enabled 
comparison between customer security requirements and security provision implementations. It 
enabled proper assessment of each security domain and security controls implemented in each one. 
The security framework demonstrates its effectiveness in the proper evaluation of cloud 
requirements and provisions which enabled an assessment test and is linked to each layer and 
security domain of the cloud models. A detailed result and findings analysis of each scenario 






SCENARIO 1-SECURITY AUDIT CHECK ANALYSIS 
From the security classification and analysis shown in the bar charts (Figure 8.1), Windows Azure 
offers security provisons that are able to meet the customer’s security requirements specifications.  
In the Front End, Middle-Tier and Back End Layers, the sum of the security mechanisms provisions 
on each layer were 7,11, 9 respectively while the sum security requirements in each layer were 7,10 
and 9 respectively (Figure 8.1).  
The critical areas of focus as highlighted in both barcharts indicated the Middle-Tier layers for both 
security requirements and provisions. However the security provisions had a higher sum compared 
with the requirements specifications i.e  11 > 10. Findings  from the security classification of security 
mechanisms in the layer highlighted security capabilities are offered by the security provisions and 
implementations in Windows Azure. This enhanced security capapbility is managed by the CSP. 
 
    
FIGURE 8.1: SCENARIO 1- SECURITY AUDIT CHECK
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The enhanced security capabilites is found to be linked to the Database Security domain where 
Windows Azure offers a stronger security mechanism enforced through the security controls 
implemented in the domain. The security provision mechanism description is classified as High (3) 
compared to the Moderate (2) requirement description gathered from the scenario overview.   
Moreover, results and findings from the security assessment  indicated the Network Security domain 
as the prioritised security domain where Windows Azure offers high layered security implementations 
than any other security domain  within the cloud architecture. The security mechanism description 
across the cloud layers were classified as High (3). Assessment showed that this result was due to  
enhanced security  implementations across all communication channels and endpoints between 
components of the cloud architecture.   
SCENARIO 1- SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEST ANALYSIS 
Results from the security assessment test highlighted a number of perceived vulnerabilities in each 
layer of Windows Azure.  Perceived security vulnerabilities were found to be relative within Identity 
and Access Management, Virtulization Security, Network Security and Database Security domains. 
However, vulnerability validations were successfully conducted in domains D1 and D3 (Identity and 
Access Management and Virtualisation Security domains) using the proposed manual techniques 
described in the research approach and methodology.  These validations exposed the Front-End and 
Middle-Tier layers could be exploited with vulnerabilites in the security implemenations using SSO, 
WIF and WSUS security controls in the layers respectively. 
Having an enhanced security features implemented to strenghten security on these layers will 
mitigate such threats which will have to be classified and evaluated to ensure they are compliant to 
meet security requirements and appropriate compliant models. However this will be subject to SLA 
agreements and additional subscription to the service level required to meet these vunerlabilities.  
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Perceived security vulnerabilities identified in other layers could not be validated as it would require 
seeking ethical approval to conduct penetration tests in the Windows Azure cloud environment 
which at the time of this study could not be initiated.  
 
SCENARIO 2- SECURITY AUDIT CHECK ANALYSIS 
From the bar chart graphs shown in Figure 8.2, security audit check highlight the security provisions 
implemented in Windows Azure Pack did not meet the classified security requirement specifications. 
The security provision classifications for the Front End, Middle-Tier and Back End layers had the sum 
of 6, 10 and 8 respectively. However, the requirements specifications sum for each layer were 8, 12 
and 11 respectively (Figure 8.2).  These results showed that the critical area of focus is the Middle-
Tier layer, However the security provisions had a lesser sum compared with the requirements 
specifications i.e  10 <12.Security provision limitations were found in two domains  which are Identity 
and Access Management and Database Security domains. Security provisions in both domains were 




    
FIGURE 8.2: SCENARIO 2- SECURITY AUDIT CHECK 
Moreover, security requirements specification prioritised Network Security and Encrytion/Key 
Management as domains where enhanced security implementaions will have to be enforced and 
compliant. Each domain has a classification sum of 9 respectively from the prioritised security 
requirement specifications. However the findings highlighted security provisions offered, were 
sufficient for the Network Security domain while Encryption/Key Management had a sum of 6 and 
did not meet the requirement. This was due to the SSL v2 which was implemented by default in the 
configuration of Windows Azure Pack. The security control was found to be relativley vulnerable to 
the security threats which were identified in the security assessment tests. 
 
SCENARIO 2- SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEST ANALYSIS 
Security assessment results highlighted a number of vulnerabilities and significant threats in 
Windows Azure Pack security implementations.  Vulnerabilities were found across the three layers   
within the Identity and Management domain. This results highlights why the sum of classified security 
191 
 
provision in the domain was ranked the lowest from the security audit check and vulnerability 
validations confirmed the successful exploitation of security threats due to the vulnerabilities 
identified in all three layers of the cloud. 
Successful vulnerability tests were also conducted in security domains which include Virtualisation 
Security, Database, Encryption and Key Management domains respectively.  These findings show that 
for Windows Azure Pack to meet the specified security requirements in the scenario, additional 
security features would have to be implemented in each layer of the cloud. The use of the cloud 
environment would be a risk to a cloud production environment and should be relatively constrained 
to a test environment only. On the other hand, layers and components in the cloud can be 
outsourced to a CSP or cloud vendor to provide security capabilities that will enhance security 
provisions in the cloud.
SECURITY EXCLUSIONS 
Security issues that were excluded from the assessment tests were issues that were found to have 
low or minimal impact based on the simulation proof of concept. Resolution to these security issues 
and warning were excluded and were found not be have severe impact in the preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability in the PaaS cloud environment. However in a production 
environment, these security issues could be considered as minimal or severe risks based on the 




FIGURE 8.3: CERTIFICATE TYPE WARNING 
Issue: The warning highlighted in Figure 8.3 above, indicates the authentication site as well as other 
Windows Azure Pack sites such as the SQL Server, TenantAPI site, AdminAPI site, Tenant site and 
MySQL site, are using a self-signed SSL certificate within the WAP deployment.  
Impact (Low): This however indicates tenants might see an untrusted SSL certificate warning when 
they try to access the site as they may think they are accessing a malicious site. 
Resolution: Replacing the self-signed SSL certificate with a valid SSL certificate issued by a CA. 
Action: Result Excluded. No action was taken as the self-signed certificate is valid enough for a test 




FIGURE 8.4: WARNING SHOWING TENANT PUBLIC API AND ADMIN API INSTALLED ON SAME MACHINE 
Issue: The warning highlighted in Figure 8.4 above, indicates the Tenant Public API and Admin API 
should be configured on separate machines. 
Impact (Low): Admin API could be vulnerable to attack since it is on the same domain with the 
Tenant Public API which is accessible over the internet. 
Resolution: Install Tenant Public API and Admin API on separate machines. 










The analysis of the data generated from the deployment of the security framework and the security 
assessment of each cloud model based on the scenarios revealed gaps in the security posture of 
both cloud environments. Security vulnerabilities were based on various issues relative from core 
technologies used to secure the environment to the nature of cloud environments. The analysis in 
the chapter discussed the results and findings in detail and offered recommendations that could 
enhance security provisions to meet the security requirement specifications in both cloud scenarios. 
The analysis enabled security issues found within the cloud architectures to be mapped to security 
layers, components, security domains and stakeholders in the clouds. The deployment of the 
framework also proved to be effective in order to accomplish the primary aim of evaluating and 









 CONCLUSION  
 RESEARCH ACHIEVEMENTS 
This research highlighted cloud computing security management issues, challenges and 
responsibilities in PaaS cloud models. The research also discussed current related studies, security 
frameworks, guidelines and publications that are centred on cloud computing in general with no 
specific consideration for customer security requirements in the auditing and evaluation of cloud 
computing deployment and delivery models. The work contained in this thesis is summarised as 
follows: 
This research study was set out to develop a framework that was deployed for security analysis in 
PaaS cloud models and security architectures. The objectives a critical evaluation of PaaS cloud 
architectures and its components to develop a reference model which allowed the segregation of 
the cloud architecture into distinctive layers.  This segregation allowed security to be evaluated and 
assessed using a top to bottom approach on each cloud layer. It allowed PaaS cloud layers and their 
components to be assessed based on security mechanisms that are used and the multi-layer security 
architecture that makes the possibility of a malicious attacks difficult.  
The developed framework can be adapted to suit customer security requirements from high to 
medium and basic requirements, in order to enhance security requirements gathering and 
classification.  The framework also enables security analysts to initiate the evaluation and assessment 
using the processes within the security management cycle.  The collated security requirements are 
mapped using a matrix to identify critical security areas within the cloud architecture were security 
requirements vary and are represented with quantitative data. The security analysis approach 
provided a platform for gathering these requirements and comparing them with security provisions 
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offered in PaaS cloud models. The results and findings enable customers to establish whether a 
specific PaaS cloud model fits their security needs or has the capabilities to be enhanced through 
security configurations or SLAs. 
The evaluation result highlighted vulnerabilities and threats within the cloud architectures which can 
be traced to specific layers and security domains in the cloud. 
The framework offers more control to cloud customers and enables security analyst to gather specific 
requirements needed in security evaluations and risk assessment in PaaS clouds. Hence making sure 
customers get a cloud service model that fits their specific and identified security needs. 
Overall, this thesis provided security guidance, security analysis techniques using an adaptive 
framework and its processes to enable PaaS cloud customers, especially organisations make critical 
decisions based on security requirements in the adoption and choice of PaaS cloud models. 
 
 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The nature, configuration and computer resources used in the simulation of cloud environments 
made it difficult to consider more than one private or public PaaS cloud model.  Having more than 
one of these to evaluate would have subjected the developed framework to rigorous test of 
effectiveness in the evaluation and assessment of security provisions of PaaS cloud models. However, 
the choice of cloud models used is relevant and a leading provider of cloud deployment and delivery 
model across the I.T industry. The segregation technique also proved useful in the analysis of other 
cloud vendors which were considered and studied in this thesis. 
A typical scenario for a hybrid (Semi-Managed) PaaS cloud model would have been considered in 
this study. However, this cloud delivery model offers the same services as a private cloud (managed) 
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with specific services or architectures managed by a cloud service provider. Therefore the evaluation 
and assessment using the framework will be effective and valid however the management 
responsibility of certain layers and components will shift from private to public hands. 
 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The constant evaluation and review of security features and implementations to ensure they are fit 
for purpose in PaaS cloud environments requires a methodical approach. Since customer service 
level objectives and security requirements differ, CSPs must ensure security implementations can be 
upgraded and downgraded depending on these security requirements to ensure performance and 
preservation of security. 
As cloud service offerings continue to evolve and security attacks become more sophisticated, the 
developed framework and its processes provides a valuable tool in the evaluation of security 
implementations to identify critical areas within the cloud architecture and management 
responsibilities for implementation and configuration of security features to ensure adequate 
security is guaranteed.  
Using quantitative data to represent requirements gathered and security provisions enabled the 
adequate mapping and matching of security mechanisms to cloud components and architecture 
layers as well as specific security threats. It allows the auditing process to be specific rather than 
generic in highlighting critical areas in the cloud where security threats could have severe impact of 
the customer’s data and resources. The adaptive framework also enables security analysts to conduct 
tests on specific components and highlight vulnerabilities within the cloud architecture with regards 
to impact on the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer resources. Organisations can 
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use the framework to focus on a risk based approach to align security and IT management 
requirements with PaaS service level objectives. While the framework is intended to evaluate PaaS 
cloud architectures, it can easily be adapted once security requirements are gathered and mapped 
into the critical security area of focus matrix to generate output for analysis. 
In future, more security evaluations are needed to be carried out on different PaaS cloud 
architectures based on specific customer requirement scenarios. This will ensure the robustness of 
the framework which can be adapted to suit the need of other cloud delivery models such as IaaS 
and SaaS. Further adaptation of the framework is also being considered to ensure the classification 
of security requirements and provisions can be automated into the mapping matrix to generate 
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APPENDIX A- PAAS CLOUD ARCHITECTURES 
1. Google App Engine (GAE) 
Google App Engine (GAE) is a PaaS cloud serviced by Google.  It offers customers the capabilities 
and tools needed to develop, deploy and host applications using resources provisioned by Google 
on a pay as you go basis. It is categorised as a Managed PaaS cloud. 
Similar to other PaaS clouds considered in our study, the Google App Engine architecture is very 
similar and closely related in the way it functions. Its components can also be segregated into the 
three distinct layers, Front End, Middle-Tier and Back End. 
Layer 1- Front End Layer:   
 Service /Web Management Portal -This layer ensures customer requests get off the internet 
and onto the Google network to be handled by the GAE. The dedicated Front Ends take 
customer data via HTTPS requests and send them across to the Middle-Tier layer to be 
processed and executed by the Runtime Environment. To manage the Front End, GAE 
provides customers or users with a console known as the Google Developer Console and 
Administrator Console. IT allows customers to manage cloud platform resources using their 
subscription account credentials to access the console portal.  
 
Layer 2- Middle-Tier:  
 Runtime Engine + SDK- this layer presents itself with an environment where application is 
executed and deployed onto application hosting servers [123]. The execution and handling 
of application source codes are invoked by requests sent through communication endpoint 
channels from the Front End. The Runtime Environment creates instances which is isolated to 
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an individual user within the multi-tenant cloud environment.  Once application requests are 
handled, responses are sent back through the GAE request handlers using HTTPS 
communication channels or APIs. Coupled with the Runtime Environment are the tools 
needed to build web based applications. These tools known as the Software Development Kit 
(SDK) contains resources and APIs that is used to develop applications which are hosted on 
Google’s cloud platform. The SDK enables applications to be managed on the user’s local 
computer before being deployed via communication channels and endpoints to the runtime 
environment for execution.  
 Application Containers +DBMS- Web applications developed and deployed on GAE are 
hosted on application servers. These applications are supported by database management 
services where data images, files and objects can be stored.  The DBMS offer storage services 
for customer web applications hosted on dedicated servers include, Google Cloud SQL 
(Google Cloud SQL is a MySQL database that lives in Google's cloud), Data Store and 
Memcache (allows storage of commonly accessed data). 
 Abstraction and Operating System- Individual runtime engines are isolated with runtime 
environment instances that support different programming languages.  Therefore the 
Abstraction on GAE is supported by virtual instances of runtime environments called 
sandboxes. The respective sandboxes host languages supported by GAE. Languages 
supported are Python, Java. PHP and Go. 
Layer 3- Back End: 
 Platform Physical Resources + DBMS- GAE is supported and hosted by Google’s Platform 
physical servers hosted in datacentres. Supported by cutting edge technologies for managing 
datasets and creating instances for which application can be built and data stored in the 
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cloud. Database Management Systems (DBMS) on GAE and managed and powered by 
infrastructures such as Map Reduce, Dremel and Bigtable. They ensure data can be 
provisioned, stored, queried and retrieved for numerous number of virtual instances running 
runtime engines and environments.  
 
FIGURE A.1: STRUCTURE OF GOOGLE APP ENGINE [1] 
2. OpenShift Origin 
OpenShift is a PaaS cloud built around a core of application containers and Linux infrastructure to 
provide developers with a platform to build and deploy web based applications. Over the years 
OpenShift has developed and many versions of the PaaS cloud have been released. Its recent version 
OpenShift v3, is a layered system designed to expose underlying Docker and Kubernetes concepts 
as accurate as possible to provide developers with an application building platform [2]. 
Similar to most PaaS Cloud architectures, OpenShift v3 provides an architecture overview that 
highlights its architecture surrounded by service provision through network, compute and storage. 
In figure 11.2, the core of the cloud architecture runs on Red Hat’s Enterprise Linux OS and network 




FIGURE A.2  OPENSHIFT ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW [2] 
 
Layer 1- Front End  
 Service/ Web Management Portal- OpenShift web console serves as the service and 
management portal were developers and administrators can manage the PaaS cloud 
resources. It can be assessable through a web browser which sends initial API requests to 
cluster servers (containers) running in the Middle-Tier layer.  
Layer 2- Middle Tier 
 Runtime Engine + SDK- The runtime engine on OpenShift are made up of a collection of 
containers that build application source codes into images. The SDK also known as OpenShift 
Client tools (rhc) are built and packaged using Ruby. 
 Application Containers + DBMS- Application containers on OpenShift a represented by 
Linux containers managed by Kubernetes. Kubernetes, an open source platform powered by 
Google, automates deployments and scaling of application containers virtually, creates hosts 
for developed applications in OpenShift PaaS cloud. Linux containers are similar to VMs as 
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they have core allocations of CPU shares, Bandwidth, Memory and Input/output block. The 
DBMS for applications are provisioned by data store cartridges created within the cluster of 
Kubernetes managed containers. They include MongoDB, MySQL and PostgreSQL serve 
database images for developed applications.  
 
 Abstraction + Operating System- Abstraction on OpenShift is provisioned by a Type 2 
Hypervisor called Docker. Written in Go programming language the software that runs on 
top of Linux OS, it provides automated level virtualisation for the deployment of web based 
application into application containers. Control groups within the Linux OS kernel enables 
sandboxing and isolation of application containers in the multi-tenant cloud architecture. 
Layer 3- Backend 
 Physical Platform Resources and DBMS- The DBMS on OpenShift is provisioned by etcd. 
Etcd serves are database management system for CoreOS (Linux containers) which allows 
application data objects to be read and written on.  
OpenShift v3 can be run locally or on a virtual machine running Windows, Mac or Linux. It 
can also be run on a cluster of servers running Fedora or OSX. It can also be run on AWS or 








APPENDIX B- WINDOWS AZURE SIMULATION 
TABLE B.1 SERVER ROLES AND FUNCTIONS: WINDOWS AZURE PACK CLOUD SIMULATION 
 
Server Role Computer name Function IP 
Address 





VMM.cloud.local Hypervisor Manager 192.168.1.11 
Hypervisor (Hyper 
V) 
HV1.cloud.local Native Hypervisor; hosts virtual machines. 192.168.1.22 
Windows Azure Pack 
Server 
Wap.cloud.local Hosts the management portal interfaces for 





SPF.cloud.local Service Provider Foundation; provides an 





SQL01.cloud.local Provides SQL instance for hosting Windows 
Azure Pack services and VMM database 
192.168.1.11 
PaaS Server Farm Management Server: 
MServ.cloud.local 
Used by Windows Azure Pack to connect the 
Website clouds infrastructure across a REST 
endpoint. 
192.168.1.44 
Front End Server- 
FrontServ.cloud.local 
Handles Web HTTP requests from the Front 
end routes them to the Worker role Serves 




Responsible for publishing website and 
application contents to the File Server 
192.168.1.51 
Worker Role Servers- 
Worker01.cloud.local 
Application container used to host websites 192.168.1.10 
File Server- FServ.cloud.local Serves as host for website contents. 192.168.1.42 
Control Management Server- 
CServ.cloud.local 
Serves as management controller for the 
entire server farm 
192.168.1.41 
Runtime Database Server- 
WebSQL.cloud .local 
Serves as website runtime database and 
service management API database  
192.168.1.11 
Tenant Application Database 
Server- MySQL.cloud.local 
Serves as database server for hosting 
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0 0 1 0 17 18
Details
Severity Plugin
Id
Name
Medium
(5.0)
57608 SMB Signing Required
Info 10114 ICMP Timestamp Request Remote Date
Disclosure
Info 10150 Windows NetBIOS / SMB Remote Host
Information Disclosure
Info 10287 Traceroute Information
Info 10736 DCE Services Enumeration
Info 10785 Microsoft Windows SMB NativeLanManager
Remote System Information Disclosure
Info 11011 Microsoft Windows SMB Service Detection
Info 11219 Nessus SYN scanner
Info 11936 OS Identification
Info 12053 Host Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)
Resolution
Info 19506 Nessus Scan Information
Info 22964 Service Detection
Info 25220 TCP/IP Timestamps Supported
Info 35716 Ethernet Card Manufacturer Detection
Info 45590 Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)
Info 53513 Link­Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)
Detection
Info 54615 Device Type
Info 84047 Hyper­V Virtual Machine Detection
This is a report from the Nessus Vulnerability Scanner .
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